

SAFE FILE: United Nations Conference 2

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA

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MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE QUESTION OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

This Government hopes that no question regarding the Turkish Straits will be raised because:

(a) The Montreux Convention (signed July 20, 1936; signatories: Belgium, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia) has worked well, and the Soviet Government so declared to the Turks jointly with Great Britain on August 10, 1941. Non-use of the Straits as an avenue of supply to Russia during this war was due to Axis command of Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Aegean, not to the Montreux Convention.

(b) Any major changes in the regime of the Straits probably would violate Turkish sovereignty and affect adversely the strategic and political balance in the Balkans and the Near East. By and large Turkey has been a good custodian of the Straits.

(c) The Convention was drafted to fit into the League of Nations' collective security system and consequently can be adapted to the Dumbarton Oaks pattern.

This Government might not object if minor changes in the Convention are suggested by the U.S.S.R. (the Great Power primarily at interest), or Great Britain. Such proposals should, of course, be carefully considered by the Navy and War Departments.

No valid claim can be made for altering the Convention so far as merchant vessels are concerned, because, under its provisions, defensively armed merchant vessels of any flag, with any cargo, are free to transit the Straits subject to certain Turkish security provisions.

Under its terms the Montreux Convention can be reconsidered in 1946 - it would be preferable to leave all changes until then and to have them made within the framework of the Convention itself.

"Internationalization" of the Straits is not a practical solution at this time because, if that is done, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal logically should receive the same treatment. Turkey would strongly resist such a proposal.

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If asked whether the United States would be willing to participate in a revised Montreux Convention in 1946 or some other future regime of the Straits, the reply might be that we, having in mind Dumbarton Oaks, would be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the idea.

Note: Navy and War Departments concur with the above.

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January 6, 1945

GREECE

Necessity of Russian Agreement to Oppose Aggression Against  
Greece in Guise of a Movement for Macedonian Independence.

It is of the utmost importance that Russia should neither directly nor indirectly encourage a movement for Macedonian independence which aims at depriving Greece of any of her pre-war territory. Greek Macedonia, an area of 13,358 square miles, is the richest agricultural region in Greece, possessing 30 percent of the cultivated acreage and 25 percent of the forest acreage of the whole country. Without this region, Greece can hardly be called a viable state.

The existence of a Yugoslav Partisan Macedonian Army and the creation of a Macedonian Army in Russian-occupied Bulgaria are evidences of a strong movement, with tacit though not official Russian approval, for the incorporation into a future federated Yugoslavia of an autonomous Macedonia, which will perhaps include certain adjacent Bulgarian territory. Neither Tito nor the Bulgarian Government has yet advanced claims on Greek territory. However, several Yugoslav Partisan generals and public figures (Vlahov, Apostolski, and Vukmanovich) have stated categorically that Greek Macedonia and Thessalonika are to be part of the new autonomous state. Furthermore, since the outbreak of civil strife in Greece there have been reports of infiltration into Greek Macedonia of armed Yugoslav and Bulgarian irregulars.

The agitation for an independent Macedonia, a twentieth-century phenomenon which has been kept alive primarily by Macedonian émigrés in Bulgaria and the United States, represents no ethnic nor political reality, nor was there ever a "Macedonian nation" or "race." After the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey and Bulgaria, only 5 percent of the population of Greek Macedonia was Slavic-speaking (1936). The Greek people are almost unanimously opposed to the creation of a Macedonian state, and allegations of serious Greek participation in any such agitation can be assumed to be false. The approved policy of this Government is to oppose any revival of the Macedonian issue as it relates to Greece.

Although no serious objections can be raised to an autonomous Macedonian state within a federated Yugoslavia, provided that no claims are made on pre-1939 Greek territory, the very existence of a Slav bloc to the north of Greece must naturally inspire Greek fears and make Balkan unity more hazardous of achievement.

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January 6, 1945

GREECE

Bulgaria's Restitution of Greek Property and Delivery to  
Greece of Supplies for Relief and Rehabilitation.

The Germans, in withdrawing from Greece, deliberately destroyed the economy of the country. The Corinth Canal was blocked, railways and bridges blown up, port facilities wrecked, and enormous quantities of transport removed, including draft animals. Only five locomotives and forty cars are left in all Greece. The country has been stripped of livestock and agricultural machinery. Although much of the looted material has been taken to Germany, some probably remains in Bulgaria, and any delay in restoring it to Greece will make its identification more difficult. Two Greek delegations have already attempted to present claims to the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria but have been turned back for lack of proper credentials. The U.S. and U.K. Governments agree that Greek needs could be met more effectively by the accreditation of a Greek liaison officer or military mission to ACC Bulgaria, than by actual membership on the Commission as originally requested by the Greek Government.

It is to the interest of this Government that, on the basis of the Bulgarian Armistice, measures should be taken for the prompt restitution of Greek property in Bulgarian hands and the immediate shipment to Greece on reparations account of the maximum obtainable quantities of foodstuffs, livestock, agricultural implements, and transport equipment. The Bulgarian Armistice, unlike the Finnish or the Rumanian, provides for no direct reparations to Russia, nor are any specific demands included, though both Greece and Yugoslavia are recognized as claimant countries for damages suffered by Bulgarian aggression. Yugoslavia, of course, has legitimate claims against Bulgaria, but Greece has been the main victim and should, therefore, have first priority on Bulgaria's capacity to make restitution.

As Greek needs are most urgent, and as any postponement in demanding restitution and reparations would give Bulgaria an opportunity to conceal stolen property or to plead that her effort in the prosecution of the war should reduce the claims against her, it is advisable to press for immediate aid to Greece. Careful analyses indicate that without unduly upsetting her economy, Bulgaria could deliver to claimant countries within the next six months appreciable quantities of supplies, including 150 locomotives, 200 passenger cars, 3,000 freight cars, 1,000 motor trucks, 500 motor cars, 500,000 tons of coal, 888,000 tons of foodstuffs, as well as farm animals and agricultural equipment. The foodstuffs alone represent more than twice the total Anglo-American military relief allocations for a six-month period.

Although the U.S. Government is not participating in the military operations in Greece, it is committed to a comprehensive program of relief and rehabilitation involving heavy outlays of supplies and shipping. Any supplies similar to those scheduled from Anglo-American sources which can be made available to Greece from Bulgaria will proportionately reduce American financial responsibilities and release shipping space for other vital war needs.

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## LEBANON AND SYRIA

Necessity of Encouraging the French to Confirm the Independence of Lebanon and Syria and of Opposing Any French Attempt to Reassert Mandatory Powers.

Syria and Lebanon were declared independent by the Free French in 1941, following the ousting of the Vichy administration from these territories by British and Free French forces. However, the French have since tried, with decreasing success, to retain mandatory control. In November 1943 they forcibly deposed the elected Lebanese Government, but were obliged by vigorous British and American intervention to restore the situation and to take steps to fulfill their promises. Under the resultant "Catroux accords" of December 1943 the normal governmental machinery was transferred to local hands and in October 1944 the United States extended full and unconditional recognition to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, which undertook to recognize and protect existing American rights and interests. 3

The French continue to exert political, economic and military pressure by: 1) refusing to transfer to local control the native levies (Troupes Speciales - about 20,000 strong), on the now flimsy excuse of war necessity; 2) maintaining financial control through possession of the local gold and foreign exchange reserves, transferred to France in 1941; 3) failing to convert their Délégation Générale to the status of a diplomatic Mission rather than a High Commissioner's Office. There is danger that the French may not hesitate to use military force to attain their ends after the British troops now stationed in the Levant are withdrawn.

The French are seeking in particular to induce Syria and Lebanon to accept treaties giving France special privileges, including cultural concessions which would seriously injure the American University of Beirut. Discriminatory treatment was not permitted even by the mandate and we have made known to the French our opposition to a special privilege treaty (see attached Memorandum). Though our position has strengthened the local Governments' present refusal to negotiate, we have suggested that their bargaining position might be improved if they offered the French a non-discriminatory treaty consistent with their independence.

The British are in essential agreement with our views, but are handicapped by their 1941 pledge to de Gaulle to recognize the "predominant position of France among European nations" in Syria and Lebanon. The Soviets have extended full recognition and, like ourselves, regard their policy toward Syria and Lebanon as entirely distinct from their policy toward France.

The United States should seek the agreement of Great Britain and Russia in encouraging the French to confirm and respect the independence of Lebanon and Syria and in opposing any French attempt to reassert Mandatory powers.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 5, 1944,  
HANDED TO DELEGATE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT  
OF FRANCE AT WASHINGTON.

The Government of the United States has been guided in its attitude toward Syria and Lebanon since the events of July 1941 by two principal considerations:

- 1) Its frequently reiterated sympathy with the aspirations of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples for the full enjoyment of sovereign independence which has been envisaged since the establishment of the "Class A" Mandate; and
- 2) its established policy of according recognition to another government only when such government is in possession of the machinery of state, administering the government with the assent of the people thereof and without substantial resistance to its authority, and is in a position to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of a sovereign state.

The United States Government was thus unable to accede to the original request that it grant full recognition to Syria and Lebanon, made to it by the French authorities following the issuance of the independence proclamations by General Catroux in 1941, though it was glad to recognize the step thus taken towards independence by establishing Legations at Beirut and Damascus and accrediting to the local Governments a "Diplomatic Agent," a rank customarily used in the case of semi-independent States. This Government has subsequently followed developments in the Levant States with careful attention. It welcomed the accords concluded with the local Governments by General Catroux in December 1943 and observed with satisfaction the transfer to them of the substantial governmental powers previously exercised by the French authorities. As the French Delegate at Washington was recently informed, the Government of the United States has concluded that Syria and Lebanon may now be considered to be effectively independent, and is therefore according full recognition of this independence by accrediting to the local Governments at Beirut and Damascus an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the relations of the United States Government with Syria and Lebanon have been conducted in accordance with the realities of the situation. In the view of this Government, the war powers exercised by the French and British authorities in Syria and Lebanon could not be considered inconsistent with or derogatory to the independence of the States, since these powers have been freely and willingly granted and have been repeatedly confirmed by the local Governments. As to the complex legal situation, involving questions of the status of the League of Nations and of the position of France therein, as well as of the juridical validity of the independence proclamations themselves, it is the opinion of this Government, as the French Committee of National Liberation was in-

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formed at Algiers in November 1943, that no useful purpose would be served by academic discussion of these legal technicalities.

As regards "the accords to be concluded between France and the States," these would appear to constitute a question between France and the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, respectively, which would not affect the relationship between these Republics and other sovereign States. The United States would naturally have no reason to object to the conclusion of agreements defining the relationship of France with Syria and Lebanon which were freely and voluntarily agreed to between the interested parties and did not infringe the rights and interests of others. In this connection, it may be recalled that France long ago accepted the general principle that all nations should receive equal treatment in law and in fact even in the mandated territories and that France guaranteed such treatment to the interests of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon by the Treaty of 1924 and related instruments. The United States could therefore not agree that France or French nationals should enjoy discriminatory privileges in independent Syria and Lebanon.

On the other hand, the United States Government gladly recognizes the relations of special friendship which have long existed between France and the Levant States, particularly Lebanon. It was distressed when this relationship was endangered by the crisis of November 1943 in Lebanon and sincerely hopes that the close friendship and mutual good will heretofore prevailing between the French people and the peoples of Syria and Lebanon will continue to characterize the relations between them in the future.

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~~SECRET~~  
SUGGESTED PROCEDURE REGARDING THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

(SUMMARY)

The British should be asked to commence at this time to implement their existing commitment on Palestine, which is that before reaching a decision on the future of that country, they will consult all those, including both Arabs and Jews, whom they may judge to be concerned. In other words, the British Government should invite Arabs and Jews and other interested parties (specifically certain religious groups) to present their views in writing with respect to a Palestine settlement.

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The proposals submitted by these groups should be made available to the Soviet and United States Governments for their consideration in the formulation of a proposed Palestine settlement, which would have the concurrence of the Three Great Powers.

Rather than seeking (as we have in the past) to avoid all agitation, this proposal would take the position that from a realistic point of view, we cannot prevent agitation from constantly recurring on both sides. What we would do is seek to turn this agitation into more productive channels. The proposal would also take the position that the approval of the Soviets is an indispensable element in any settlement.

At the same time as we would suggest to the British that they collect statements from the interested parties with a view to conferring eventually with the Soviet Government and ourselves regarding a settlement, we would ask the British to consider an interim policy on Jewish immigration, in view of the widespread humanitarian interest in this question.

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**SUGGESTED PROCEDURE REGARDING THE PALESTINE QUESTION.**

In determining what action should be taken in regard to the Palestine question, the following are the principal factors to be considered:

1. The Department's policy up to the present time has been directed primarily at forestalling any action which would be likely to create a situation in the Near East that would endanger the war effort and jeopardize American interests in that area.

This preventive policy cannot be continued indefinitely. The adoption of a more positive policy is clearly desirable. The coming meeting would seem to be the appropriate time to initiate such a policy.

2. Ibn Saud and the heads of other Governments in the Near East have been informed, with the President's concurrence, that it is the view of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine should be made without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

3. The British Government has officially stated that it will not enter into commitments regarding the future of Palestine without prior consultations with all those, including both Arabs and Jews, whom it may judge to be concerned.

4. Soviet officials have stated recently that the Soviet Government does not favor the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

In view of the foregoing factors, it would be inadvisable for the United States at the present time to take a definite attitude toward the future of Palestine. It also follows that it would be inadvisable for the United States and Great Britain to undertake any long-range settlement for Palestine without the approval of the Soviet Government. We should not give the Soviet Government an opportunity to augment its influence in the Near East by championing the cause of the Arabs at the expense of the United States or at the expense of both the United States and Great Britain.

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It would be inadvisable, also, to discuss, or for any of the three great powers to formulate, a Palestine settlement until there has been full consultation with both Arabs and Jews in accordance with commitments made both by us and the British. It is therefore suggested that the President might raise at the forthcoming meeting the question of initiating consultations with Arabs and Jews and representatives of the three religions interested in Palestine. Specifically it is proposed that the British Government be asked to take steps to implement its commitment to consult Arabs and Jews and other interested parties by inviting them to present their views regarding a Palestine settlement in writing to the British Government.

The proposals submitted by these groups should be made available to the Soviet and United States Governments for their consideration in the formulation of a proposal for a Palestine settlement, which would have the concurrence of the three great powers. This body of material might be presented, at an appropriate time after the cessation of hostilities, to any future international conference at which a Palestine settlement was under consideration.

It is thought that the present unprofitable and increasingly dangerous activities of both Arab and Jewish pressure groups would in part be checked, if all the interested groups were to occupy themselves with the organization and presentation of proposals to the British Government with respect to the post-war settlement for Palestine.

It is thought, also, that this procedure would give the more moderate and less vociferous groups among both Arabs and Jews, who now lack the means to present their views, an opportunity to do so officially. It would also make it possible for ecclesiastical organizations with important interests in the Palestine settlement to give expression to their views in regard to the future of the Holy Land.

In view of the widespread humanitarian interest in the fate of Jews whose lives are or may be jeopardized in Axis Europe, the British should at the same time be asked to consider formulating and announcing the immigration policy which they will pursue in Palestine between the time when the White Paper quota becomes exhausted and the time when a long-range settlement of the Palestine question becomes operative.

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EXTRACT REGARDING PALESTINE  
FROM REPORT OF CULBERTSON MISSION TO NEAR EAST

The economic mission which recently visited the Near East under the chairmanship of Ambassador W. S. Culbertson made the following reference in its report to the question of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine:

"Until this question is settled it will remain a serious menace to the peace and security of the area. Moreover, the situation injures our prestige among Arab peoples. Perhaps the price the United States pays for the privilege to hold its widely publicized views on the Jewish state is worth all it costs. The Mission wishes only to emphasize that the price is considerable and that apparently the American people do not realize how considerable it is."

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## KING IBN SAUD

### SUMMARY

King Ibn Saud is known to his subjects as "The King" or as "'Abdul 'Aziz". He is tall and heavy, and must be sixty-odd years old. His beard is dyed black, he is lame, and his vision is impaired by cataracts. Although the sovereign wears the usual court attire, he is easily recognizable in any assemblage. He is surrounded by a numerous retinue, even in traveling, and is attended by a bodyguard.

Deference to the King's religious objections prevents smoking in his presence. Other than references to the women of the King's family, no pitfalls are likely to occur in conversation with him. He likes to talk about political and military subjects. He is openly hostile to the rulers of Iraq and Trans-Jordan. In his pleasures the King follows the pattern of his Prophet in preferring women, prayer and perfume.

His Majesty has risen to power as much through statesmanship as through military prowess. He has never been outside Arabia, and his judgment is remarkable in view of his lack of experience and restricted sources of information regarding foreign affairs. He speaks only Arabic.

The King is first a Moslem and secondarily an Arab. Leader of the Wahhabi sect, guardian of the Holy Places, and an independent Moslem sovereign, he considers himself the world's foremost Moslem and assumes the defense of Moslem rights. Hence his opposition to Zionism. The possibility of any alteration in his opposition is remote since it would involve a violation of his principles, loss of the respect of his co-religionists, a possible threat to his influence with his subjects, and even a speculative overthrow of his dynasty.

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## KING IBN SAUD

The sovereign of Saudi Arabia is generally known abroad as King Ibn Saud. His full name is 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn 'Abdurrahman al-Faisal Al Saud, and he is known to his subjects as "The King" or as "'Abdul 'Aziz".

He is a big man, well over six feet tall, and heavy. In all probability he resembles most desert Arabs in neither knowing nor caring about the date of his birth, but he must be sixty-odd years old.

Careful use of dye keeps his beard black. Both his eyes are afflicted by cataracts, but he is still able to see fairly well with one of them. Messages for him to read are written with special care in large characters. The King is lame in one leg as a result of old injuries.

The sovereign's dress resembles that of the members of his court: he wears the red and white checked head scarf characteristic of Nejd (Central Arabia), and, like other members of the royal family, uses gold head ropes. In his audience room he usually sits without footgear, showing gaily colored socks. His cane and slippers are brought before he leaves his chair. He is nearly always surrounded by numerous members of his family and of his court. Despite his undistinguished Arab attire, it is never in any assemblage difficult to recognize the King.

When a number of persons are with him, a bodyguard, in picturesque costume, stations

himself

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himself ten steps in front of the King, and stands there, leaning on his sword and watching every move of his sovereign. At private audiences, guards, even though hidden from sight, are always within earshot if the King raises his voice.

When the King travels, he is usually accompanied by several hundred relatives, officials, doctors of religious law and retainers. He has never travelled by air.

No pitfalls are likely to be encountered in conversation with the King. His Majesty refers details of financial and commercial questions to his advisers, but he enjoys discussing military and political matters himself.

Like most Arabs, he has a good sense of humor. To a visitor of Ministerial rank, he often makes the facetious offer of an Arab wife, in addition to any wife the visitor may already have. Perhaps he does so to others.

According to Arab and Moslem custom, the women of his family are strictly secluded, and, of course, should not be mentioned. Otherwise, most subjects can be discussed. He refers openly to the House of Hashim (the ruling family in Iraq and Trans-Jordan) as his enemies.

The King's three admitted delights in life are said to be in women, prayer and perfume. In these tastes, he closely follows the example of the Prophet, Mohammed.

Both smoking and drinking are forbidden by the King's religious tenets, and no one smokes (or drinks) in his presence.

His Majesty has much personal charm and great force of character. His rise to power established order in a country having a tradition of uninterrupted lawlessness, and was partially based on astute policy and on well-publicized

displays

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displays of generosity or severity, according to the occasion. Statesmanship contributed to his success to a greater extent probably than his ability as a desert warrior. It is entirely fitting, therefore, that the kingdom which is his own handiwork should take its name (Saudi Arabia) from the King's family (Al Saud).

His Majesty has never been outside the Arabian peninsula, and few Saudi Arabs have comprehensive knowledge of other countries. For the conduct of his foreign affairs, the King utilizes several Moslem advisers of Syrian or North African origin. He is accustomed to employ a relay of interpreters who translate for him news picked up from radio broadcasts, whether Allied or enemy. In view of his limited experience and restricted sources of information, the King's judgment is remarkably sound.

One of these foreign advisers, Fuad Bey Hamza, is often used as interpreter in Arabic and English, since King Ibn Saud speaks only Arabic. The American Minister to Jidda could be used in this capacity if desired.

King Ibn Saud is first a devout Moslem and only secondarily an Arab. He is the head of the Wahhabi (fundamentalist) sect of Islam. The Wahhabis regard themselves not as a sect, but as the only true Moslems, while non-Wahhabi Moslems are considered to have lost the purity of their faith.

There is every reason to credit the sincerity of this King's beliefs. Leader of the Moslems (Wahhabis anyway), guardian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, and a Moslem sovereign who is independent in fact as well as in theory, he, with much justice, regards himself as the world's foremost Moslem, and assumes the defense of the rights of the Moslem community. Hence, his pre-occupation with Jewish immigration into Palestine, a problem in which Moslem religious considerations are supported by Arab nationalist sentiment.

Although the King is reasonable in his interpretation of Moslem religious law, he is

scrupulous in observance of established principles. Any relaxation of his steadfast opposition to Zionist aims for Palestine (about the only question on which the Moslem world shows unanimity) would violate his principles; it would cause him to lose the respect which he now commands from his co-religionists; it might threaten his influence with his intolerant Wahhabi subjects; and it could even result in the overthrow of his dynasty. The possibility that the King can be persuaded to alter his position with regard to Palestine is, therefore, so remote as to be negligible.

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January 6, 1945

**SAUDI ARABIA: UNDESIRABILITY OF DISCUSSIONS  
ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS.**

Soviet Russia has no direct interest in Saudi Arabia. It is considered, therefore, that it would not be either appropriate or desirable to discuss Saudi Arabia during the forthcoming tripartite conversations.

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January 6, 1945

MEMORANDA CONCERNING IRAN

I American Policy in Iran

The U.S. supports Iranian independence and seeks to strengthen the country internally, so that excuses for outside interference will be minimized. Iran is considered a testing ground for U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. cooperation and for the principles of Dumbarton Oaks.

American, British and Soviet Ambassadors in Iran should be authorized and instructed to cooperate and consult closely on all questions of mutual interest. Allied wartime controls in Iran should be removed as rapidly as possible.

II Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran

We should dispel any idea in Soviet minds that U.S. officials or individuals prompted Iran to refuse the Soviet request for an oil concession. Effort should be made, however, to persuade the Soviet authorities that pressure on Iran to grant a concession would be contrary to assurance of respect for Iranian sovereignty contained in the Declaration on Iran.

III Desirability of Limiting or Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran

The progress of the war no longer requires the strict censorship now in force.

IV Suggested International Trusteeship to Operate Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian Gulf

While the aims of the proposal are excellent, the Department sees no possibility of its being made acceptable.

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I American Policy in Iran; Continued and Growing American Interest in Iran as a Testing Ground for the Atlantic Charter and for Allied Good Faith

The basis of our policy toward Iran is a desire to contribute to the maintenance of the independence of Iran and to increase its internal strength. This policy is based on four principal desires:

- (1) to carry out the pledges of assistance we have given Iran;
- (2) to insure a nondiscriminatory position for the United States in Iran with regard to commerce, shipping, petroleum and aviation;
- (3) to contribute toward postwar security by helping to construct a strong and independent Iran, free from the internal dissensions and weaknesses which invite foreign intervention, and
- (4) to develop U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. cooperation there, as a testing ground for postwar relations and a demonstration of Dumbarton Oaks in action.

This policy was crystallized and given emphasis by the Declaration on Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This document acknowledged Iran's contribution toward the war effort, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran's sovereignty and integrity, and pledged allied economic assistance to Iran both now and after the war.

Our policy toward Iran has been implemented in various ways: by the development of a comprehensive American adviser program, by American participation in the Middle East Supply Center program of meeting Iran's essential needs, by supplying the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie with the military supplies necessary to maintain internal security, and by other similar means. The cornerstone of this program has been the American adviser program, under which we have assisted Iran in finding, always on specific Iranian request, a large number of American citizens to advise them in the fields of finance, economy, public health, army, gendarmerie, and irrigation. The largest of these advisory missions is that headed by Dr. A. C. Millspaugh in the fields of finance and economy, with a present strength of some 45 American citizens.

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The Allies have a unique opportunity in Iran, common meeting place of the three great powers, to set a pattern of cooperation and develop a mode of conduct in dealing with small nations which will serve as a model in the postwar world. Since the sincere cooperation of the British and Russians must be obtained if this objective is to be realized, we should endeavor constantly to bring about allied consultation and common action in all matters of mutual interest regarding Iran. In the development of our own policy toward Iran, we should bear in mind the special historic interests of the British and Russians in that country. We should avoid the impression that we stand at Iran's side as a buffer to restrain other countries or that we have undertaken a unilateral obligation to defend Iran by armed force. Toward this end, we should make a special effort to bring the Russians and British into common allied deliberations regarding Iran and should seek their active collaboration in carrying out an agreed policy. Moscow should be requested to instruct the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran to consult fully with his American and British colleagues on all questions of mutual interest. The three Ambassadors might constitute an Allied Advisory Commission in Iran, with a secretariat, to bring about constant collaboration on matters of mutual concern.

Effort should be made to remove two specific causes for allied friction in Iran. They are: the oil concession controversy; and the continuance of allied censorship. Each subject is discussed in a separate paper.

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II The Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran and the Disturbing Effect recent Negotiations have had on Soviet-Iranian Relations

Soviet displeasure at the action of the Iranian Government in suspending, until after the war, all negotiations for oil concessions is an ominous development which should be carefully followed.

A brief summary of the immediate background of this matter follows. American and British oil companies began negotiations with the Iranian Government in early 1944 for a petroleum concession in southern Iran. The American and British Embassies in Iran were aware of these negotiations but regarded them as private commercial ventures and in no way participated in the negotiations. The negotiations seemed about to terminate successfully in September when a large Soviet delegation, headed by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze, appeared in Tehran and demanded that a concession be granted to the Soviet Government for the five northern provinces of Iran. The Iranian Government, alarmed by the sweeping Soviet demands, disturbed by Soviet refusal to discuss terms or conditions, and fearful that Iranian sovereignty would be jeopardized if a foreign government should obtain such wide and lasting control in the country, announced that all petroleum negotiations were suspended until the end of the war.

The United States Government promptly informed the Iranian Government that, while American companies were disappointed, we recognized the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its territory. We asked that, when negotiations are resumed, American companies be informed and be placed in no less favorable position than granted to any foreign company or government. The British followed a similar policy although they made no formal statement to the Iranian Government, as far as we are aware. The Russians showed great annoyance, taking the Iranian action as an affront. The Soviet press began a strong and concerted attack on Iranian Prime Minister Saed and his Government, accusing Iranian officials of being "disloyal" and Fascist-minded. These attacks and the strong statements of displeasure by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze in Tehran brought about the resignation of the Saed Government.

The American Embassy in Moscow informed the Soviet Government on November 1, 1944 of the attitude we had taken and stated that our action had been based on the Declaration on Iran signed at Tehran by President Roosevelt,

Prime

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Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin on December 1, 1943. The Soviet Government, in a reply addressed to us on December 28, 1944 strongly supported the action taken by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze, again accused the Iranian Government of unfriendly and "disloyal" action, denied that the granting of an oil concession to the Soviet Government would affect Iranian sovereignty, and declared that the concession would in no way be in contradiction to the Declaration on Iran. The note described the American attitude toward this Soviet-Iranian dispute as "unsympathetic" to the Soviet Government.

The British Government, for its part, subsequently called the attention of the Soviet Government to the harmful effects of Soviet action in Iran and has asked the Russians to state frankly their designs and intentions in this matter. The British have asked us to make similar representations in Moscow but we have taken no action other than our original note of November 1.

The situation is potentially dangerous, not only as regards Iranian sovereignty but in the more important bearing it may have on allied relations. The British, however willing they may be to make concessions to the Russians in Eastern Europe, will probably refuse to consider concessions in the Middle East, which is so vitally important to Empire communications. The consequences of this dispute, if it is allowed to continue, may be serious.

The American Government should continue to maintain the reasonable and tenable position we have taken; that we recognize the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its territory. We should stress to the Russians, at the highest possible level and in the most friendly and constructive manner, the harmful effects of their action in Iran. While British opposition to the Soviet action may be based primarily on strategic grounds, our chief concern is that the assurances of the great powers of respect for Iranian sovereignty be not violated. The confidence of the world in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be seriously affected by action to force Iran to grant an oil concession.

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### III Desirability of Limiting or Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran

When Russian and British troops entered Iran in August 1941 the British and Russian military authorities agreed upon a joint censorship arrangement under which each could exercise a veto over the release in Iran or dispatch from that country of any information considered harmful to the war effort. When American troops entered Iran in 1942, the American military authorities were invited to participate, to the extent of the American interests involved, in the censorship arrangements.

In actual practice, the arrangement has given the Russian a veto over the dissemination of news in Iran from American and British sources and over the dispatch from Iran of any news contrary to Soviet interests, while the British and American authorities have had no such veto, due to the fact that Tass despatches between Moscow and Tehran in both directions are sent over the Soviet Embassy wire and are consequently uncensored.

As a result of this situation, the Soviet authorities were able to prevent the facts regarding the recent oil concession controversy between Russia and Iran from being disseminated abroad, and even prevented the Iranian Government from telegraphing to its diplomatic representatives in Moscow, London and Washington.

The censorship has been irksome, not only to the Iranian Government but also to foreign newspapermen and civilians in Iran, who have frequently been denied American and British publications addressed to them by mail. Both the British and American authorities have complained about the operation of the censorship, but the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran claims that it is a matter of military censorship which he cannot control.

Iran is not a zone of military operations, and the excuse for military censorship there has practically disappeared. There is no excuse whatsoever for this censorship to be extended to political information. Its operation during the past two years has been a serious infringement of Iranian sovereignty and is no longer justifiable. Ambassador Morris feels strongly that a solution can be reached only through discussion by the highest officials of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R.

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Soviet control of news in Iran is an important phase of the larger question of the freedom of information in which this Government is so greatly interested. A solution would be to eliminate the veto feature and to require American, British, Soviet and Iranian concurrence before items are censored and to restrict censorship to strictly military questions. The remoteness of Iran from the war and the rapidly diminishing importance of Iran as a corridor for military supplies justify this move. An alternative would be to remove allied censorship, placing censorship responsibilities in the hands of Iran, one of the United Nations.

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IV Suggested International Trusteeship to Operate  
Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian Gulf

The Department has given careful study to a suggestion that the Iranian railways and an Iranian port on the Persian Gulf might be operated under an international trusteeship. The purpose of the trusteeship would presumably be (a) to provide to Russia an assured economic outlet to the Persian Gulf; (b) to assist Iran economically by developing transit of goods through the country; (c) to avoid more forceful methods by Russia to gain an outlet to the Gulf; and (d) to develop international cooperation rather than rivalry in Iran.

The aims of the proposal are excellent. A properly conducted trusteeship of this kind would bring advantages to Iran and to the world. The Department regrets that there are not, in its view, any feasible means for accomplishing the results desired.

No matter how drawn up or proposed, the plan would appear to Iran, and doubtless to the world, as a thinly disguised cover for power politics and old-world-imperialism. Iranians are highly suspicious of foreign influence in the country and would unquestionably resent any extension of foreign control there. The railway, built by their own strenuous efforts at a cost of some \$150,000,000, without foreign borrowing, is a source of especial and intense patriotic pride. The Department's judgment is that the trusteeship could only be imposed on Iran, a sovereign, allied nation, by force of arms.

There is little reason to believe that Soviet Russia would be interested, at least for the present, in participating in an international trusteeship in Iran in the genuine manner contemplated, particularly if it included an element of non-Russian control in northern Iran.

The British, we feel, would almost certainly raise equally strenuous objections. British policy for more than a hundred years has been pointed toward preventing any other great power, and especially Russia, from gaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf. There is no indication that this policy has been altered. If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interest of the United States, it might be considered wise, in protection of vital British communications in this important area, to discourage such a trusteeship. The British also will probably continue to endeavor to keep the Russians away from the vital South Iranian oil fields.

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The laudable ends contemplated by the proposal might be accomplished in some measure through the employment by Iran of foreign technicians to assist them in operating the railway and port. The Iranians would prefer to employ Americans or the nationals of small European countries (Sweden or Switzerland) for this purpose, if they should agree to the idea.

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January 6, 1945

India - Suggested Action for Improvement in Indian Political Situation

The Indian situation remains a festering sore, prejudicial to the position of the white races in the eyes of the Asiatics and a threat to the peace of the post-war world. While the complete failure of the recent Gandhi-Jinnah conversations support the British contention that any change in the status quo is impossible at the time, the situation continues properly to be one of grave concern to this Government.

The British have repeatedly declared that the broad principles of the so-called Cripps's Proposals represent the settled policy of the British Government towards India. As some confusion regarding the British position nevertheless exists in the public mind both here and in India, and in order that the far-reaching concessions which the British have stated they are prepared to make may be widely known, it seems desirable that a clarification of the British position, through a formal restatement of British intentions towards India, be made at this time. Points which might appropriately be emphasized in any such formal statement are:

- 1) Britain's commitment to recognize a completely self-governing India under the terms of the Cripps proposals immediately after the cessation of hostilities;
- 2) The fact that while these proposals suggest the machinery for the creation of a new constitution, any other method of procedure agreed upon by the principal political parties of India will be acceptable to the British Government;
- 3) The contention that Great Britain prefers to see India united and that the question of unity or separatism has not been prejudged but has been left for decision to the groups in India immediately concerned;
- 4) A genuine willingness of the British to facilitate at the present time in every way possible the attainment of a satisfactory and peaceful settlement. (An earnest of this willingness would be the release of those members of the Congress Working Committee who are prepared to adopt a constructive attitude towards the prompt and amicable settlement of India's problem. Among the members of the Working Committee who could be expected to adopt such an attitude would be Nehru and Azad.)

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January 6, 1945

Imperialism Versus an Enlightened Colonial Policy in the Area  
of the South East Asia Command

At the present time political policies of the South East Asia Command appear to be based almost exclusively on concepts looking to the reestablishment of the colonial empires of the European powers concerned, with the British political staff, supported by the Dutch and French representatives, formulating and directing all political policies for the area. The Chinese representatives, not being taken into full confidence, play no significant political or military part in the headquarters. Thus the United States becomes the only significant non-colonial partner of the SEAC.

Because of this partnership, the U.S. cannot avoid some measure of responsibility for the political policies of that Command, and in fact because of the existing military association, it is increasingly difficult for the U.S. to avoid becoming in the eyes of the Asiatics and colonial peoples politically indistinguishable from the European colonial powers.

Our interest in contributing wherever possible to the defeat of Japan, in providing aid to China, and in assuring a means of supply to our forces in China, as well as our general relations with the European colonial powers, appears to preclude any diminution of our activities in SEAC. It seems, therefore, extremely important to seek at once collaboration and agreement with the British, the Dutch, and the French in the declaration and subsequent operation of a progressive and forward-looking program for non-self-governing peoples. So long as the colonial powers fail to implement some such program, there can be expected from the native peoples increasing bitterness and antagonism. The United States, as the close associate and ally of the colonial powers, will share with the latter that enmity. Furthermore, failure to reconcile our objectives and interests in SEA has already resulted, according to reliable reports, in bitterness and antagonism between the American and British personnel of SEAC to an extent sufficiently serious to be a factor in Anglo-American relations.

Soviet Russia, on the other hand, appears to be benefiting by present developments. Its policies and ideologies have gained a real hold over many progressive leaders in Asia and nearby areas. The Soviet's power, position and growing influence in SEA are factors which must receive serious consideration. If Soviet Russia is prepared to cooperate with us and to support our policies towards Asia, those policies appear to be assured of success. If U.S. policies in this area are unacceptable to Soviet Russia, it is most important that this be ascertained, in order that the position of the U.S. may be properly evaluated.

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## FUTURE STATUS OF TANGIER

We are about to enter into technical discussions with the British regarding the future status of the International Zone of Tangier.

Among the suggestions that have been made is that after the war Tangier might become the seat of a Western Mediterranean Security Commission, in which the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and possibly others might participate.

The immediate problem, however, is to consider how long the Spanish should be allowed to continue their unilateral occupation of the Zone or whether they should be invited to leave. It is possible that they will leave voluntarily, though this is not probable. Failing this, the interested nations might request them to leave just prior to or immediately after the close of hostilities in Europe. In either case, pending the establishment of a permanent regime for the International Zone, we must provide for the interim period following the departure of the Spanish occupying authorities. It is being suggested to the Secretaries of War and Navy, for possible submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the possibility be explored of sending a combined British and American force to occupy and administer the Zone temporarily immediately upon the departure of the Spanish.

The attitude of the other interested powers, particularly the French, must be taken into consideration. France's interest in the Zone is of long standing and the French appear to be making definite plans regarding their post-war position there. It is probable that sooner or later France will have to be included in the discussions.

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## FUTURE STATUS OF TANGIER

The question of the future status of the International Zone of Tangier has been the subject of preliminary talks between officials of the British and American Governments, and matters have now reached the stage where it is expected that detailed exchanges of views on the various technical aspects of this question will take place in further conversations in the near future. The American Government has already demonstrated its interest in the status of the Tangier Zone, an interest which has grown out of developments in the present world conflict and particularly out of the illegal Spanish occupation of the Zone. Future conversations, therefore, will not only touch upon the question of the restoration of the International Regime and the revision of the Tangier Statute of 1923, but also will deal with the extent of the future possible participation of the United States in the administration of the International Zone.

It appears to be the consensus of opinion of the interested friendly powers that the continued occupation of the Zone by Spain should not be tolerated much longer, certainly not after the war. Accordingly, there are two aspects of this problem which should receive serious consideration at an early date. They are:

1. The introduction of a provisional, or interim, regime to take over at an opportune time the administration of the Zone from the existing Spanish administration in order to prepare the way for:

2. The establishment

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2. The establishment of a permanent international regime to replace that abolished by the unilateral action of Spain.

The question of the departure of the Spanish and the interim occupation and administration of the Zone is being taken up at length in communications to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War for possible presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One procedure which has been suggested is that a combined force of British and American troops (or, failing this, a force of British troops from Gibraltar) should occupy and administer the Zone in a temporary capacity immediately upon the departure of the Spanish. The Spanish may, for various reasons, depart from Tangier toward the end of the war on their own initiative, although by so doing they would, of course, lose all claim to the dominant position in the International Zone which they so obviously desire. While a voluntary departure is hardly to be expected, it would be unwise to fail to be prepared for such a contingency.

If the Spanish do not depart voluntarily, it is proposed that at a suitable moment following, or just prior to, the conclusion of hostilities, the Governments of Great Britain and the United States bring pressure to bear upon Spain to transfer its exercise of authority in Tangier to a High Commissioner representing those two powers (possibly in the name of the United Nations). The High Commissioner should be accompanied by a military force, to preserve order, and by such civil

affaires

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affairs officers as may be required to administer the Zone in the interim period. Such action should be accompanied, or preceded by, assurances to all interested powers that this action is of a temporary nature and that its purpose is to insure the security of passage through the Straits of Gibraltar pending the establishment of a permanent regime.

In formulating plans for a permanent regime it has been suggested that a Western Mediterranean Security Commission be formed under the sponsorship of the United States and Great Britain and such other major powers as may be interested, such as Russia, which Commission would occupy itself with all matters relating to the security of the Straits and their approaches. This Commission would assume the duty of appointing the major executive officers of the Tangier International Administration. In the organization of a permanent regime consideration might also be given to the possibility of including the administration of the International Zone of Tangier within the framework of the International Security Organization which is expected to be set up after the war.

While the proposals made with respect to the interim regime call for action on the part of the British and American Governments only, it may be desirable to include other nations in the discussions at an appropriate time. For example, it has been suggested that Russia might take part in the organization of the permanent regime to be established. The interest of the French in the Zone is undeniable and dates from the time of the establishment of the French Protectorate over Morocco; accordingly, it will probably be desirable to include the French, sooner or later,

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in any discussions.

It is not contemplated that Spain--which, with France, exercised dominant control over the International Zone before the war--play any part in the interim administration. Upon the establishment of the interim regime however, assurances could be given to Spain, and to other interested neutral Governments such as Portugal, Sweden and Turkey, that the purpose of the action taken is to ensure the security of passage through the Straits of Gibraltar and that, if they so desire, it is proposed to associate them in whatever future international administration may be framed for Tangier.

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**FAR EAST**

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FAR EAST

- 1) China
  - (a) Political and Military Situation if U.S.S.R. enters war in Far East.
  - (b) Unity of Anglo-American-Soviet policy.
  - (c) Short-range objectives and policies.
  - (d) Long-range objectives and policies.
- 2) Inter-Allied consultation regarding Japan.
- 3) Inter-Allied consultation regarding Korea.
- 4) Future Status of Thailand.
- 5) Indochina.

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POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA IN THE  
EVENT THE U.S.S.R. ENTERS THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST

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BACKGROUND:

Territory now controlled by the Chinese Communists covers large portions of North China and disconnected areas to the east and south. Reports also indicate that Communist underground strength in Manchuria is considerable. The Communists claim to have 500,000 regular troops and 2,000,000 militia. The soldiers are poorly equipped but are well-trained in guerrilla warfare and are in good physical condition.

Inner Mongolia lies between Outer Mongolia and the northern areas under Chinese Communist control. The Chinese armies in Inner Mongolia are of poor quality. They are passively hostile to the Communist armies.

It is reasonable to anticipate, or one must at least be prepared for the eventuality, that one line of attack by Russian armies would be from Outer Mongolia, where military strength could be amassed in advance of hostilities, through Inner Mongolia toward Shantung, the principal gateway between North China and Manchuria. After traversing Inner Mongolia, the Russians would have on their right flank Chinese Communist armies.

(When he returned from Chungking last spring, the Chinese Ambassador made the disturbing comment to Mr. Vincent that, in the event Russian troops attacked Japan through north China, the Chinese Government had plans which would prevent contact between Russian troops and Chinese Communist troops. However, it may be assumed that the Russians would not be deterred from making use of Chinese Communist forces by any attitude or actions of the Chinese Government.)

SOLUTION:

It is of course highly desirable that embarrassment and difficulties, political or military, be avoided in the event of Russian military operations in north China. The obvious and reasonable solution would be a working agreement between the Chinese Government and the Communists which would establish a unified Chinese military command to work with the Russian command. There is, however, doubt that such a working agreement will be reached.

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An alternative solution would be an over-all American command of Chinese troops. If Russia enters the war in the Far East, it would be highly advantageous to have in China such a command rather than a disunited Chinese command. Furthermore, it would make practicable supply of ammunition and demolition material to the Communists and would obviate political difficulties in the event of coastal landings adjacent to areas under Communist control. And finally, an American command could serve as a stabilizing influence in the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Continuation of efforts to bring about a settlement between Chinese Government and Communist leaders which would bring about united military command and action.

At the same time negotiations looking toward the establishment of an over-all American command in China directly under the Generalissimo. Institution of such a command may not be immediately feasible but the groundwork should be laid to enable smooth establishment of such a command if and when developments make such a step advisable.

In the event neither of these courses of action bring about the desired results, it is recommended that this Government, and the British Government, lend no support to a policy by the Chinese Government which might impede Russian military action against Japan. On the positive side, the two Governments should make every effort to bring about cooperation between all Chinese forces and the Russian military command in order to prevent military developments from further widening the gap between the Communists and the Chinese Government and increasing the possibility of a disunited China after hostilities.

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UNITY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN-SOVIET  
POLICY TOWARD CHINA

SUMMARY

There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. toward China. There appear to be elements among the British who, out of imperial considerations, desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period. Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China or Manchuria.

We recommend that we assume the leadership in assisting China to develop a strong, stable and unified government in order that she may become the principal stabilizing factor in the Far East. We also recommend that we seek British and Russian cooperation to achieve this objective.

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## UNITY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN-SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA

There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. toward China. At present, the British recognize that China is a theater of primary concern to us in the prosecution of the war, and the Russians desire to see established in China a government friendly to them. But the progress of events during the war and in the immediate post-war period may develop discords detrimental to the achievement of victory and peace -- detrimental to our objective of a united, progressive China capable of contributing to security and prosperity in the Far East.

An unstable, divided, and reactionary China would make stability and progress in the Far East impossible, and would greatly increase the difficult task, which will be largely ours, of maintaining peace in the western Pacific. A strong, friendly China would do much to lighten our task and to promote mutually beneficial cultural and commercial intercourse.

It is not enough that we merely hope for a strong, friendly China or that we simply pursue the negative policies of the pre-war period. We should assume the leadership in the development of the kind of China that will contribute toward peace in the Pacific in cooperation with the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. We may reasonably expect that a strong, united China will cooperate with the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. in dealing with post-war Japan.

There is now Kuomintang China, Communist China, and puppet China. Kuomintang China is being weakened by dissident elements and widespread popular discontent. Communist China is growing in material and popular strength. Puppet China is filled with pockets of Communist guerrilla resistance. A partial settlement between the Kuomintang and the Communists would not eliminate the fundamental struggle for power, one aspect of which will be competition to win over the

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puppet troops as Japan is driven from China. The only hope of preventing civil war and disunity will lie in the creation of a democratic framework within which the opposing groups can reconcile their differences on a political level.

There are reports that elements among the British out of imperial considerations desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period. The British are undoubtedly less optimistic -- more cynical -- than we are regarding the future of China but neither the British Government nor the British people will derive benefit from an unstable China in the post-war period.

Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China and Manchuria. There is nothing in Russia's present attitude as officially disclosed to us to substantiate those fears. But if Russia comes into the war in the Far East, or if an open break between the Kuomintang and the Communists occurs, Russia may be strongly tempted to abandon its policy declared in 1924 of non-interference in China's internal affairs.

It is our task to bring about British and Russian support of our objective of a united China which will cooperate with them as well as with us. The British attitude is characterized by skepticism and is influenced by a residue of nineteenth century thinking. We hope that the British, given a clear knowledge of our objective and assurance that we mean to work consistently and energetically for that objective, will support our efforts. The Russians primarily want a China friendly to them. We should give Russia definite assurance that we too desire and are working for a united China friendly to all its neighbors.

Our policy toward China is not based on sentiment. It is based on an enlightened national self-interest motivated by considerations of international security and well-being. Unless the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. are in substantial agreement with us it is doubtful whether we can accomplish the objective of our policies.

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OUTLINE OF SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES  
OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO CHINA

The principal and immediate objectives of the United States Government are to keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China's full military and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war. To accomplish these objectives the United States Government has undertaken the following measures:

(a) Direct Military Assistance to China and the Chinese Armed Forces

We are keeping China in the war by supplying war materials to the Chinese armed forces, by maintaining an effective air force in China and an American expeditionary force based in India but operating in northern Burma with the participation of Chinese units, and by flying into China a substantial quantity of munitions and war materials. It is this Government's policy to encourage and to assist, in so far as transportation of supplies permits, effective participation by Chinese armies in the war against Japan. To this end we are also engaged in training numbers of Chinese troops.

(b) Promotion of Effective Sino-American Military Cooperation

Sino-American military cooperation has been strengthened since the appointment of General Wedemeyer as commander of the China area and we hope that it will become increasingly effective. There would be advantages from a political and probably from a military point of view if an American officer should be given command of all Chinese and American forces in China.

(c) Encouragement to the Chinese to Contribute their Maximum Effort in the War

Internal disunity, economic instability (including severe inflation), lack of supplies and general war weariness are greatly impeding China's war effort.

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It is this Government's policy to support and encourage all measures designed to resolve these difficulties. Through the exercise of friendly good offices our Ambassador is endeavoring to promote greater internal unity, including the reconciliation of the fundamental differences between the Chungking Government and the Communist group. The establishment of a Chinese WPB as a result of Mr. Donald Nelson's mission should result in increased production of certain types of military equipment and in an improvement in the problem of supply. Arrangements are being completed for the shipment of increased quantities of Lend-Lease materials into China, including spare parts for industrial equipment, raw materials, several thousand heavy trucks, a complete oil refining unit and a substantial number of small power plants. Inflation in China, which has been a serious obstacle to maximum war effort, may be partially checked by such measures and by the shipment into China of small quantities of consumer goods.

This Government believes that China can and should make every effort to collaborate with us to the full extent of her capabilities in the vigorous prosecution of the war. We consider that the Generalissimo should continue earnestly to seek to bring about internal unity, that he should take immediate measures adequately to feed and clothe his troops and that he should strengthen national morale and increase popular participation in the war by the introduction of fundamental governmental reforms.

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OUTLINE OF LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES  
OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO CHINA.

SUMMARY

The American Government's long-range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives:

1. Political: A strong, stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people.
2. Economic: The development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries.
3. Cultural: Cultural and scientific cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress.

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OUTLINE OF LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES  
OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO CHINA.

The American Government's long-range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives:

1. Political: A strong stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people:

a. We seek by every proper means to promote establishment of a broadly representative government which will bring about internal unity, including reconciliation of Kuomintang-Communist differences, and which will effectively discharge its internal and international responsibilities. While favoring no political faction, we continue to support the existing Government of China as the central authority recognized by the Chinese people and we look for the establishment within its framework of the unified and effective type of government that is needed.

b. Should these expectations fail of achievement and the authority of the existing government disintegrate, we would reexamine our position in the light of the manifested wishes of the Chinese people and regard sympathetically any government or movement which gave promise of achieving unity and of contributing to peace and security in eastern Asia.

c. We regard Sino-Soviet cooperation as a sine qua non of peace and security in the Far East and seek to aid in removing the existing mistrust between China and the Soviet Union and in bringing about close and friendly relations between them. We would interpose no objection to arrangements voluntarily made by China and the Soviet Union to facilitate the passage of Soviet trade through Manchuria, including the possible designation by the Chinese Government of a free port.

d. We consider cooperation between China and Great Britain to be an essential part of United Nations'

solidarity

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solidarity and necessary for the development of China as a stabilizing factor in the Far East. We would welcome the restoration by Great Britain of Hong Kong to China and we are prepared in that event to urge upon China the desirability of preserving its status as a free port. Should other territorial problems arise between the two powers, we would hope to see them settled by friendly negotiation.

e. We favor the establishment by China of close and friendly relations with Korea, Burma, Thailand, Indochina and other neighboring areas. We do not favor Chinese domination or political control over such areas.

f. We believe that China's territorial integrity should be respected, including her claim to sovereign rights over such outlying territories as Tibet and Outer Mongolia. We would not oppose, however, any agreements respecting those territories reached by process of amicable negotiation between China and other interested governments. We hope that the Chinese Government will meet the aspirations of the native peoples of such territories for local autonomy.

g. In line with the policy enunciated at Moscow and the pattern outlined at Dumbarton Oaks, we offer and seek full collaboration with China as an equal among the major sovereign powers entitled and needed to share primary responsibility in the organization and maintenance of world peace and security.

2. Economic: The development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries. Toward these objectives we intend to:

a. Continue to give to China all practicable economic and financial assistance which she may request within the framework of our traditional principles of equality of opportunity and respect for national sovereignty and the liberal trade policies to which this Government is endeavoring to secure general adherence.

b. Negotiate with China a comprehensive treaty relating to commerce and navigation on the basis of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and looking toward the elimination of all forms of discriminatory

treatment.

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treatment.

c. Give practicable assistance to China in connection with her efforts to plan an integrated and well-balanced economy, with particular reference to agriculture, transportation, communication and industry. Such assistance would be extended at China's request.

d. Make available such technical assistance as may be desired by China, including the training of Chinese technicians in the United States.

e. Provide such financial assistance as may be appropriate in the light of conditions obtaining in China, largely through private financing and investment.

f. Promote American trade with China by all practicable means to the mutual benefit and advantage of China and the United States.

In extending such forms of support, we propose to take careful cognizance of the commercial policies of the Chinese Government and of actual conditions affecting American trade with and in China.

3. Cultural: Cultural and scientific cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress:

a. We consider most essential closer association between China and other United Nations in cultural and scientific fields. Toward that end we are undertaking in various ways to promote between the Chinese and American peoples a better appreciation of each other's thought and culture and to make available to China scientific knowledge and assistance which she needs for her development and contribution to international progress.

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## INTER-ALLIED CONSULTATION REGARDING JAPAN

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### SUMMARY

It is desirable that there be reached a community of views with the British Government on the subject of which members of the United Nations at war with Japan should participate (1) in the formulation of policies and procedures relating to the unconditional surrender, the occupation and military government, and the post-surrender treatment of Japan, and (2) in the actual occupation and military government of Japan.

In regard to the first problem, it is our view that the Big Three (or Four, if the Soviet Union is included) should first consult among themselves with a view to reaching provisional agreements on the various questions, and then should invite the other United Nations actively participating in the war against Japan to express their views. Upon receipt of suggestions thus obtained, the Big Three (or Four) might formulate definitively the basic policies and procedures and convey these to the other United Nations actively engaged in the war against Japan.

In regard to the second problem, it is our view that contingents from all nations, Asiatic as well as Caucasian, actively participating in the war against Japan should be included in the army of occupation and in the military government of Japan.

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Problem: What members of the United Nations at war with Japan should participate (1) in the formulation of policies and procedures relating to the unconditional surrender, the occupation and military government, and the post-surrender treatment of Japan, and (2) in the actual occupation and military government of Japan?

Discussion:

(1) What nations should participate in the formulation of policies and procedures relating to the unconditional surrender, the occupation and military government, and the post-surrender treatment of Japan?

The Declaration by United Nations provides that "each government pledges itself ... not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies". If only a limited number of nations actually formulate the instrument of unconditional surrender for Japan and the documents containing the measures to be applied by the United Nations as a concomitant of this surrender, the procedure might be interpreted by the other signatory governments as running counter to the above pledge. Moreover, in the Cairo Declaration it was stated that "the three Allies in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan" will persevere in the operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan. The implication in both of those quotations is that all of the United Nations at war with Japan should participate in determining the policies and procedures to be followed in connection with the surrender of Japan; but there is no clear implication that they must necessarily participate in drafting the longer-term measures with which Japan must comply after surrender.

Certain developments, particularly the issuance of the Anzac Agreement, indicate a feeling of resentment among the smaller nations in not being permitted to participate in many of the basic policy decisions of the war. It is probable that their resentment will be intensified if they are not consulted on the problems bearing on the surrender, occupation, military government and post-surrender treatment of Japan.

The members

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The members of the United Nations other than the Big Three Powers (or Four, if the Soviet Union is included) may give their approval to the unconditional surrender of Japan without having participated in prior discussions of surrender procedures. It may be, however, that all the powers actively engaged in the war against Japan will wish and will feel entitled to be consulted in the formulation of the policies connected with the unconditional surrender and relating to the disarming, control and administering of Japan during the early part at least of the period of military government.

At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that those countries which are actively participating in the war against Japan will have the major responsibility for carrying through whatever policies may be adopted. Consequently, those countries, rather than all of the United Nations at war with Japan, should logically determine the basic policies and procedures to be followed in connection with Japan's unconditional surrender.

Probably the most desirable method of reaching decisions on these policies and procedures would be for the United States, the United Kingdom and China (and the Soviet Union if it has then entered the war against Japan) first to consult among themselves; second, to reach a provisional agreement among themselves; and then to invite the other United Nations which have actively participated in the war against Japan to express their views. Among the latter might well be included Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. After receiving their suggestions the leading powers might formulate definitively the documents containing the basic policies and procedures and transmit those documents to all of the United Nations which have actively participated in the war against Japan.

As the possibility cannot be excluded that the war with Japan will end suddenly, and as the procedure outlined above will require considerable time, it is believed advisable that agreement with the principal powers concerned in regard to the matter be reached as soon as possible.

(2) What members of the United Nations at war with  
Japan

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Japan should participate in the actual occupation and military government of Japan?

It appears to be generally recognized that the major responsibility for the prosecution of the war and for military government in the central Pacific area and in Japan falls upon the United States forces. However, Article II of the Moscow Declaration, which provides that the signatories "at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy" would appear to contemplate joint rather than unilateral action in regard to the occupation and military government of Japan after the surrender or complete defeat of that country.

Various political factors also enter into consideration of this matter. It would seem advisable to impress upon the people of Japan that they were at war not only with the United States but also with the peoples of the greater part of the civilized world. Therefore, contingents from all of the United Nations actively participating in the war against Japan might well be included in the army of occupation and in the military government. Moreover, in order to convince the Japanese people that the present war is not a racial war, as is claimed by their military leaders, it would appear advisable to include in the army of occupation contingents of Asiatic peoples, including Chinese, Filipinos, British Indians, and Indonesians. If resistance movements develop in other Asiatic countries, such as Korea, Thailand, and Burma, contingents from those countries might also be included in the army of occupation.

(From the viewpoint of American interests it also appears advisable that the nations, Asiatic as well as Caucasian, actively participating in the war against Japan be requested to participate in the occupation and military government of Japan. The enforcement of the terms of surrender and the control of Japan until such time as a trustworthy government emerges are apt to be long, difficult and costly processes, which the American people might support only grudgingly and impatiently. They might bear the cost and effort more willingly if assisted by other nations. Moreover, if, as seems likely, the peace terms to be imposed upon Japan are severe, it would seem advisable that the resentment which would be aroused in that country by those terms be diffused over as wide a group of nations as possible, rather than be concentrated upon the United States.)

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The above discussion is concerned primarily with the post-surrender or post-defeat period when all of Japan will be subject to occupation; during the actual combat period forces of occupation, if required for parts of Japan, will presumably be taken from the armies engaged in the combat operations. As the same political considerations would apply in such case as in the case of occupation after surrender, it would appear desirable that, if not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations, contingents from those Allied countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan be included in such combat forces.

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## INTER-ALLIED CONSULTATION REGARDING KOREA

### SUMMARY

It is desirable that an understanding be reached with the British and Chinese Governments and depending upon developments, with the Soviet Government, on the question of what countries should participate (1) in the military occupation of Korea and (2) in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established.

In reference to the first part of the question it is the view of the Department that the problems of Korea are of such an international character that with the completion of military operations in Korea, (1) there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and military government in Korea; (2) such representation should be by those countries which have a real interest in the future status of Korea, such as the United States, Great Britain, and China and the Soviet Union if it has entered the war in the Pacific; and (3) the representation of other states should not be so large as to reduce the proportionate strength of the United States to a point where its effectiveness would be weakened.

As regards the second part of the question, it is the Department's tentative opinion that (1) an interim international administration or trusteeship should be established for Korea either under the authority of the proposed international organization or independently of it; and that (2) the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union should be included in any such administration.

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### THE PROBLEM

Which countries should participate 1) in the military occupation of Korea and 2) in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established?

### DISCUSSION

(1) Joint action in connection with the establishment of Korean independence is both important and necessary for the following reasons:

- 1) China and the Soviet Union are contiguous to Korea and have had a traditional interest in Korean affairs;
- 2) The United States, Great Britain and China have promised in the Cairo Declaration that in due course Korea shall become free and independent;
- 3) The military occupation of Korea by any single power might have serious political repercussions.

While the questions relating to the operations of Allied military, naval and air forces are admittedly of a purely military character and hence are not of direct concern to the Department, military operations and subsequent military occupation in Korea by any single state alone might have far-reaching political consequences. China would fear that exclusive Soviet responsibility for military government in Korea might lead to the growth of a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria and north China. Likewise, the Soviet Union would be resentful of any arrangement whereby China would have exclusive responsibility for military government in Korea after the cessation of hostilities. It is our view, therefore, that with the completion of military operations in Korea, there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and in military government in Korea and that such military government should be organized on the principle of centralized administration with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not

as separate

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as separate zones. Such representation should be by those countries which have a real interest in the future political status of Korea, but the representation of other states should not be so large as to prejudice the effectiveness of American participation in that occupation. An important element in American participation consists of the trust which Koreans will place in the United States not to harbor imperialistic designs. The United States, therefore, should play a leading role in the occupation and military government.

Studies on post-war Korean problems are now being undertaken by the Department and the British and Chinese Foreign Offices, based on a draft questionnaire which relates to various political, military and economic aspects of post-war Korea. When these studies have been completed, papers on these questions will be exchanged informally without in any way committing the respective Governments on matters of policy. Informal bilateral parallel discussions will then be held to clarify points of difference.

The question of which countries should participate in the military occupation of Korea is of immediate importance and should receive careful consideration because 1) at the request of the British Foreign Office, the problems of military occupation in Korea are not included among those questions now being studied in the Department and by the British and Chinese Foreign Offices, 2) the entrance of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan would result in the presence of Soviet forces in Korea which would be an important factor in determining the composition of the occupational forces, and 3) the traditional interest of the Soviet Union in Korea raises the possibility that it will wish to participate in the military occupation of Korea even though the Soviet Union may not enter the war in the Pacific.

(2) The second important question concerning Korea prior to independence is what countries should participate in an interim international administration

or

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or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established. In order to reduce to a minimum the period of military occupation of Korea and at the same time to prepare the Korean people for the responsibilities which will come with independence, it is our present opinion that there should be in Korea, following the period of occupation and prior to the establishment of Korean independence, some form of international administration or trusteeship, such administration or trusteeship to function until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves.

If an interim international administration or trusteeship is established for Korea under the authority of the projected international organization, that organization would presumably appoint as trustees those countries principally interested in Korea including the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union. Moreover, even if an interim administrative authority for Korea is established independently of the projected international organization, the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union would naturally take an active part in such an administration. The position of the Soviet Union in the Far East is such that it would seem advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim international administration regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war in the Pacific.

The studies on problems of post-war Korea have not yet progressed far enough to enable the Department to make recommendations on either the exact structure of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea, or the time when Korea should be granted independence. However, it is the view of the Department that an agreement should be reached at an early date among the principal interested powers on the question of whether an interim international supervisory authority is to be established for Korea and if so what powers are to be represented thereon in order to avoid the possibility of an extended period of occupation and to prevent an unnecessary postponement of Korean independence.

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## FUTURE STATUS OF THAILAND.

British policies towards Thailand are divergent from ours. The British regard Thailand as an enemy and it is their view:

1. That Thailand's postwar independence should be conditioned on its acceptance of "special arrangements for security or economic collaboration ... within an international system".
2. That the peninsula of Thailand from Malaya to about 12° north latitude should be considered a vital strategic area and its defense under international security arrangements be undertaken by a protecting power or by an international consortium. This is reported to be the opinion of Mr. Churchill. Such action might substantially impair Thai administrative rights in the area.
3. That actual military government will not be needed, except perhaps in combat zones. However, they believe that an Allied Control Commission should be established in Thailand, which should be continued for some time.
4. That they should not deal at the present time with any Thai Government.

In contrast, we do not regard Thailand as an enemy but as an enemy-occupied country. We recognize the Thai Minister in Washington as "Minister of Thailand" with a status similar to that of the Danish Minister. We favor a free, independent Thailand, with sovereignty unimpaired,

and

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and ruled by a government of its own choosing. Thailand is the one country in Southeast Asia which was still independent before the war. We believe that it would be prejudicial to American interests throughout the Far East if, as the outcome of the war in which we will have had the major part in defeating Japanese aggression, Thailand should be deprived of any of its prewar territory or should have its independent status impaired. The history of European pressure on Thailand and of European acquisition of territory in Southeast Asia is vivid in Asiatic memories. This Government cannot afford to share responsibility in any way for a continuance towards Thailand of prewar imperialism in any guise.

Within Thailand, the administration which first yielded to Japan and which was notoriously collaborationist has been replaced by an administration largely controlled by Pradist, present Regent, most respected of Thai leaders and opponent of Japan from the first. American contact has been established with Pradist who is actively aiding Allied intelligence work and who has expressed his desire that Thailand enter the war against Japan and that the Thai army fight by the side of the Allies.

It is the view of the Department that an effort should be made to persuade the British to alter their plans so that they are not inconsistent with our own. It is believed that if Thailand joins in the war against Japan she should be treated as a liberated country and her government be recognized, at least provisionally. Although there are disadvantages from a political viewpoint in having American troops, except where militarily essential, participate in the recovery of European colonial areas, there would be advantages from a political viewpoint in having American troops under independent American command responsible for the liberation of Thailand, rather than in having Thailand occupied as enemy territory by British forces. Whether or not American forces should be used in Thailand, however, is a question which would presumably be decided in the light of over-all strategic considerations.

Attached is a brief memorandum regarding the Regent Pradist.

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REGENT PRADIST OF THAILAND

The present sole Regent of Thailand (the King will not come of age until next September 20) is Luang Pradist, a statesman held in high respect in Thailand. He conceived the plans for the original revolution which established a constitutional monarchy in June 1932. He drafted the provisional constitution and helped in the revision of the constitution which was finally accepted in December 1932. He drafted an economic scheme for the reorganization of the national economy which was regarded as communistic by the conservatives but which has been carried out in part. Pradist has held three ministerial portfolios--Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. In December 1938, he lost the struggle with Pibul for the Premiership.

It is reported that when the Japanese demand for troop transit was made on Thailand on December 7, 1941, Pradist, in the absence of Pibul from Bangkok, ordered Thai resistance to any Japanese invasion, but the next day Pibul, upon his return, directed the army to cease resistance. Thereupon Pradist and his supporters are said to have made a serious attempt to escape from Bangkok to north Thailand with part of the army to establish an independent regime. After the failure of this attempt, it is asserted that Pradist organized a secret Free Thai Committee which became active in resisting the Japanese and in opposing the Pibul Government. It is generally believed that the overthrow of the Pibul Government is an indication of the success of Pradist's organization in gaining the active support of the Thai people.

American contact with Pradist was established some weeks ago. Several messages from him have been received. He has stated that the Thai declaration of war by the Pibul Government is considered unconstitutional and contrary to Thai public opinion; that the Thai authorities desire to oust the Japanese as soon as possible; and that they are working within Thailand for independence. His messages also indicated that the Thai would gladly furnish military cooperation to the Allies; that Thailand hopes to be recognized as an Ally and to continue as a free nation after the war; that no agreement has been made by

Thailand

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Thailand with the British or with Indochina; and that this new year will bring complete victory for the Allies, with democracy triumphant in all the world.

Pradist's organization in Thailand is rendering effective assistance to Allied intelligence work. Thai contributions in this respect and in Thai passive non-cooperation with the Japanese are understood to have been worth more to the military authorities than partisan activities and sabotage would be at this stage.

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## INDOCHINA

With regard to Indochina, in addition to the question of our relations with France and Britain in world affairs, the following factors are important as affecting our position in the Far East:

1. China is deeply interested in the security of its southwestern flank to which French collaboration admitted the Japanese.
2. China desires a free port at Haiphong and release from the economic stranglehold which the French formerly exercised through the Yunnan Railroad.
3. China apparently is continuing to give support to the Annamite Revolutionary Party, which is seeking Indochinese independence.
4. There is substantial sentiment for independence or self-government among the Indochinese.
5. French plans for the future of Indochina contemplate increased native opportunity in business and participation in the government, but oppose Indochinese self-government.
6. French and British preparations for French military participation in Indochina operations continue. General Balizot, head of the French Military Mission at Kandy, is planning shortly to assign a staff officer to Allied headquarters in Chungking. SHAEF has informed the French that it has no objection to its recruiting and training a corps in southern France for Indochina service, if it does not handicap Allied communication lines and if the French provide their own equipment. It is reported that a French group has been appointed as a civil affairs advisory section in the Civil Affairs and Information division, SEAC, to deal with questions pertaining to Indochina.
7. The United States may have little practical influence on the future of Indochina if French and British

forces

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forces are in possession of the country at the conclusion of the war unless advance agreement is reached with the French and British.

8. American influence among Asiatic peoples will suffer if the status quo ante is reestablished in Indochina. The United States, as the dominant power in the Pacific War, cannot in their eyes escape a major responsibility for post-war arrangements in the Far East.

9. It is desirable that our policies toward Indochina should be consistent with our policies toward the other countries in Southeast Asia.

Attached is a summary of French and British activities relating to military operations in Indochina.

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FRENCH AND BRITISH ACTIVITIES -  
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN INDOCHINA.

SUMMARY

Early in October 1943, the French Committee of National Defense decided to establish a French expeditionary force to participate in the liberation of Indochina. General Blaizot was given the Command.

In November 1943, the British War Office and the Foreign Office gave their consent in principle to the sending in due time of the French expeditionary force, but informed the French that formal decision rested with the Prime Minister.

On December 13, 1943, the sending to Delhi of a Military Mission under General Blaizot "with the approval of the British War Office" was communicated by the French Committee to the State Department.

In March 1944, Admiral Mountbatten gave his approval to the immediate sending of a French Military Mission to be accredited to the SEAC, the sending of a special French force to India, (its sole liaison with SEAC to be carried out with the British SOE) and the sending in due time of a French expeditionary force.

On May 24, the French Commissariat of Foreign Affairs addressed a note to the British representative at Algiers requesting formal approval of the proposals accepted by Admiral Mountbatten.

During the summer, the British arranged to drop French agents in Indochina, one carrying a letter from de Gaulle, to contact possible French resistance forces. British SOE agents were directed by the Foreign Office to have nothing to do with Annamites or other native groups in Indochina.

On August 26, Lord Halifax left with the Department an aide memoire informing us that the French had requested British approval of the three proposals mentioned, and in addition, that they should participate in planning the war against Japan and should participate in planning political warfare in the Far East. In the aide memoire British approval was expressed and American approval of the Military Mission and of the sending of the special French force to India was requested. It was indicated, also, that the

British

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British disapproved of French participation in planning the war against Japan, approved the later sending of an expeditionary force, and approved of French participation in planning political warfare "in areas in which the French are interested", this to be "a matter for arrangement between the SEAC and the French Military Mission".

On August 30, the French Committee issued a statement that "The fate of the union of Indochina will be settled according to the wishes of all the peoples of the union, between the Government of the Republic and the Japanese Government and it will be done through armed force".

In September, the French Ministry of the Navy announced that volunteers were being registered in connection with the campaign for the reconquest of Indochina.

Early in October, Admiral Mountbatten informed his staff that the United States had decided to recognize the de Gaulle Government and that, on the basis of a verbal agreement between the President and Mr. Churchill sic, the French Military Mission would be officially recognized and have the same status as the Dutch and Chinese missions.

According to a usually reliable and well-informed source, during the meeting of Admiral Mountbatten and Mr. Churchill in Cairo in mid-October, Admiral Mountbatten urged the extension of his Command to include Indochina, and that operations there be conducted by French troops with British support.

On October 22, the French Ministry of War in Paris issued an appeal for recruits for service in the liberation of Indochina.

On October 24, General Blaizot and the French Military Mission of about fifty members arrived in Ceylon. Shortly thereafter it was accorded official status by SEAC.

Late in October, the British staff at SEAC, when informed that Indochina was included in the theatre of the Commanding General of the United States armed forces in China, telegraphed to the British Chiefs of Staff a protest drafted in large part by the Chief Political Adviser.

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About this time, a detachment of 2,000 French troops who had been training in North Africa arrived in India to carry on further training. French paratroopers and other agents to be dropped into Indochina by parachute are also being trained in India.

At some time, presumably in November, SHAEF informed the French military authorities that it had no objection to the formation by the French in southern France of a two-division corps for Far Eastern service provided that this did not interfere with Allied lines of communication and that the French furnished their own equipment.

In London, special training is being given those recruited by the French in France for clandestine service in the east and for wireless operators.

On November 23, 1944, Lord Halifax left with the Department a second aide memoire urging American approval of the French Military Mission and French military participation in Indochina operations and also confirmation by this Government of a reported understanding between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo whereby either Command might engage in pre-operational activities in Indochina.

Twice during December, Lord Halifax pressed for a reply.

On December 21, 1944, Mr. Bennett, head of the Far East Department of the Foreign Office, speaking personally, but evidently voicing the views of the Foreign Office, stated that it was felt that, in the light of increasing French strength in world affairs, it would be difficult to deny French participation in Indochina operations.

On January 1, 1945, the Secretary of State was informed (1) that the French Naval Mission requested liaison between the air forces under General Wedemeyer and French resistance forces in Indochina and (2) that the French Naval Mission stated that General Blaizot would, in the near future, assign one of his staff officers to the Allied headquarters in Chungking.

A report was received on January 10, 1945, that a French group had been appointed as a civil affairs advisory section in the Civil Affairs and Information division in SEAC to deal with questions pertaining to Indochina.

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LATIN AMERICA

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LATIN AMERICA

- 1) Policy toward Argentina.
- 2) Soviet Union in relation to the Other American Republics.
- 3) British activities in the Other American Republics.
- 4) Main factors affecting present relations with the Other American Republics.
- 5) Current situation in the Other American Republics.

70-02

## POLICY TOWARD ARGENTINA

The United States has refrained from entering into diplomatic relations with the government established in Buenos Aires by General Farrell in February, 1944. This position was based upon two factors: first, the failure of Argentina to observe her inter-American commitments for the defense of the hemisphere against the Axis; and, second, the development in Argentina of a regime embodying characteristics which were interpreted as a threat to the future peace of the American republics. It has been this government's policy not to recognize Argentina until its government by unequivocal acts had fulfilled its obligations and cooperated fully in the war effort. In this position the United States has received in general the cooperation of the other American republics and of the United Nations.

Our economic policy toward Argentina is to buy as little from them and sell as little to them as the necessities of the war permit. For the past several months purchases from and sales to Argentina have been held at a very minimum. The requirements of the war now demand that substantial purchases of oils and fats, hides, leathers, lead, etc., be made from Argentina.

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THE SOVIET UNION IN RELATION TO  
THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS

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Political Relations

Largely because of admiration of the Soviet Union's war effort, interest in establishing relations with the U.S.S.R. has grown in the other American republics. Recently, fear of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the status in post-war settlements of nations without such relations has stimulated the trend. Opposition, by conservatives who fear increased communist influence in politics or other fields, or by Clericals who abhor materialistic aspects of communist doctrine, is strong in some republics.

Seven countries now maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. By dates of establishment, they are:

Cuba. October 17, 1942. The Cuban and the Soviet Ambassadors to Washington are, respectively, accredited also to Moscow and Habana.

Mexico. December 10, 1942. Mexico had established relations in August 1924, but had broken them in January 1930, primarily because of propaganda activities by the Soviet Legation.

Colombia. February 4, 1943. Colombia had recognized the Soviet Union in 1935.

Uruguay. July 28, 1943. Relations had been established by notes of August 22, 1926. Representatives were first exchanged in the spring of 1934. Propaganda activities of the Soviet Legation in Uruguay caused displeasure and, immediately because of a request from Brazil, which believed that Soviet agents in Uruguay were involved in Brazilian disturbances, Uruguay broke relations on December 27, 1935.

Costa Rica. May 8, 1944. Relations are maintained through the Mexican Ambassador to Moscow and the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico.

Chile. December 11, 1944. Representatives have not yet been exchanged.

Nicaragua

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Nicaragua. December 18, 1944. The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico will present credentials also as Minister to Managua. Nicaragua has requested that the American Ambassador to Moscow represent Nicaraguan interests during the war.

Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela seem most likely to establish relations with the Soviet Union in the relatively near future.

Brazil. President Vargas, though long opposed to Soviet ideas, has prepared the way for establishment of relations at such time as may most benefit Brazil. He has made his position known to the United States.

Ecuador. Concerted efforts by leftist elements to force the government to establish relations have been made since the revolution of May 28. Conservative opposition continues.

Venezuela. In spite of strong rightist opposition, President Medina's increasing dependence upon leftist groups including the technically outlawed Communist Party makes it probable that Venezuela will soon seek relations.

#### Soviet Activities

Political activities by the various Soviet Legations are widely believed in, in the other American republics. Nothing has been proved except that the American Embassy in Mexico received some evidence that Ambassador Oumansky furnished funds for the recent Central American revolutions. The Mexican Government is said to be so convinced of Oumansky's improper activities in that country that it is considering requesting his withdrawal. The Soviet representatives in the other American republics also maintain close relations with, and are believed to furnish guidance to, the local Communist Parties.

Extensive propaganda activities in the cultural field are carried on. The Soviet Union, and the Communist Parties, have been ably publicized as champions and practitioners of democracy and as the only true friends of labor. Accomplishments in warfare and in industry have been made well known. Technical experts have recently been offered, at least to Colombia.

470-05

## BRITISH ACTIVITIES IN THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The British, through both official and business channels, are carrying on an aggressive program in the other American republics. Through well-prepared programs of publicity and cultural relations they are everywhere working to raise the prestige of Great Britain in the eyes of the Latin American people. These and other efforts are in large measure directed to the support of British economic interests in the other American republics and the resumption of an increased trade after the war.

Generally speaking British activities have not exceeded the bounds of what any leading power might be expected to do in order to advance its legitimate interests and present itself to other peoples in a favorable light. However, there is a deep and strong underlying current of competition between British and American business communities in the other American republics, each of which has viewed the activities of the other with some suspicion and severe criticism.

With respect to Argentina, unofficial British opinions and publicity have actually taken a markedly anti-American stand. A review of press material appearing from British sources in the other American republics, particularly Argentina, reveals a strong tendency to criticize the United States position toward Argentina. Official British policy has gone along with the United States in the political field. The British Ambassador was withdrawn from Buenos Aires, and the Prime Minister criticized the Farrell regime in a speech before the Commons. In economic matters, the British have found it impossible to go as far as we have asked because of their situation as regards supply and investments. After urgent representations on our part, the British finally postponed until May the renewal of the meat purchase contract which expired September 30, 1944. The British Government has maintained however that it could not decrease its trade with Argentina, and reports in fact indicate an actual increase in both imports and exports in recent months.

Assistant Secretaries Dunn and Rockefeller recently discussed the problem of Anglo-American relations in the other American republics with Lord Halifax. An agreement was reached, later confirmed by Mr. Eden, to approach this subject at the top level in full frankness for the purpose of achieving mutual understanding and full cooperation between the two governments and their representatives in the other American republics. A good working basis for this cooperation has already been established.

470-06

## MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING PRESENT RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The military progress of the war has had a basically important influence upon our relations with the other American republics. As victory over the Axis appeared increasingly imminent, there was a parallel relaxation in the close relationships cemented at the time the hemisphere was attacked. Within individual countries political instability, which the war had tended to hold in check, also emerged. The Argentine problem has been a further disturbing influence.

More remote from the war than the United States, the other American republics have for the most part suffered from over-optimism in expecting an early end of the war in Europe. This optimism augmented the impatience with restrictions imposed by war conditions on civilian life, particularly shortages of consumer goods, of fuel and of capital goods for industrial development. The lack of adequate shipping from the United States continues to be an important factor in these shortages.

Shortages of imports, coupled with vastly increased exports to the U.S., have contributed greatly to inflation and consequent political unrest.

Anxieties over the expected decreases in purchase of strategic materials, which would follow military victory, have also contributed problems to our relations with the other American republics.

The absence of relations between most republics and Argentina has handicapped the operation of the Pan American system, and has created special problems for consideration by the United States with respect to the countries adjoining Argentina which fear her economic, political and growing military power.

At the same time the American republics are greatly interested in plans for world organization and have felt somewhat left out of deliberations on this subject. They are eager to see the inter-American system maintained and strengthened. These subjects, together with economic matters and problems involved in the termination of the war, will be discussed at a Conference of American Republics cooperating in the war effort in February in Mexico City.

A brief

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A brief report of the political situation in each country and particular problems affecting our relations with each is attached.

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CURRENT SITUATION IN THE OTHER  
AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Argentina is governed by a group of strongly nationalist army officers, influenced by Nazi-fascist methods and ideology. Civilian support comes chiefly from a small but powerful group of reactionary nationalists. The government's strength is uncertain. It is faced with widespread public apathy and some domestic opposition (including an underground movement, and Argentine political exiles centered in Montevideo) plus antagonistic elements within the army, dissatisfaction with its maladministration, and political and economic pressures from without. The negative reaction of other American republics to the Argentine request for a meeting of Foreign Ministers has lessened confidence and increased dissension within the controlling army group. The Argentine attitude toward the war and the inter-American system is a major problem for the United States.

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Bolivia has a government, largely military in character, which represents a combination of nationalism and social reform. Its elements have used violence to maintain themselves in power, thus cowing or eliminating most political opposition. The regime's near insolvency has interfered with carrying out measures of social reform. The country's economic dependence on high-cost tin production bodes ill for the post-war future, and its chronic political instability arouses concern that it might fall under influences inimical to the United Nations. The present Government is, however, cooperating in the war effort. It is one of the United Nations.

Brazil is under a personal dictatorship, run by President Vargas with army support. Much popular unrest exists because of transportation difficulties, inflation and the lack of effective democracy. The regime appears to be secure, at least for the near future, but opposition is definitely increasing. However, there are reliable reports that President Vargas contemplates early elections. Some important problems for the United States arise from Brazilian

ambitions

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ambitions to be a world power with constant representation in any World Organization. Of the leading American Republics, Brazil has been outstandingly cooperative with the United States in international relations and in war problems. The last are projected into the future by a secret agreement on post-war use of air bases. Brazil is one of the United Nations.

Chile has a democratic, leftist government. As the Congressional elections of March 1945 approach, its domestic and its pro-United Nations policies are being sharply challenged by opposition groups, who are aided by popular dissatisfaction because of the rapidly rising cost of living. As a result the Chilean political and economic situation is extremely delicate. Of prime importance for the United States are the questions of preserving Chilean economy as war purchases decline, and of aiding the government to resist Argentine influences. Chile is associated with the United Nations.

Colombia, with a democratic government of leftist tendencies, is currently rewarding liberal and labor groups for their support by a program of social legislation. The government appears to be fairly stable, having outwardly recovered from the abortive Pasto revolt of last June, engineered by Conservative forces and dissident army factions. At present government support of growers' demands for higher coffee prices is an important problem for the United States. Colombia's feeling that there has been discrimination in favor of Peru in allocating Lend-Lease, and its desire to acquire arms for the National Police, are also current problems. Colombia is one of the United Nations.

Costa Rica has a democratic and leftist government. It has long enjoyed good stability, but that is at present somewhat threatened, chiefly because of financial maladministration by the previous regime. It presents no serious problem to the United States. It is one of the United Nations.

Cuba has a government of strongly leftist but non-Marxian character, chosen recently in a reasonably free election. Some threat to President Grau's government comes from an unorganized combination of

conservatives,

470c10

conservatives, disgruntled military men, and dissident leftists, who support the former rather opportunistic "strong-man" president, Batista. Inept administration is helping to undermine popular support. Questions about the sugar crop are perennially of high importance to the United States. Cuba is one of the United Nations.

The Dominican Republic has a personal dictatorship of a somewhat conservative cast. Stability is less sure than formerly, but is not known to be seriously menaced, though there are active opposition movements at least outside the country. The tendency of the dictator to pretend that he has support from the United States and to intrigue against Haiti presents current problems of some importance to the United States. The Dominican Republic is one of the United Nations.

Ecuador is at present governed by an extremely leftist National Constituent Assembly, which in practice dominates the President. The Assembly is preparing a democratic constitution influenced by state socialism. Very fluid political conditions make attempted coups from the right or left probable, but a leftist government seems likely to remain in control. Post-war use of the Galápagos Islands is the outstanding question now under negotiation with Ecuador. Ecuador is associated with the United Nations.

El Salvador, which for a few months in 1944 shook off a conservative personal dictatorship, has since October 20 been dominated by a dictatorship of military conservatives. It has not been recognized by the United States or most of the other American republics and faces very strong popular and democratic opposition. Only army support has maintained it in power until now and its future is very uncertain. An election for President is scheduled for January 14, 15 and 16 but all candidates except the official one have withdrawn in view of the farcical character of the situation. The situation presents an embarrassment but not a major problem to the United States. El Salvador is one of the United Nations.

Guatemala has a new and authentically democratic government since the downfall of the long-time dictator

Ubico

970 c11

Ubico and of his temporary successor. President Arévalo, elected December 17, 1944, has widespread popular support. Guatemala at present offers no serious problem to the United States, but such a problem can arise if Guatemala's fear of aggression by its dictator-neighbors proves justified, and from Mexican support of Guatemala in that case. Guatemala is one of the United Nations.

Haiti is under a personal dictatorship, without any pronounced socio-political orientation. Stability is always somewhat uncertain, due basically to unsatisfactory social conditions but immediately to the ambitions of other members of the small, politically active "elite" and to hostile influences from the Dominican dictator. Haiti presents no current outstanding problem to the United States, but President Lescot's appeal to the United States about a Dominican plot to assassinate him is a recent example of his sometimes embarrassing desire for United States support. Haiti is one of the United Nations.

Honduras is governed under a long-time conservative personal dictatorship which, in spite of vociferous opposition from abroad, seems still to be firmly entrenched. It offers no problem of high importance to the United States. It is one of the United Nations.

Mexico has a middle of the road administration which in general is trying to carry on the leftist-agrarian heritage of the Mexican Revolution. It is dominated by a single party, the PRM (Partido Revolucionario Mexicano). There are many cross currents but no presently serious threats to governmental stability. There are important pending problems with the United States but there is every prospect of mutually satisfactory solutions of all of them. Mexico is one of the United Nations.

970-12

Nicaragua is under a long-time personal and reasonably benevolent dictatorship. Growing popular pressure has caused the dictator to enact social legislation and to renounce his intentions of succeeding himself. His government appears reasonably stable and presents no serious problem to the United States. Nicaragua is one of the United Nations.

Panama has a government of currently anomalous character.

President De La Guardia took power on October 9, 1941, under circumstances sometimes interpreted as a coup. The Assembly long refrained from electing the Designates to the Presidency who might have been able to replace him, but planned to do so on January 2, 1945. In view of this situation, and of the possible return from Argentina of his displaced predecessor, on December 29, 1944 the President suspended the greater part of the constitution. He promised to hold elections in May for delegates to a Constituent Assembly. Stability of his regime remains uncertain. The chief problems which Panama offers to the United States arise from its complaints that the latter practises race discrimination and permits commercial abuses in the Canal Zone. Panama is one of the United Nations.

Paraguay is under a dictator who has remained in power over four years by balancing the pressures of a small group of powerful, totalitarian-minded army officers against those of democratically-inclined military, civilians, students, and workers. Influence of the former element has been difficult to reduce because of the danger of Argentina supporting that group. Stability of the regime has increased to the point where Morfnigo has instituted preliminary democratic reforms while reinforcing his policy of supporting the Allied war effort. Recently he has stiffened toward Argentina, notwithstanding Paraguay's acute economic dependence on that country. Paraguay's need of aid in resisting Argentine pressures is its most important problem for the United States. It is associated with the United Nations.

Peru is governed by an extremely conservative civilian, Catholic and military oligarchy, which, though observing constitutional forms, has outlawed its potentially powerful political opponents, including the Communist Party and the left-liberal Apristas. The election scheduled for June 10, 1945 has caused increasing tension, and some possibility exists of a social revolution comparable to that which has occurred in Mexico, but on the whole Peru appears stable. It presents no high problems to the United States. It is associated with the United Nations.

Uruguay has a democratic government representing a coalition of liberal and leftist parties. Normal political maneuvering among parties in the Congress and between

Congress and the Administration has produced stresses, but fundamental political stability persists. Danger of an opposition coalition of rightest pro-Argentine parties has recently resulted in closer collaboration between the legislative majority and the executive and at least temporarily in a more efficient administration. Uruguay depends vitally on United States aid against Argentine pressures. It is associated with the United Nations.

Venezuela possesses a liberal-leftist government, dedicated to a program of social legislation designed to improve the status of the laboring classes. With support from moderates as well as from the Communist Party and from labor as a whole, the government seems stable. There are no problems of high importance to the United States. Venezuela is associated with the United Nations.

470 c14

SAFE FILE: War Department

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR  
STATISTICS BRANCH

Oct. 28, 1939

File No.	SB-1740-1
Subject:	Weekly Report No. 5
	Chief of Air Corps
	Chief of C.W.S.
	Chief of C.A.C.
	Chief of Engineers
	Surgeon General
	Chief of Ordnance
	Quartermaster General
	Chief Signal Officer
	Lt. Col. C. H. Tenney
	<b>SECRET</b>
REMARKS:	
Weekly Report of Oct. 26, 1939	
Statistical Reports Nos. A, B, C, D, E	
M, 01, 02, 03, 01, 02, 4-8-17-40	
B-1000-1000-1000-1000-1000	
To Be Returned	
By 19	
Received C.N.T.	

Please Sign both slips.


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16  
A.C.

a71c.03

# AIRPLANES

PROGRAM TO JUNE 30, 1941\*



U.S. AIR FORCE LIBRARY

6200.9 (9/27/58)

SECRET

\* TOTAL PROGRAM - 6132

INCLUDES OBSOLETE AND EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANES.  
ALSO SUBJECT TO REDUCTION BY LOSSES.

a71a04

STATISTICAL REPORT NO. A-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: A.C., P.R.



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COAST ARTILLERY CORPS

**Negative Report**



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C.W.S.

a71a07


CHEMICAL  
WARFARE

## STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.

~~SECRET~~

STATISTICAL REPORT NO. C-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: C.W.S., P.R.


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## CORPS OF ENGINEERS

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.



## P.M.P. PROGRAM

ON COMPLETION  
OF CURRENT  
PROGRAMP.M.P.  
REQ.

## CURRENT PROCUREMENT

ACCEPTED  
DELIVERIESSCHEDULED  
DELIVERIESUNDER  
CONTRACTON  
PROPOSAL

SECRET

STATISTICAL REPORT NO E-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939.  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: O.C.E.P.R.

\* INCLUDING 108 UNITS FOR SEACOAST DEFENSE, MARINE CORPS, ETC., IN ADDITION  
TO MOBILE ARMY REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE P.M.P.

a71a10




a71 all


## MEDICAL

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939

## P.M.P PROGRAM



#### CURRENT PROCUREMENT



8532	FORCEPS, HEMOSTATIC	461	7239	7-1-40
60,727			12,300	
15,320	SCISSORS, BANDAGE	3000	9300	3-1-40
19,792			10,100	
10,906	SPLINTS,ARM			4-10-40
19,792			10,100	
10,627	SPLINTS,LEG			4-10-40
152,838			32,000	
32,546	KITS,CANTLE RING STRAP.	1600	30,400	2-20-40
141,216			31,000	
32,222	KITS,LITTER STRAP	7775	23,225	2-20-40
152,713			26,000	
29,054	KITS,POUCH, CANVAS	10,000	18,000	2-20-40
72,999			13,300	
13,892	KITS,SUSPENDER			2-20-40
792			300	
366	CARRIER,FIELD, COLLAPSIBLE			
3042			2030	
2620	CHEST,FIELD, MODIFIED			2-20-40

## P.M.P PROGRAM

A small square containing a diagonal hatching pattern, used as a section identifier.

### ON COMPLETION OF CURRENT PROGRAM

PMR  
REC.

#### CURRENT PROCUREMENT

ACCEPTED  
DELIVERIES

**SCHEDULED  
DELIVERIES**

UNDER  
CONTRACT

PENDING

SECRET

STATISTICAL REPORT NO M-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
OASW  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: MED.PR.

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



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




ORDNANCE  
SMALL ARMS

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.

P.M.P. PROGRAM



CURRENT PROCUREMENT



P.M.P. PROGRAM

ON COMPLETION  
OF CURRENT  
PROGRAM

P.M.P.  
REQ.

CURRENT PROCUREMENT

ACCEPTED  
DELIVERIES

BEHIND  
SCHEDULE

UNDER  
CONTRACT

PENDING

SECRET

STATISTICAL REPORT NO. 01-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: ORD.P.R.

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(89/28/0) 0-0059-1


## ORDNANCE

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939

FORTRESS IN D. PROGRESSIVE LIBRARY

## P.M.P. PROGRAM

## CURRENT PROCUREMENT



P.M.P. PROGRAM  
 ON COMPLETION OF CURRENT PROGRAM  
 P.M.P. REQ.

CURRENT PROCUREMENT  
 ACCEPTED DELIVERIES  
 BEHIND SCHEDULE  
 UNDER CONTRACT  
 PENDING

-SEGREG-

STATISTICAL REPORT NO. 02-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: ORD.P.R.


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ORDNANCE  
E. A. MATERIEL



THE LIBRARY

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.

## P.M.P. PROGRAM



#### CURRENT PROCUREMENT



### R.M.P. PROGRAM

ON COMPLETION  
OF CURRENT

P.M.P.  
REQ

#### CURRENT PROCUREMENT


ACCEPTED  
DELIVERIES

**UNDER  
CONTRACT**

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STATISTICAL REPORT NO. 03-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: ORD.P.R.


g7lab



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Q.M.C.  
MOTOR VEHICLES

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939



UNDER  
CONTRACT

ON  
PROPOSAL

PENDING

SECRET


STATISTICAL REPORT NO. Q1-17-4  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: QMC, PR.

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Q.M.C.  
CRITICAL ITEMS

(02/28/61) 6-2028  
PROHIBITION, ROUNDABOUT LIFEBOAT

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.



\* IN ADDITION 7000 SUBSTITUTE STANDARD RANGES ARE AVAILABLE

SECRET

STATISTICAL REPORT NO Q2-17-40 21 OCTOBER 1939 O.A.S.W. STATISTICS BRANCH SOURCE: Q.M.C.P.R.
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
P  
SIG.

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# SIGNAL CORPS

## STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.

### CURRENT PROCUREMENT



██████████  
ACCEPTED  
DELIVERIES

██████████  
SCHEDULED  
DELIVERIES

██████████  
UNDER  
CONTRACT

██████████  
ON  
PROPOSAL

██████████  
PENDING

-SECRET

STATISTICAL REPORT NO S-17-40  
26 OCTOBER 1939  
O.A.S.W.  
STATISTICS BRANCH  
SOURCE: SIG. C, PR.

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OCT 21 1939  
60-1700 (2/27/53)  
OCT 21 1939

a71a21

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1937.

*J. R.  
Seargent Please  
fit everything ready for  
me in my return*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
The attached joint War and Navy  
report on espionage was forwarded to me  
with pencil memorandum to call it to  
The President's attention.

Since then the following memo-  
randum from the Secretary of War has been  
prepared, with the suggestion that the  
data contained therein be distributed to  
the State, Treasury, Justice, Labor and  
Interior Departments.

Respectfully,

*E.M. Watson*  
E.M. WATSON,  
Lieut. Colonel, F. A.  
Military Aide to The President.

Incl.

a 71 b01

SP 100-22  
2-2-67  
August 5, 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR: **UNCLASSIFIED**

The President requests me to advise that General Douglas MacArthur be informed that his services in the Philippines shall terminate upon the conclusion of a two year tour of duty there; that the General is needed for service in the United States; that the General be acquainted with post commands which he may be assigned at the time of his return to active duty in the United States; and that he be given his preference of such posts as may be available at that time. As a further consideration, in the event the General prefers some Corps Area or other command which may not be open, at that time, the President is willing that the War Department work out such transfer of officers as may be necessary to permit General MacArthur to take over the post he most desires.

The President has noted the contents of the confidential letter addressed by Brigadier General Conley to General Douglas MacArthur, under date of September 18, 1935. He directs that such portions of this letter or of existing War Department orders as conflict with the above request shall be nullified, i.e. "x x x limit of time of foreign service is waived in your case" etc.

STEPHEN EARLY  
Secretary to the President

STG } Little memo from Craig on this  
in Miss Lefland's Christopher files.

a71c01

*Pls. keep this in  
your War*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 15, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL CRAIG

Will you speak to me about  
the possibility of some useful  
employment for Major General Frank  
Parker?

F. D. R.

*REGD MAIL*  
UNCLASSIFIED

a71d01

Safe: War Dept  
PSF

For the President -

*EMW*  
E.M.W.

November 14, 1939

Dear Pa,

Here is Report No. 5, for the President, covering "Foreign Inquiries for Production of Munitions".

Sincerely yours,

*James T. Hersey*

General E. M. Watson  
Secretary to the President  
The White House

Enclosure

a71e01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD  
MUNITIONS BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Report No. 5.

November 14, 1939.

MEMORANDUM For The Assistant Secretary of War:

SUBJECT: Foreign Inquiries for Production of Munitions.

1. In accordance with instructions to submit from time to time brief reports on foreign inquiries for military equipment, the following notes are made:

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

The Naval Attaché of Argentine Republic (Captain Godoy) stated in a letter to Mr. James W. Young, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, that because of the war situation and diminution of sources of supply from Europe, he desired to obtain a list of approximately ten plants for each of a list of types of material furnished with the letter.

The items in which he is interested include steel, copper, brass, oil, refractories, machinery, electrical equipment, woodworking equipment, fabricated rubber, aluminum and zinc. The Department of Commerce furnished him a list of outstanding sources for these items.

BRAZIL

The Brazilian Government has ordered 60 searchlights from the Sperry Gyroscope Company.

An inquiry has been received from Mr. Sidney Mashbir, a former officer of the Army who is now agent for several manufacturers in this country. It seems that Mr. Mashbir has been approached by the Brazilian Government to procure forging and machining equipment for 75 mm and 105 mm shell, and machinery for the manufacture of gun tubes of the calibers noted above. He stated that the equipment desired was originally ordered from Rheinmetall in Germany and that the order has been cancelled by the Brazilians.

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003 WIL 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Among other things, he desired to have an Ordnance officer detailed to inspect and install the machinery. It was stated to him that these requests should be transmitted by the Brazilian Government to the State Department, and that the detail of an Ordnance officer would have to be taken up with the Chief of Staff.

CANADA

Dr. Riddell, Counsellor of the Legation, presented a memorandum asking for permission to use designs of certain Naval searchlights in the Canadian affiliates of the Westinghouse and General Electric Companies. This request was referred to the Navy Department. It is noted that the Canadians desire to produce an American naval design in Canadian plants. Decision has not yet been received from the Navy Department.

Various newspaper reports have indicated that orders for training airplanes will be placed by Canada, but the Committee has not received any recent inquiries for airplanes of this type.

CHILE

Information has been received that Major Marin-Carmona, Secretary of the Army Armament Commission of Chile, is on his way to the United States to contact American manufacturers concerning the supply of armament to his government. It will be recalled that there was a previous inquiry from the Chilean Embassy but that nothing came of it.

CHINA

The State Department advised us that China Airmotive Company (Mr. Patterson) is having difficulty in obtaining aluminum for shipment to China. After consultation with the Division of Controls, the State Department sent a telegram to the China Airmotive Company stating that there is no legal restriction on the export of aluminum and that the State Department has had no communication with the Aluminum Company of America in regard to this matter.

FINLAND

The Signal Corps is in active cooperation with the Finnish Military Attaché in suggesting sources of supply for items of Signal Corps equipment which have been released for export, and a list of firms who manufacture the components of Army sets has been prepared.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Finnish Attaché has also advised the Committee that a firm of brokers in New York has offered him 37 Pratt & Whitney twin Wasp engines, 24 Pratt & Whitney Junior Wasp engines, and 22 2-place Bellanca airplanes. From what can be ascertained, this offer is for new equipment which was originally produced for the Spanish Nationalists and the brokers are evidently trying to sell it to the highest bidder.

In this connection, it is desired to point out that the Legation of Finland has kept the Committee fully informed on all of its activities.

FRANCE

A list of possible sources for gun tubes, small arms, small arms ammunition and fuze components was furnished to the French Attaché. France is also inquiring of the McQuay-Norris Manufacturing Company for 1,000,000 20 mm shell and 2,000,000 25 mm shell. The officials of the company have been in to see the Committee and have requested certain assistance on specifications of corresponding American shell. It seems probable that if this company accepts the order it will install screw machines at a slight additional cost which will be entirely suitable for the production of our own 37 mm shell.

The Bethlehem Steel Company has inquired whether there is any objection to acceptance of an educational order for 90 mm gun forgings from the French. The Committee has encouraged this order since an American 90 mm gun is now under development and the creating of facilities at Bethlehem will be to our advantage.

An informal inquiry has been received whether we would release the Garand rifle to the French and if so what size order would be required. There seems to be no objection to the release of this design if an order for at least 50,000 rifles is placed.

The French are buying horses and automotive equipment in considerable quantities.

A firm in New Bedford, Massachusetts, which can make gas masks, has been approached by the French with a view to an order for gas masks with a fully molded rubber facepiece. This is the type of facepiece which our own Chemical Warfare Service would like to see developed, and encouragement has been given to the commercial firm to go ahead with the order if offered to them.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PORTUGAL

The Minister from Portugal has requested the advice of the Committee concerning the supply of certain fixed coastal defense armament. His request was for eight 6" batteries of 2 guns each and four 9" batteries of two guns each, together with other ammunition and equipment. An estimated cost has been given to the Minister and a preliminary analysis of the problem provided for transmittal to his government.

RUMANIA

The Rumanian Minister visited the office and stated that he was having difficulty in buying 18-20 tons of electrolytic copper and 100 tons of aluminum, and asked our help to locate a supply of these materials for him. Contact was made with the local representative of the Aluminum Company, but no success was achieved in persuading them to sell this aluminum to the Rumanians. As to the copper, the local representative of the National Association of Manufacturers located a stock in Baltimore, and this information was transmitted to the Minister. Although the Aluminum Company would not sell, the Committee was able to give the Minister a list of dealers in so-called "secondary" aluminum, obtained by remelting scrap. The names of these firms were also obtained from the National Association of Manufacturers, who have cooperated very satisfactorily in all matters referred to them.

In the course of conversation with the Minister, it was learned that a considerable shipment of field shoes, trucks, ethyl fluid, aviation oil, tin and antimony has been bought and will be shipped on a Rumanian vessel from Chester, Pennsylvania, on November 20th. This information was furnished to the Division of Controls, State Department.

VENEZUELA


Another conference was held with the Venezuelan Minister and his Military Attaché concerning airplanes. They desire to purchase one training bomber, three basic training planes and six primary training planes. The names of firms best in a position to supply these needs were given to the Minister.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

YUGOSLAVIA

It will be recalled that Yugoslavia made inquiry within the last month for a considerable list of American design equipment. Included in the list were some airplanes. Information was received a few days ago that Yugoslavia is purchasing airplanes from Italy and it is circumstantially stated that a contract to purchase 100 Savoia-Marchette bombers, to be paid for in cash in New York at the rate of \$115,000 each, has been signed by the Yugoslav Government. The information goes on to state that half of the purchase price has already been paid and that twenty airplanes have been delivered.

For the Army and Navy Munitions Board:



CHAS. HINES,  
Colonel, U. S. Army,  
Chairman, Clearance Committee,  
Army and Navy Munitions Board.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DDC-BIG 5000.9 (9/27/58)

a71e06

safe: War Dept

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

G-2  
J M

April 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Subject: Military Situation as of April 23, 1940.

I. Western Front.

Minor ground activity. Increased aerial reconnaissance in past few days. Allied and neutral forces remain vigilant although, due to the Scandinavian situation, tension is somewhat relaxed despite the undiminished German concentrations along the frontiers.

II. Scandinavian Front.

1. Ground Operations. The town of Narvik and several outpost positions in that vicinity remain occupied by the isolated German force estimated at 3500. An attack against this force by combined British and Norwegian detachments, supported by naval units, seems imminent.

The German main forces (strength now estimated at 90,000-100,000) advancing radially from the Oslo area quickly cleared southeastern Norway and have now opened communications with other German detachments along the southern coast as far as Stavanger. The objective of the German main body was to effect an early junction with the German landing force at Trondheim. The naval interruption of the line of the communications in the Skagerrak prevented the timely arrival of reinforcements, heavy weapons, motor equipment, and perhaps munitions. The resistance of weak Norwegian detachments north of Oslo gradually stiffened.

These unforeseen interruptions to German plans afforded British units landing at Andalsnes time to reinforce Norwegian delaying detachments along the general line Rena--Lillahammer. For several days the Germans have been unable to advance beyond this line.

Meanwhile other British units advancing from Andalsnes closed on Trondheim in the region north of Storen, and a combined

a71f01

British-French force from landings at Namsos joined Norwegians in pushing southward toward Steinkjer. Serious fighting is expected as the Allied units attempt to destroy the Trondheim garrison of some 10,000 men and establish a firm front facing southward before the German main body can break through the delaying area north of Rena--Lillahammer. The establishment or not of this front may be decisive in the Scandinavian campaign.

2. Recent Air Operations. The Germans have repeatedly since April 20 bombed Andalsnes, Namsos, and the railway junction of Dombas. Norwegian ground troops were attacked north of Famar.

The Royal Air Force bombed German air bases at Aalborg, Denmark and fields near Kristiansand and Stavanger on the night of April 20-21. On the following night they again attacked Aalborg and, for the first time, bombed the fields near Oslo.

The ability of aviation to dominate narrow seas is an issue of this campaign. This issue has not yet been settled.

*John Magruder*  
JOHN MAGRUDER,  
Colonel, F. A.

td

W. O. Bost

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

Safe War Dept  
PSF

July 8, 1941.

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending you a compilation of some recent telegrams from our Military Attaché in Cairo which I hope you will read without fail. I am sure they will interest you.

I am sure that you will understand after you have read them why I feel so keenly my responsibility to build up the efficiency of our own army and air force and not to subordinate its development too far to our efforts to build up the British defense.

These cables should also tend to confirm your confidence in the good judgment of our own military advisers in respect to the proper relation between air and ground forces.

Faithfully yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War.

The President,  
The White House.

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BOD DIR 5200.9 7/9/1988

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Below are copies of three parts to a cablegram from the M.A., Cairo  
Part 1 was filed June 14 and received at 15:12, June 15 in W. D.  
Part 2 was filed June 15 and received at 08:57, June 18 in W. D.  
Part 3 was filed June 16 and received at 06:55, June 17

Part I

1. The responsibility for the losses which the Navy sustained in the evacuation from Crete should be charged to the Army, according to Naval officers, for in the effort to save Army personnel the Navy exposed its ships to the most concentrated air bombardment which has ever been employed against naval units. The situation at Crete was sheer folly, a massacre of one branch of the service in order to preserve the other from being massacred.

2.. The Army, on the other hand, contends that if the air force had granted any pursuit squadrons, the withdrawal would not have been necessary. What they lose sight of is the fact that after the casualties of the Greek campaign, the air force did not have enough planes to grant pursuit protection. Whoever expected it in Crete was ignorant of the facts, and yet it seems that all concerned expected it.

3. It is not possible to hold General Freiberg or his brave soldiers responsible. Denied protection from the air, they surrendered Crete deluged by the most concentrated air bombardment yet beheld. The island was secure from the sea. The naval protection afforded by the fleet kept the island's sea flanks and all ranks attained a stature beyond the call of duty during the withdrawal. It must be obvious that the air force which had never made any promise of substantial aid but which granted much more than deemed possible must be held innocent of any blame for the fiasco.

4. The air, land, and sea defeats of the Middle East Command since the month of March once again highlight divided responsibility which is part of its command system.

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5. After the withdrawal from Greece, the three commanders-in-chief voted not to attempt to hold Crete. Orders arrived from London that the island was to be held.

6. A conference was held on May 13 of the Army, Navy and Air commanders. It was the sentiment of all that the fleet would maintain the security of the sea flanks without fail and that "the present strength of the R.A.F., six Hurricanes, was to be added to by ten Blenheim pursuit planes if procurable."

7. The air force made no promise in regard to material assistance. However, as the German air operations grew, planes were tragically necessary and both at sea and ashore there were wild demands for fighter protection. No such planes were available for service. Nevertheless, the lack of them was availed of to alibi the Cretan disaster.

FELLERS

PART II

1. Admiral Cunningham, commanding the Mediterranean Fleet has no very high opinion of the operation of the air force during the battle for Crete. Now that it is over, he estimates at its proper weight the importance of air strength, and has ordered to England by plane Lord Louis Mountbatten, the King's cousin and the former commander of the sunken KELLEY (destroyer), with the mission of gaining a personal audience with King George to inform him that if 1,000 planes are not immediately received, the Middle East cannot be held. General Wavell recently wired the Prime Minister that the War Cabinet must contain at least one man who is conscious of the fact that the British have other lines to hold than those which center in London.

2. After the evacuation from Crete, there arose a serious  
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ill will among the army, navy, and air force. When the troops were disembarked in Alexandria, air force enlisted personnel were not permitted in the harbor.

3. The appointment of Air Chief Marshal Tedder in the place of Marshal Longmore meets with general approval. Tedder knows American planes and appreciates them.

4. Dangerous rumors circulate which hint that commanders in the army will also be changed. However, if changes take place under present circumstances, they will in actuality be merely an effort to choose a scapegoat upon whom to fix responsibility.

FELLERS

PART III

1. If the recriminations which are described in Part II of this cable were to be avoided, the frantic demands as described in the same message should have been received at London prior to and not subsequent to the battle of Crete.

2. This battle was the fourth disastrous setback to Britain and on account of the divided responsibility which is a part of her command system, she has not yet the faintest conception of where the blame lies. The facts remain that no blame attaches to any one person. By dividing the responsibility a convenient system is built up which protects all commanders, reduces all blame, whitewashes every defeat, furnishes holeproof excuses, but will not manufacture victories.

3. It is fundamental that there be a single general commanding the Middle East theater, alone responsible for the conduct of all operations. He should be given command of all forces in this theater, Army, Navy and air, for the successful performance of his

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mission.

4. Prior to the defeat in Crete such a general, commanding the Middle East, knowing that the retention of the Island necessitated air forces which he did not himself have at hand, would have either obtained a sufficient number of squadrons for the defense or he would have been well situated to refuse to attempt the impossible. Recognizing that a withdrawal from Crete could only be effected with ship casualties beyond all precedent, he would have at once demanded of the War Office sufficient forces or he would have executed the withdrawal in time to avoid the losses. A shrewd commander-in-chief of the Middle East would attempt joint operations in one event only; that he had under his control a balanced force which promised a fair opportunity of success.

5. If personal responsibility for Middle Eastern activities attached to one officer, he would delegate such responsibility from top to bottom of the chain of command. Immediate reaction would be to energize all ranks for in the event of failure all ranks would risk being relieved.

FELLERS

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Lieutenant General Blamey under whose command the Australians fought in Greece and who is now Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East made the following statement to me: \* \* \*

"Immediate air support is a matter of absolute necessity to a commander in the field. The German air system is right and the British independent air force is wrong. I will not go into combat again unless I am able to give direct orders to the squadrons allocated to my support."

(Extract from paraphrase of code cablegram received at War Dept. from Cairo May 15, 1941.)

General Gort—

Fundamentally the separation of the Army and Air Force was a mistake and that proper coordination of air and ground troops, both in training and in operations, can only be had under unified command and a single department of government.

Report # 41016 G.B.-9000  
March 27, 1940.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff—General Ironside—expressed himself almost violently in opposition to the separation of the Air Force from the Army. He said that for certain specific missions, such as the aerial defense of Great Britain, an independent Air Force was not only fitting, but should have ground forces (A. A. etc.) under its orders for operations. For land operations independence was absurd, the most intimate mutual dependence based on close coordination of training is absolutely necessary.

Report # 40733—G. B. 9100  
Jan. 5, 1940.

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SAC  
July 11, 1941

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Will you take this up with  
Jerry Land?

F. D. R.

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*Wat*  
~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

JUL 10 1941

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of July 7th, requesting information relative to the activities of certain vessels of the Army Transport Service which were listed on an inclosure thereto, has been received. I am attaching in tabular form the information which you have requested.

Respectfully yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War.

Incl.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 4-6-59

Signature - *Carl L. Spier*

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## DATA U. S. ARMY TRANSPORTS AS OF JULY 1, 1941

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VESSEL	FORMER NAME	GROSS TONNAGE	DATE ACQUIRED	DATE IN OPERATION	REMARKS: POSITION & ACTIVITY
Ed. B. Alexander	Amerika	21,329	1-10-1940	1-15-40	Repairs, New York*
American Legion	Same	13,736	11-15-1939	3-2-40	Maneuvers, Buzzards Bay
Deltargentino	Same	7,997	6-28-1941		To sail N.O. 7-3-41
Irvin L. Hunt	Edenton	6,958	10-15-1940	12-14-40	Enroute Manila-Singapore
Liberty	Wichita	6,211	12-7-1939	12-18-39	Enroute Manila
Munargo	Same	6,336	3-26-1941	6-9-41	Secret Movement (Greenland)
Oriente	Same	11,520	6-16-1941	6-21-41	Discharging, San Juan, P.R.
Panama	Same	10,021	6-13-1941	6-17-41	Enroute C.Z. - N.Y.
Pres. Cleveland	Golden State	12,568			To be delivered 7-7-41
Pres. Coolidge	Same	21,936			To be delivered 7-12-41
Henry T. Allen	Pres. Jefferson	14,174	11-1-1940		Conversion San Francisco**
J. Franklin Bell	Pres. McKinley	14,127	2-21-1940		Conversion San Francisco***
Pres. Pierce	Hawkeye State	12,579	6-23-1941		To be delivered 7-26-41
Pres. Taft	Buckeye State	12,562	6-17-1941	6-21-41	Enroute S.F. - Manila
Irwin	Santa Cecilia	4,900	3-6-1941	3-12-41	Enroute C.Z. - Charleston
Kent	Santa Teresa	4,858	4-13-1941	6-2-41	Maneuvers, Buzzards Bay
John R. Hannay	Waukegan	6,209	8-22-1940	9-12-40	Discharging C.Z.
Wm. H. Point	West Corum	5,795	10-29-1940	11-26-40	Discharging, Seward, Alaska
Henry Gibbins	West Elcasco	5,766	4-15-41		Repairs, New Orleans****
W. P. Gibson	West Segovia	5,701	11-15-1940	11-30-40	Enroute, Seattle - Alaska

\* Available, 7-18-41

\*\*\*\* Ammunition Ship, complete 7-12-41. (Todd-Johnson Drydock Company)

\*\*\* Schedule to complete 8-15-41; delayed on account of strike. (Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation)

\*\* Schedule to complete 9-1-41. (Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation)

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DOD Ref. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 4-6-59

Signature - Carl L. Spicer

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 7, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Will you please advise me of  
what activity each of the ships listed  
on the enclosure herewith is engaged in  
and what objective these ships are  
carrying out as of July 1, 1941.

x530

Will you also advise me of  
the date of acquisition of these vessels  
and the date placed in operation.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Encl.

(List C - Vessels Acquired by War Department)

6  
We can't find  
any more

199

a71h04

Safe File : War Dept  
PSF *B*  
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WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

September 19, 1941

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

In conformity with your verbal instructions at the conference in your office on Wednesday, action is being taken by the Ordnance Department to increase the production of medium tanks to 2,000 per month and of light tanks to 800 per month, or a doubling of the program in effect previous to Wednesday. Action has been initiated with respect to that part of the expanded program calling for the creation of certain critical and essential new facilities since it is possible to make available for this purpose certain funds now available. However, a prompt carrying out of your instructions in full will also require at the earliest practicable date authority for the placing of additional orders for light, medium and heavy tanks. An estimate of the funds required for this purpose has been submitted to me by the Chief of Ordnance and will shortly be sent to the Bureau of the Budget.

As pointed out on Wednesday, the carrying out of your instructions for this major tank effort will require an A-1-A preference rating for all tanks, in order that the necessary machine tools and equipment may be made available promptly. Request for such a rating has already been made to the Joint Board.

With reference to your instructions to double immediately the production of light and medium tanks, the Ordnance Department estimates, provided an A-1-A preference rating be granted at once, that tank production can be increased approximately 15% by 30 June, 1942; that is, an increase of light tanks from 4,190 to 4,820 and an increase of medium tanks from 5,500 to 6,325.

Respectfully yours,

*R. L. P. H.*

Acting Secretary of War.

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~~RESTRICTED~~

G-2/2657-220; No. 504 M.I.D., W.D. 11:00 A.M., September 27, 1941.

SITUATION REPORT

I. Eastern Theater.

Ground: Information from both Russian and German sources is meager.

Heavy fighting continues around Leningrad.

The Germans claim officially to have completed the mopping up of the Russian forces east of Kiev, with the capture of 665,000 prisoners.

The situation in the Crimea is obscure.

The Russians are fighting strongly in the defense of Odessa.

Air: The German communique claims strenuous activity in recent operations by the Luftwaffe particularly in the Crimea and the Ukraine. Russian arms works at Tula and military objectives in Moscow were attacked.

II. Western Theater.

Air: The R.A.F. resumed normally heavy operations yesterday afternoon after a period of relative inactivity since last Sunday. Raids on northern France particularly German airdromes there featured the assault.

There has been no report of any German activity over Britain.

III. Middle Eastern Theater.

Ground: No significant reports have been received.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Date 11-1-66

Signature *Cecil L. Spier*

a71,01

Per

Rec'd  
D. C.  
War Dept.

January 13, 1942.

My dear Mr. Secretary:-

I approve your memorandum of  
January eighth relative to the increase in  
our Army for 1942.

Always sincerely,

The Honorable  
The Secretary of War,  
Washington, D. C.

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600 DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

Date- 4-7-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spaed*

January 8, 1942.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. During the Cabinet meeting on January 2d you gave me a rough rule of thumb regarding your desires as to the strength of the military forces, as follows:

In Continental United States

Trained Troops -	1,000,000 men
Troops in training -	1,000,000 men

Beyond Continental United States

Such overseas forces as required.

2. It is the War Department's desire during 1942 to:

a. Reach the objective of 115 trained Air Corps Groups, (87 combat, 15 observation, 13 transport) as early in the year as possible. (Previous final objective, 84 Groups; present strength, 54 Groups).

(Total Air Corps strength - 1,000,000)

b. Increase the ground forces by:

4 Armored Divisions to a total of 10 Divisions  
32 Triangular Infantry Divisions (motorized or otherwise) to a total of 59 Divisions.

Essential supporting troops, and additional anti-aircraft and military police units for home employment.

(Total ground troop strength - 2,600,000).

3. Under the present agreed Defense Aid allotments of materiel, the 115 Air Corps Groups can be initially equipped.

For the new divisions of the ground forces, only the necessary training equipment (viz. about 50% of critical items) can be provided and this only if 105mm howitzers now set up for the British can be made available to the United States.

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4. Your decision as to the War Department's proposal outlined in paragraph 2 above (explained in more detail in the attached paper), is necessary to the prompt development of our military resources. Your approval could be given with the understanding that the present allocations under Lease-Loan will stand until the strategical situation or increased production rates make a new decision advisable. The matter of 105mm howitzers will be discussed with the British Chiefs of Staff as a separate proposition. Indications are that the British will be agreeable to the diversion of these howitzers.

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War.

1 Enclosure.

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D-2

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**SECRET**

INCREASE PROPOSED FOR 1942

1. Our plans at the present moment contemplate increases to the following totals by December 31, 1942:

Air:

115 groups (87 combat, 15 observation, 13 transport). These groups involve a strength of men in units of about 700,000. For the maintenance of these groups, for school overhead, and for trainees required for the organization of additional groups provided for in the Victory Program - 300,000 men.

Ground troops:

71 Divisions (present strength 35 Divisions).

This would add 4 armored divisions to the present 6, and 32 Infantry divisions to the present 27 Infantry divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions.

2. There would also be included the proportionate additions of antiaircraft, tank destroyer units and supporting Corps and Army troops, particularly of Engineers, Signal Units, Ordnance and Quartermaster troops.

3. Further, there must be considered a heavy increase in Military Police for the permanent guarding of the most critical installations in the United States, in order to relieve combat troops now dispersed and tied down to this type of duty.

4. Total oversea land forces of 766,000, (including 300,000 men in strategic outposts and 466,000 men in probable expeditions, for some of which the task forces are now being organized), are projected in 1942.

5. Summary of strength to be reached by December 31, 1942:

Continental United States:

Trained troops:

a. Air Corps 600,000

b. Ground troops 1,300,000

(including expeditionary troops under consideration which may be transferred to overseas).

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-59

Signature- *Carl L. Shultz*

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Continental United States Cont'd

Troops in training:

- a. Air Corps 300,000
- b. Ground troops 1,000,000

Overseas forces:

- a. Air Corps 100,000
- b. Ground troops 300,000

(In strategic outposts)

(b. Includes general overhead,  
base ports etc.)

Total strength:

December 31, 1942 - 3,600,000

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PSF  
Safe  
Wen Spt.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

*file*

January 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Shipment Small Troop Detachments  
from Halifax, Nova Scotia.

An investigation has been made to determine the feasibility of shipping small detachments of troops in any space which might be made available on loaded freighters awaiting escort from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the United Kingdom.

It has been determined that less than 25% of such vessels have space which can be utilized. A few freighters do have facilities for from ten (10) to twenty (20) troop passengers and small additional cargo. The Canadian government makes a careful survey to secure any available space for troops or freight. From a replacement depot which has been established at Halifax all such space is fully utilized.

Any United States troops which might be transported by freighter from Halifax would cause a like reduction in Canadian shipments for which special facilities have been constructed. In view of the small numbers affected and since no overall gain would be secured, it is believed inadvisable to make use of this means of transportation at this time.

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-58

Signature- *Perl L. Spencer*

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a71 L01

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

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Safe  
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D-Bot Left

February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Cargo Planes for China.

1. In order to cut down time of delivery of personnel and supplies to China the Air Ferry Service from the United States cross Africa to China must be used. Accordingly, the build-up of this Ferry Service must be considered along with the build-up of the service between Rangoon or Calcutta and Kunming. Furthermore, it is very doubtful if facilities now exist between Calcutta and Kunming to take care of a large number of air transports and it would be very wasteful and perhaps disastrous if they were to be sent in without facilities.

2. Calcutta-China Ferry Service. Conditions in Burma now are such that a new route into China other than through Rangoon must be developed. This is under way, using Calcutta as a port of debarkation and the end of the railroad at Sadiya as the start of the Ferry Service. From there the airplanes will fly either to the first point of the Burma road at Bhamo or all the way into Kunming. Five transport planes are being sent to Calcutta by air from our Army production. These planes will start by air within a few days. Five additional planes are being sent this month on the Chinese order, giving a total of ten. It is believed that this is all that can be absorbed for the time being.

Provisions are being made so that additional planes can be fed into this line from the Takoradi-Khartoum-Ceylon main line as soon as General Stilwell's Staff reports that ample facilities are available. It is believed that a total of maybe 50 airplanes may be put on the China line (if facilities can be provided) by June 30th.

3. Takoradi-Cairo-Ceylon Ferry Service. This is the main system and must be built up as rapidly as possible. Over this line will go supplies and personnel destined for:

- a. British, Near East operations in and around Cairo.
- b. Russia via Basra.
- c. Far East by way of Ceylon.
- d. China via Calcutta or Rangoon.

4. Personnel and Materiel for China Through Calcutta. Our present plans for this line contemplate a build-up to a peak of about 50 to 75 airplanes in operation. As facilities in China become available we will take planes from

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the main Takoradi-Ceylon line and send them to the China line. In addition to what we take from the main line, China will have the 10 planes already allotted plus 10 more scheduled for them from production between now and June. The exact number which will go on the China run depends on the number they will be able to handle with the facilities available.

5. Instructions have been given to put the above into effect at once, with a view of reaching the maximum of about 75 on the main Ferry line by June 30th.

6. In view of slow delivery of Army cargo planes and the urgency of putting this plan into effect, any aid which can be received by securing cargo planes from airlines will be of tremendous value.

  
H. H. ARNOLD  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

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*BW* THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 3, 1942

Dorothy:

This can be filed.

Lois

a71n01

ere are two sources of supply:

a. The stocks and presently scheduled

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

With a view to enabling our representatives and those of the United Kingdom to plan and dispose of our joint program of armament production in a manner best designed to win the war, I am submitting the attached paper relating to our joint production as a basis for the discussions which are now proceeding.

This document does not embody any detailed study of either the Navy or Maritime Commission programs and to be complete should be supplemented by such programs. It is intended, primarily, as a statement of 1942 production of Army items. It is not exact but it gives an over-all picture of our joint production for 1942 upon which I believe basic decisions can be made.

It is necessary, of course, that British and United States 1942 production be reviewed in order to plan both production and strategy. As you are perhaps aware, it is proposed to increase the munitions production of the United States by about 13 billion dollars in 1942. How this increase is to be planned and disposed must be determined. It is likewise essential that consideration be given to our production of 1943.

I suggest a special committee of the Conference be set up immediately to deal with these considerations.

I am also sending you a brief report on the status of the United States Victory Program.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

The President  
The White House

a71n02

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: VICTORY PROGRAM.

The Victory Program is now on its way to becoming a reality. The Office of Production Management and Supply Priorities and Allocations Board estimate that the total munitions production potential of the country for the year 1942 is approximately 40 billion dollars. Of this 40 billion dollars, 27 billion dollars of munitions are already scheduled. We intend to increase this schedule to the limit of the country's potential, that is, another 13 billion dollars worth of munitions. An adequate carry-over into the year 1943 will be assured by certain measures which are now in process in the War Department and which are described below.

The War Department is at present expediting estimates for an appropriation of approximately 12 billion dollars for aircraft and its accessory equipment. It is anticipated that this money will be made available during January. This sum will insure that scheduled aircraft production rates will not only be maintained but will be increased through 1942 and 1943. To illustrate, it will permit the construction of new and converted facilities for heavy bombers sufficient to increase the production rate of this class of aircraft from 775 to 1,000 a month.

The War Department is also preparing new estimates for submission to Congress early in January to cover additional munitions other than aircraft. By expeditious action both in the War Department and Congress, a sum of approximately 14 billion dollars for munitions other than aircraft and about 3 billions for expediting production can be made available during January for subsequent releases to industry.

The estimates referred to in the preceding paragraphs will, with the funds appropriated by the Congress for Army equipment on December 17, 1941, aggregate about 33 billion dollars which should be translated into contracts and taken over by industry in the early months of 1942. The breakdown of this vast sum into the general categories comprising the proposed expenditures for munitions is shown in Inclosure 1. Whereas these categories are expressed in terms of

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expenditures further figures are being assembled to translate certain of the more important categories into units produced per given period. When these are available, I shall forward them to you but I venture to caution you regarding their use as I feel to disclose them would aid the enemy.

With the appropriation of the funds covered by the estimates mentioned above, action may proceed with the orderly provision of raw materials, a broadening of the base for procurement, the construction of new facilities, and the renegotiation of contracts where advisable, with the result that a greatly accelerated production schedule will be achieved. As indicated in a previous paragraph, the production potential for the country for 1942 is estimated by SPAB and OPM to be approximately 40 billion dollars for the all-out war effort during this period compared with 27 billion dollars now scheduled. Of the margin available for new production in 1942, it is expected that approximately 6 billion dollars will be for ground army munitions,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  billion for aircraft and accessories, and the remainder for military construction, the Navy, Maritime Commission and other purposes.

While the plan as outlined above is being put in effect, and under it, industry is absorbing the orders resulting from the proposed appropriations, the War Department will continue with its re-analysis of the list of materiel originally submitted for the Victory Program to the end that its portion of that program will be on as firm a basis as it is possible to make it for an all-out industrial effort. Although this analysis is now under way, it may be substantially influenced by the present Joint Conferences. While the date of March 1, 1942 has been set for the completion of the War Department's re-study of the Victory Program lists, unless difficulties arise that are not foreseen, it is expected that a completion date substantially prior to March 1 will be achieved. With completion of this re-analysis, the War Department will then be prepared to furnish SPAB and OPM with additional estimates for the purpose of enabling them to plan the complete production of the War Department's share in the total program.

The War Department has been in close contact with the representatives of SPAB and OPM. The procedure outlined above is familiar to them and has their hearty approval.

*Henry H. Stimson*

Secretary of War

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Inclosure

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CATEGORIES OF MUNITIONS PROPOSED FOR EXPENDITURE  
 FROM THE THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ACT FY 1942 AND PROPOSED NEW ESTIMATES

CATEGORIES	TOTAL
<u>Air Craft and Accessories</u>	
Planes, Spare Engines & Parts	\$9,041,373,090
AC Small Arms & Cannon	243,785,400
AC Ammunition	1,301,208,729
AC Signal Accessories	592,508,460
AC CNS Munitions	234,572,518
Sub-Total Air Craft and Accessories	<u>\$11,413,448,197</u>
 Antiaircraft Materiel	 984,490,910
Small Arms & Automatic Weapons and AC Cannon	1,634,996,164
Artillery & Fire Control	1,095,047,531
Tanks, Armored Cars, Scout Cars, Tractors, Etc.	3,908,022,690
Ammunition	5,390,171,289
Signal Equipment	825,021,240
Engineer, Chemical, Medical & Quartermaster (other than motor)	1,435,907,240
Trucks & Passenger Cars	1,201,473,152
Sub-Total (other than Aircraft)	<u>\$16,475,130,216</u>
Contingencies	<u>2,458,882,492</u>
Total Munitions	30,347,460,905
Expediting Production	<u>3,000,000,000</u>
Grand Total	\$ 33,347,460,905

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WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington

M E M O R A N D U M

December 25, 1941

Supply for 1942

1. The means of warfare which will become available to the anti-Axis powers in 1942 will come primarily from the stocks and production of Russia, the British Empire and the United States.

a. Russian stocks and production are unknown, but can be assumed quite properly as inadequate for Russia's strategic role in 1942.

b. British Empire stocks and production are known, but it is doubtful that there can be any appreciable increase in production over present forecasts.

c. American stocks and production are known. Production schedules have been prepared based on appropriations to include all but the last supplemental (3d Supplemental, Fiscal Year 1942.) With additional appropriations, the amounts in these schedules can be increased.

2. The means of warfare should be produced to fit the strategic concept of defeating the enemy. However, the establishment of production takes so much time that the items scheduled for 1942 cannot be greatly changed without causing a serious reduction in output during that year. Consequently, present production schedules for 1942 should be changed as little as possible. The change in emphasis on the production of certain types of supplies for 1942 should be effected within the increased productive capacity available primarily in the United States. In other words, for 1942 there are two sources of supply:

a. The stocks and presently scheduled production of the anti-Axis powers.

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b. The productive capacity above presently scheduled production available in the United States.

3. Based upon the third revision of the Anglo-American Consolidated Statement, the present stocks and scheduled production of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States can provide the following means of warfare in 1942:

a. Aircraft.

(1) As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 700 heavy bombers are on hand, with a production of 5,000 in 1942. Assuming a six months life in operation against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, the striking force of heavy bombers may be estimated to increase from 250 in early 1942 to 1,500 by the end of that year.

(2) A similar consideration indicates that the prospective striking force which can be maintained will be:

	<u>At the beginning of 1942</u>	<u>Mid-1942</u>	<u>By the end of 1942</u>
Heavy Bombers	250	730	1,500
Medium Bombers	1,200	1,690	1,900
Light Reconnaissance and Dive Bombers	2,800	3,160	3,200
Fighters	4,200	4,755	5,000

b. Ammunition for Aircraft. Ammunition requirements for maintaining the aircraft in paragraph 2 a (2), compared with quantities available, are as follows:

(Figures are cumulative. Unit is a million.)

	<u>At the beginning of 1942</u>	<u>Mid-1942</u>	<u>By the end of 1942</u>
Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)			
A. P. (Required)	315.	667.	1,485.
A. P. (Available*)	400.	1,330.	2,850.
Tracer (Required)	77.	167.	371.
Tracer (Available*)	300.	1,100.	2,200.

\*For all purposes including aircraft. While this table shows a generally satisfactory condition, there are considerable shortages in certain specific calibers, particularly caliber .50

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RHP, NARS Date

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Bombs, All Types  
(Pounds)

Required	390.	875.	2,230.
Available*	500.	1,070.	2,040.

\*While this table shows a generally satisfactory condition, stocks and production are not sufficient in the presently desired types.

c. Tanks.

(1) As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 5,000 medium tanks are on hand with a production of 21,000 in 1942. Assuming a three months' life in operations against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, the striking force of medium tanks may be estimated to increase from 1,600 in early 1942 to 5,550 by the end of that year.

(2) A similar consideration indicates that the prospective striking force which can be maintained will be:

	At the be- ginning of 1942	Mid- 1942	By the end of 1942
Heavy Tanks	160	300	400
Medium Tanks	1,600	3,270	5,550
Light Tanks	800	984	1,450

d. Ammunition for Tanks. The requirement and availability of armor-piercing shot for tank and anti-tank cannon are as follows:

(Figures are cumulative and in thousands of rounds)

	At the be- ginning of 1942	Mid- 1942	By the end of 1942
Required for Tanks Only	4,800.	11,725.	32,600.
Total Available	?	19,260	53,463

e. Anti-Tank Artillery and Ammunition. As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 5,000 anti-tank cannon of calibers varying from 37 mm. to 4.5" are on hand. Assuming a six months' life in operation against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, the anti-tank guns available for combat will increase from 1,600 at the beginning of 1942, through 3,160 at mid-1942, to 6,100

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at the end of 1942. Cumulative ammunition requirements, which must be met from the balances in sub-paragraph 2 d, which are sufficient after mid-1942, are 2,880 thousand at the beginning of 1942; 8,570 thousand by mid-1942; and 19,548 thousand by the end of 1942.

f. Machine Guns (except those in aircraft). As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 330,000 machine guns are on hand. Assuming a five months' life in operation against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, a force of 2.8 million men on U. S. allowance basis can be maintained in combat throughout 1942, which can be increased at the end of 1942 to 3.0 million men.

g. Small Arms Ammunition. Indicated stocks for the beginning of 1942 are approximately 2,500 million rounds of ball; 400 million rounds of armor-piercing; and 300 million rounds of tracer. Based on U. S. rates of expenditure, after deducting the aircraft requirements, 2 million men can be supplied early in 1942; 2.5 million men by mid-1942; and over 4 million men by the end of 1942. However, there are serious shortages in certain types, particularly armor-piercing and incendiary; also in certain calibers, particularly caliber .50.

h. Land Antiaircraft Weapons (over 20 mm.) There is an indicated stock at the beginning of year 1942 of 4,000 heavy and 4,500 light land antiaircraft weapons. These will increase, allowing for normal losses, to 5,200 heavy and 8,100 light by mid-1942; and 7,200 heavy and 14,100 light by the end of 1942.

i. Land Antiaircraft Ammunition (over 20 mm.) At present U. S. rates, the following figures compare antiaircraft ammunition requirements and availability:

(Figures in thousands of rounds)

	Required	Available
1st Half 1942	19,620	25,000
2nd Half 1942	31,140	34,000

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- 4 -

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1. T. N. T. Production outside the United States is practically stationary during 1942. U. S. schedules indicate that quarterly production will be approximately doubled during 1942. Even with this expansion, presently scheduled production is inadequate to meet requirements. Early in 1942, U. S. quarterly production is approximately 50% greater than U. K. plus Canada, and reaches three times their combined production by the end of 1942.

k. Naval Vessels

(U.S., U.K., AND CANADA)

		Production				
	: On Hand	1st Quarter	2d Quarter	3d Quarter	4th Quarter	: On Hand*
	: 1/1/42	: 12/31/42				
Battle Ships & Battle Cruisers	: 33	: 0	: 3	: 1	: 2	: 39
Aircraft & Seaplane Carriers	: 14	: 1	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 15
Cruisers & AA Ships	: 108	: 4	: 5	: 4	: 3	: 124
Destroyers	: 447	: 29	: 39	: 42	: 41	: 598
Submarines	: 203	: 16	: 14	: 17	: 20	: 270
Convoy Escort Vessels**	: 217	: (8)	: (5)	: (7)	: (11)	: 248

\*Assumed no losses

\*\*50 on order for U.K. under Lend-Lease on which no schedules are available. No orders placed for this type ship for the U. S. Navy.

4. What has been discussed above is based upon the existing production schedules of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States for 1942. The present proposal is to increase the productive capacity of the means of warfare in the United States in 1942 by approximately 13 billion dollars. There exists at present a list of supplies required beyond the existing production schedules. Based on this list, and a consideration of 1942 production possibilities as they are now envisaged by O.P.M. and S.P.A.B., it is planned to utilize this additional U. S. productive capacity as discussed below (also, see attached list.) However, the production of these supplies is still in the planning stage and does

11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

not fully utilize the additional productive capacity available in 1942. The supplies discussed below which are to be produced with this additional 1942 capacity can be adjusted within the limitations of production possibilities both to suit the strategical needs of 1942, and to serve as a basis for 1943 production.

a. Aircraft

The additional aircraft, which there is a possibility of producing in 1942, are:

250 Heavy Bombers
500 Medium Bombers
900 Light Reconnaissance & Dive Bombers
1,000 Fighters

Assuming the delivery of the great majority in the last quarter of 1942, the prospective striking force by the end of 1942 becomes:

Heavy Bombers	1,600
Medium Bombers	2,100
Light Reconnaissance & Dive Bombers	3,500
Fighters	5,300

b. Ammunition for Aircraft

The possibility of increasing the production in 1942 of small arms ammunition of the types and calibers required for the increase in the aircraft striking force to the figures shown in paragraph 4a seems at present to be barely sufficient to meet the needs of this force. Increase in production of bombs in 1942 is almost entirely a question of increasing the output of explosives. Cal. .50 ammunition and T.N.T. are the choke items which must be loosened in planning increased productive capacity. ✓

c. Tanks

The additional tanks, which it is proposed to produce in 1942, are:

150 Heavy
6,000 Medium
3,000 Light

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Assuming the delivery of the great majority in the last quarter of 1942, the prospective striking force by the end of 1942 becomes:

Heavy Tanks	450
Medium Tanks	7,550
Light Tanks	2,450

d. Ammunition for Tanks. The possibilities of producing armor piercing shot during 1942, as compared with the requirements, are increased to the following figures by the end of 1942:

(Figures are cumulative in thousands of rounds)

Required for tanks only	41,250
Total available	78,463

e. Anti-tank Artillery and Ammunition. The additional anti-tank artillery, of 37mm and 3" calibers, which there is a possibility of producing in 1942 are 3,900 37mm, and 800 3", a total of 4,700 guns. This production increases the number of anti-tank guns available for actual combat by the end of 1942 from 6,100 to 7,400. The additional ammunition requirement for these guns, based on their utilization in the fourth quarter of 1942, is 5,200 thousand rounds making a total requirement by the end of 1942 of 24,784 thousand rounds. From paragraph 4d there can be 37,213 thousand rounds produced to meet this requirement.

f. Machine Guns (except those in aircraft.) The additional machine guns, except those in aircraft, which there is a possibility of producing in 1942 are approximately 70,000. The force which can be maintained in combat at the end of 1942 can be increased by this production from 3.0 million men to 3.6 million men.

g. Small Arms Ammunition. The increase in production planned for AP, incendiary and .50 cal. ammunition is more than absorbed by the need for these types and calibers for the increased aircraft striking force. For the remaining types of small arms ammunition it is not wise to plan on supporting in combat any greater force than that shown in paragraph 3g, Viz. slightly over 4 million men by the end of 1942.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

h. Land Antiaircraft Weapons (over 20mm.) The additional antiaircraft guns in 1942, will increase the total heavy antiaircraft guns from 7,200 to 8,000; and the light from 14,100 to 15,000 by the end of 1942.

i. Land Antiaircraft Ammunition (over 20mm.) The additional antiaircraft ammunition in 1942 will be sufficient to keep pace with the additional production of antiaircraft guns.

j. T.N.T. The increase of present production schedules of T.N.T. in 1942 appears to rest upon two factors: first, increasing output of existing plants; second, completion in the calendar year 1942 of the plants recently financed. While the first is possible, the second is complicated, not only because of the time required for construction, but also because the producers of the highly specialized plant machinery have orders for equally specialized machinery for naval construction. An acute shortage is indicated throughout 1942.

5. This memorandum has been prepared in advance of the latest information on merchant shipping. Shipping information contained in the Consolidated Statement is now rather out of date. New information will be attached as soon as it becomes available. However, a rough estimate of the shipping requirements for the means of warfare which might leave the United States during 1942, based on average dollar value, is probably a maximum of 20,000,000 gross tons.

6. The information furnished above is based on the over-all figures of the Anglo-American Consolidated Balance Sheet. It is probably not exact in all respects. In many cases more specific or detailed requirements may operate to reduce the striking forces which have been indicated. However, it serves to indicate the possibilities for 1942 on present schedules, and to raise the question as to the kind of supplies which should be manufactured with the potential still available in the United States in 1942, in order to further the joint strategical plans for that

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EO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

year and for 1943.

7. A short summary of the major categories of United States production for the year 1942 is appended.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

U. S. PRODUCTION - CALENDAR YEAR 1942

(U. S. part of the information on which the discussions in the memorandum "Supply for 1942" are based)

Supplies	Present Schedules	Tentative Increase
Aircraft (complete)		
Heavy Bombers	2,156	250
Medium Bombers	3,757	500
Light Reconnaissance and Dive Bombers	7,548	900
Fighters	11,097	1,000
Tanks (complete)		
Heavy	166	150
Medium	13,721	6,000
Light	6,524	3,000
A. P. Ammunition		
Cal. .50 (Unit 1000)	1,001,996	100,000
20mm (Unit 1000)	12,985	9,000
37mm to 4.5" (Unit 1000)	37,092	25,000
Anti-Tank Artillery		
37mm	6,374	3,900
3"	600	800
Machine Guns (less Aircraft)		
Cals. .30 and .50 ground	135,541	50,000
Cal. .50 AA	34,200	20,000
Anti-Aircraft Weapons		
37mm and 40mm	1,490	800
90mm	1,789	800

(Source: Present schedules, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Office of Production Management, December 23, 1941. Tentative Increase, Production Branch, Office of the Under Secretary of War.)

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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Wash. D. C.

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

I deem it necessary that there be established with the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East a branch of the Office of The Judge Advocate General and a board of review in such branch office. Pursuant to the last paragraph of Article of War 50½, I therefore direct The Judge Advocate General to establish such branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, and to establish in such branch office a board of review. Upon the establishment of such branch office and board of review therein, they shall be empowered to perform for the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, under the general supervision of The Judge Advocate General, the duties which The Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of War.

Copy - The White House

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

WD 321.4 (2-26-42)MSC

Auth: ..... TAG .....  
Initials: *D.C.*  
Date: .....

March 3, 1942.

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, by radio dated February 25, 1942, has recommended that a branch office of The Judge Advocate General and a board of review be established in the Philippine Islands under authority of the final paragraph of Article of War 50<sup>1</sup>, which reads as follows:

"Whenever the President deems such action necessary, he may direct the Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, with any distant command, and to establish in such branch office a board of review, or more than one. Such Assistant Judge Advocate General and such board or boards of review shall be empowered to perform for that command, under the general supervision of the Judge Advocate General, the duties which the Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President."

The establishment of the branch office and the board of review is made necessary because of the existence of a distant command with which communication is now difficult or impossible. It is obvious that Congress in enacting Article of War 50<sup>1</sup> had such a situation in contemplation.

It is now impossible to forward records of trial by general court-martial from the Philippine Islands to the Judge Advocate General's Office at Washington. The establishment of a branch of the office of The Judge Advocate General and a board of review in the Philippine Islands will make the administration of military justice within General MacArthur's command self-contained and will permit the execution of certain sentences which may not now be carried into effect because not approved by the board of review in the office of The Judge Advocate General and by The Judge Advocate General himself. The maintenance of

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REF ID: A6000.9 (9/27/58)

Date 4-7-59

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discipline in General MacArthur's command may require the prompt execution of sentences imposed by courts-martial.

The Article of War above quoted contemplates a direction by the President to establish such an office whenever he shall deem such action necessary. I concur with General MacArthur in thinking such action now necessary. Officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department now in the Philippine Islands under General MacArthur's command may be detailed to these duties by radio. A draft of letter authorizing such action, pursuant to the Article of War above quoted, is herewith submitted, which I recommend receive your signature.

Respectfully yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*

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Drft. let.

Secretary of War

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Date- 4-7-59

Signature- CL Spice

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PSF

S. A.

Wardipt.

## 1942 &amp; 1943 PROGRAMME

AIRCRAFT	1942	1943
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	11,300	30,000
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	11,000	17,000
Pursuits	16,000	38,000
Observation & Transports	6,700	15,000
	—	—
	45,000	100,000

## TANKS

Heavy	500	5,000
Medium	25,000	50,000
Light	19,500	20,000
	—	—
	45,000	75,000

## ANTI-AIRCRAFT

Light 37 mm.	1,600	-
40 mm.	13,000	25,000
Heavy 90 mm.	5,400	10,000
	—	—
	20,000	35,000

## ANTI-TANK

37 mm.	13,700	-
3"	1,200	4,000

## MACHINE GUNS (Ground, Tank A.A.)

.30"	330,000
.50"	170,000
	—
	500,000

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

BMT

March 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I have your outline report of your visit to Panama. I approve the proposed steps for the greater security of the Canal. As I understand it, all of the proposed steps are within the jurisdiction of the War Department, with the exception of the problem of the east coast patrol. Please take this up with the Secretary of the Navy and settle it.

Please also take up with the Secretary of the Navy the problem of the type of radar or ASV. This is a technical matter which the technical people of the Army and Navy should determine at once.

F. D. R.

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PSI-Safe  
was Dept.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Here is the cursory report on Panama which I mentioned to you over the telephone.

I will bring you the map when I come tomorrow morning.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry A. Steiner

Secretary of War.

The President,  
The White House.

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Signature - Carl L. Speer

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SECRET

1942 (3/14/42) WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

11-1-66

Signature - Carl L. Spencer

March 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is a cursory outline report on my visit to Panama. I am omitting figures and details. My views in general coincided with those of General Andrews and his officers.

I.

The problem

1. At present the Canal is vulnerable to a sufficiently heavy air attack. Such an attack from one carrier might be sufficient. From two or three carriers it would have a strong chance of success.

On the other hand, a successful attack from adjacent land bases in Central or South America is not considered likely owing to the difficulty which an enemy would have on concentrating sufficient planes on a secret base within sufficiently short range.

2. A heavy successful attack at either of two places might, by draining Gatun Lake, close the Canal for over two years.

3. After a carrier has released its planes for attack, no subsequent means of defense against those planes can sufficiently ensure the safety of the Canal.

4. Therefore by far the most effective defense is by a long distance patrol to intercept and destroy the carrier before she gets within range of the Canal.

II.

Proposed outer patrols

We discussed with the Bomber Command at Panama the essentials of a theoretically perfect outer patrol, it being admitted that the existing outer patrol is very imperfect. A carrier attack from the Pacific is assumed to be the most likely attack, and the geographic approaches to the Canal make an approach by a carrier from the Pacific more difficult to intercept than one from the Atlantic where the Caribbean Sea is encircled on the east by islands which leave only a comparatively few narrow entrances

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Carl L. Spaier

open for the approach of such a carrier.

a. Such a theoretically perfect outer patrol on the Pacific side would consist of a patrol zone about 400 nautical miles in width extending from an outer semi-circle 1000 nautical miles distant from the Canal to an inner semi-circle about 600 miles distant. The patrolling bombers for such a zone could be most conveniently based upon Guatemala City, Tehuantepec, Mexico, on the Central American coast; Salinas, Ecuador, and Telara, Peru, in South America; and the Galapagos Islands in the center. The width of the patrol zone is fixed by the distance a carrier could cover at a speed of thirty knots during the twelve hours of darkness and allowing a two and a half hour margin of safety. The longer arc between Central America and Galapagos could be covered by the faster Army four engine bombers; and the shorter arc between South America and Galapagos could be covered by the slower Navy PBY's. The landing fields at Galapagos will probably be complete before the end of April. Unless new bases are obtained at Tehuantepec, Mexico, and Telara, Peru, the patrolling of the zone from Guatemala and Salinas alone would place upon the planes much additional strain. The outer distance of the arc of 1000 miles from Panama is fixed by the possible range of a bomber loaded with bombs.

To effectuate this patrol all of the bombers must of course be equipped with ASV's. These would give each sweep an effective width of at least fifty miles.

b. The Atlantic side. At present General Andrews, the Commander of Panama Defense, has no operational control over patrolling the entrances to the Caribbean Sea through the gaps in the Antilles. In my opinion he should be given such control and an adequate arrangement should be worked out with the Navy for that purpose. Otherwise a thoroughly coordinated defense of the Canal is rendered difficult if not impossible. Admiral Hoover, who today is commanding the patrol of the gaps in the Antilles, has the mission of defending shipping against submarine attack and not the defense of the Canal. The difference in these missions necessarily affects the conduct of the patrols and thus reacts adversely on the effectiveness of the defense of Panama.

c. In addition to the patrolling planes, there must be a striking force of long distance bombers provided of sufficient power to enable it to go out and sink the aircraft carrier as soon as it is located by a patrolling plane. In addition

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to such a striking force of bombers, it is planned to have available striking forces of torpedo boats at various bases within reach to also attack the carrier. One of these proposed bases is the island of Cocos.

### III.

#### Present outer patrols

It was agreed that the present patrols are very ineffective and leave wide gaps for the approach of a hostile carrier.

- a. The planes are not yet equipped with ASV but are limited to visual observation.
- b. The number of the heavy bombers available is not yet sufficient even if they were equipped with ASV.
- c. There is not yet a sufficient reserve either of bombers or torpedo boats for the purpose of destroying a carrier when located.
- d. The base at Galapagos is yet incomplete and unusable.
- e. The patrolling system on the Atlantic side is subject to the defects of operational command above mentioned.

As a result, while an outer patrol is being regularly conducted from Guatemala outward towards Galapagos and back and from Salinas to Galapagos and back, there are many necessary gaps in its effectiveness, and the strain upon the planes employed is very excessive.

All of these defects can be eventually remedied by additional equipment and the proper organization of operational command in the Caribbean. When made, they will greatly strengthen that form of the defense of the Canal which is most effective against the most probable danger.

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IV.

The inner defenses of the Canal

1. The inner patrol. An inner patrol is now being conducted by medium range bombers and flying boats on a radius of 400 nautical miles out from Panama. The main purpose of this patrol is to supplement the recognized gaps in our present outer patrol and to try to catch a carrier which has evaded that outer patrol. Its range, however, would afford no certainty of catching a carrier before she had released her bombers.

On the Atlantic side a similar but less thorough short range patrol is also being conducted.

2. The airplane warning service. A number of both fixed and mobile detectors (called by the Navy RADAR) are now in operation at various points on the coast including Salinas. Their principal mission is to detect the approach of a hostile plane. At present this mission is being carried out ineffectively, partly on account of great geographical difficulties (causing confusing echoes) and partly because these American detectors are not effective in catching the approach of a low flying plane.

A few weeks ago I sent a British expert, Mr. Watson Watt together with some Canadian assistants to Panama to examine this service and also to locate the proper places for some Canadian CHL detectors which I had the promise of from the Canadian government. These CHL detectors are effective on low flying as well as high flying planes. These CHL's are now on the way to Panama and sites have already been selected and they will all probably be in operation before the end of April. These foreign experts have also given us useful assistance in relocating and improving our original American instruments.

Note: One of the mistakes of our original location was in placing the detector on too high a base, it having been discovered that such a height produced confusing echoes which prevented proper detection, when still higher mountains lay behind the site.

By these various steps the air warning service can be expected to be very considerably improved in detecting the approach of low flying hostile planes. Our force of interceptor planes must be enlarged.

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3. The island of Cocos. This island is situated about 500 miles from Panama. It thus lies in the intermediate space between the outer and the inner patrol. Admiral Sadler is planning to make it the base of one of his squadrons of small torpedo boats. No detector (RADAR) has yet been placed upon it.

4. The fishing boat detection service. Fifty such small boats have been obtained by the Navy and it is planned to place them on watch in a line between Point Mala and Point Pinas at the entrance to the Gulf of Panama. This would be about one hundred miles distant from the Canal.

An inner group is to be placed about fifty miles out from Panama. Each boat is equipped with radio to convey the reports of visual observation of approaching hostile planes. At the time of my visit some of the boats were on their way from California but none had yet arrived.

5. Balloon barrage. While I found a number of these balloons in the air, that number was quite insufficient. It was estimated that we should have about three hundred balloons on hand.

6. Smoke screen. This is regarded as quite an effective potential defense but we have not yet enough of the materiel. Some smoke pots and smoke generators were available but in quite insufficient quantities. In my opinion sufficient generators should be installed, particularly at Gatun and Pedro Miguel, to screen and keep screened with smoke those places during the entire period of a crisis.

7. Torpedo nets. The torpedo bomber is considered the greatest danger to the Canal. Torpedo nets have been installed but I think their number should be increased and spare nets kept on hand.

8. Emergency gates. Much admirable work has been done in the construction of such gates. The latest models, however, have not been finished in all of the locks and cannot be completed for some months.

9. Anti aircraft guns. A fairly satisfactory supply of the larger anti aircraft guns have been installed with some shortages. The main need of additional anti aircraft guns was in the smaller caliber automatic weapons suitable for defense against torpedo and dive bombers.

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V.

In summary.

While the Canal is not at present in danger of a sustained land attack, it is in danger at almost any time from surprise raids from sea and air. There is the possibility of very serious damage from such raids. This possibility can be greatly minimized by steps which can be taken and completed with comparative speed and cheapness.

The Command is well aware of these dangers and has shown very commendable energy in seeking to take the steps which I have above enumerated. Every support should be given to these efforts. The Canal is such a vital asset to our war effort and that effort could be so impaired by the Canal being put out of action that these comparatively small steps which will secure the minimization of the danger should be given the highest priority.

*Henry L. Stimson*

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Land War College (37/58)

Date 11-1-66

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TALK GIVEN BY  
MAJOR WILLIAM P. FISHER (AC)  
BEFORE G-4 OFFICERS, WDGDS.  
MARCH 20, 1942.

*White Stone  
is in question*

Col. Thomas: Will you tell us where you served in the Pacific Theatre?

Major Fisher: I was at Clark Field when the War began. The 19th Group had been over there about a month, and we were attached to it as soon as we arrived. There were 4 Combat Squadrons. We had B-17's at Clark Field although 2 Squadrons had been removed before the War started. The morning of the 8th there were 2 Squadrons at Clark and those 2 were destroyed.

The remaining 2 Squadrons started operating from Del Monte, using Clark as an advance base as long as was practicable. After about a week, we gave up Clark Field. After leaving Del Monte, we operated from Darwin. That's the general picture until Java.

I will try to give you a short picture of the Bataan show. While the B-17's were still operating, the remainder of the 19th Group withdrew down to Bataan. We were down on Bataan until the 29th of December. At that time the 19th Group -- all of the Ground Echelon and everything except the Combat Crews that were operated -- evacuated from Bataan by ship, as Infantry for a month. The Japanese had made their big landing. The 19th Group was there until Col. Eubank began to evacuate Combat Crew members by bomber, and took crew members down to Australia. That was going on continuously.

The last airplane was sent in around the 26th of January from Darwin. They were operating from Darwin bombing bases on the Group. Then we got

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LP-30's and B-24's to evacuate the personnel. By that time the Japanese had moved very far south and were operating against Java. Meanwhile Gen. Brett and Gen. Wavell had shifted operations to Java.

When we got down to Darwin, there was word there for me to take the Interceptor Command on the East of Java. We operated there with P-40's. The British had Hurricanes. After losing our airplanes there, we left and evacuated the 1st of March to Australia. Specifically, our airplanes were combatted mainly with Navy 96 and Army 96 -- bomber and predominatly fighters. There were not very many Messerschmidts 109 and 110.

The comparison of Japanese performance is significant -- their Zero Fighter weighs around 4,045 pounds, has a 14 cylinder (Pratt Whitney) engine, very high rate of climb -- 4,500 feet a minute, ceiling around 30,000 feet and outmaneuvers anything we have. It has no armor plate and sacrifices self-sealing tanks, but the P-40 outruns the Zero by about 25 m.p.h. Tactics were more or less based on these facts.

We did not attempt to combat their fighters, for our mission was to protect the Navy at Soerabaja. We started off with around 31 P-40's -- about 24 of which were in commission until our supply line was cut down through the Eastern Indies. We slowly lost airplanes after that until the first of March, although we were operating from a hidden airdrome, using all concealment possible.

The Japanese did not find our drome until the 28th of February, although the first major attack came into Soerabaja about the middle of February, being sent in unescorted by fighters. We were able to get the pursuit up about 26,000 feet and shot down 9 out of 27 planes. More probably went down, but 9 were confirmed.

After this the Japanese sent in their bombardment planes at 27,000 to 30,000 feet. The P-40 cannot get that high -- not much over 26,000. We were

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operating normally the past couple of weeks in formations of 12, 9, 14 or perhaps 16 planes. The enemy planes attacked with 27 to 34 bombers and 20 to 30 pursuit fighters, keeping from 25,000 to 26,000 feet. We got some of them, but it was difficult and we lost ships doing it. Their fighters would come down on the P-40's. These continued attacks kept up. They were increasing their air strength all the time. They first took Bali and their base on Bali caused more trouble than anything else. The Japs made their Bali landing at night and we attacked the next morning. Our B-17's were bombed then. We had a few dive bombers -- operating around 10,000 to 12,000 feet -- with P-40's giving protection. Our bombers managed to finish up what the Navy left. Only 1 destroyer and 1 cruiser got out. We lost only 1 dive bomber and 4 pursuit ships. We were down after that to 12 or 14 airplanes.

We lost our planes a few at a time, a couple a day. When the invasion fleet came in on the 28th, it was met by our fleet as it came from the North.

There were 46 transports, about 8 destroyers, 6 or 8 cruisers, They were met by our fleet about 100 miles out of Soerabaja where they had quite a cover up for their fleet. Our Navy sunk a cruiser and set some destroyers afire. Their fleet action was in front and there was a V formation. We lost 1 destroyer.

On the afternoon of the 28th fighting, bombing -- everything -- was going well for us. The Japanese convoy turned around and started north again. They next came in to Soerabaja. The fleet turned around, came in again and we had no fleet to oppose it. We were reinforced with 6 British Hurricanes and 6 Brewsters flown and operated by the Dutch but they were no good for interception. On March 1 there were 9 P-40's in commission. We ran a

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mission with 9 P-40's, 6 Brewsters and, 5 Hurricanes, 2 of which came back very badly shot up. There were 4 or 5 airplanes still ready to be used. The Japs found our field on the 28th, but a heavy rainstorm prevented much damage. When we came in from the morning mission, we put airplanes in dispersed position, but they came in with bombers and strafers and burned up everything that was left. They finished up the P-40's and we loaded all our personnel we had and fled to Singaradja. The fields had been attacked all day. We got out about a day before the Dutch blew up the flying fields there

Gen. Moses: Was there anything at all there when you left?

Major Fisher: We had absolutely nothing. The fighter outfit was wiped out. The bombers had about 5 or 6 left -- B-17's but we could not protect their airdromes.

Gen Moses: Going back to high-elevation bombing! How about the accuracy of the enemy bombing from that height?

Major Fisher: It was not very good. They did not hit our fleet. Their bombs were dropping in the water. The Japs bomb in formation only -- string bombing -- V formation and wide out as far as they can stretch it -- 24 planes wide. The Japs are accurate with that tactic when they are unopposed. After interception, they were not so good at this game.

Col. Hoag: Have you seen any indication of other than Japanese personnel?

Major Fisher: Yes. Germans. I have seen one body that was apparently German -- tall, blond, etc. You run into quite a few white men in their crews. It's hard to tell much about the men though after death as they are usually pretty badly smashed up and also we shot down Japanese women pilots.

Col. Hoag: What about our own bombing?

Major Fisher: Our bombing has been more accurate than peacetime, due to the

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fact that we were using large bombs with better projectory. We use around 600 now. Kelly used that on the Haruna.

Col. Hoag: I understood that was 500's -- 3 of them.

Major Fisher: I think 2 bombs did the damage ... When Kelly came back to Clark, there was an overcast 10,000 feet over the field, and there were some enemy fighters in the vicinity. He let down through the overcast, starting his approach to come into the field when these fighters attacked him. In a few moments the parachutes bloomed. They had set his plane afire. He was able to get all his crew out except the co-pilot. The controls were probably burned through. Kelly crawled out the top hatch and was struck by something. The co-pilot was getting ready to climb out behind him and the plane exploded, burning his arms and hands, face and hair. The co-pilot didn't seem to know how it happened -- he was in the plane, and then in the air the first thing he knew. Kelly was the only pilot out of the original 14th Squadron over there to be killed so far. Most of the pilots have gotten out and the Navy has had exceptionally good luck on getting out after wandering through the jungles, etc.

Col. Thomas: What about ships being burned up on the ground?

Major Fisher: That comes from the 20mm Guns and incendiaries from the machine guns. The Jap cannon makes quite a hole in the tank. It catches fire. In the air, you know, gasoline will leak out and blow away. Only a couple of ships burned up in the air as we had self-sealing tanks.

Col. Thomas: What about the attack at the airdrome in Java? Did they circle around much? At low altitude?

Major Fisher: Very low altitude. We had the planes covered with palms back in the trees. The bunkers and revetments are absolutely worthless. Bunkers give no protection against strafing, except from a theoretically close bomb. In the first big raid at Clark Field the Japs were dropping anywhere from 5 to 10 bombs a piece. Only 2 B-17's were damaged by the bombing.

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Col. Blair: There were 30 caliber incendiary and 20mm Cannon on the fighters? Didn't the cannon do the most damage?

Major Fisher: It was hard to tell. Sometimes they would start to burn in the tail. It was not always the gasoline that started the fire.

Col. Thomas: Were the ships loaded with gas?

Major Fisher: We knew about the Pearl Harbor attack which occurred at 3 o'clock in the morning. We heard about it at 6 or 7. We were prepared for the first mission at Formosa when we got our first air raid alarm. One of the stations reported 27 airplanes flying toward Clark Field. We stayed up all morning. We landed about 11:30, when given an "all clear". At that time the order came in to prepare to attack air bases on Southern Formosa at about dusk. We were getting our ships prepared and our crews ready and all organized when we looked out of the hangar and there were 54 airplanes over us. All communications to Clark Field had been cut about an hour or so before the attack. There was no warning. We were caught with everything on the ground.

Col. Blair: What did you lose in the Clark Field attack?

Major Fisher: Around 15 B-17's, and pursuit about the same number not to mention B-18's shot up, and miscellaneous airplanes, around a total of possibly 40.

Col. Thomas: How about Nichols Field?

Major Fisher: They were patrolling when Clark Field was attacked, but for some reason they did not get word of the attack.

Major Fisher: We had no dive bombers in the Philippines. They first went into action at Java. The A-24 is a very excellent weapon. The most effective weapon against small surface vessels. If we had had about 50 or 60 we would

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have done a lot better in Java. We attacked with 3 A-24's. It did not worry us that the Japs had air superiority. We just had to catch them in the air. The morale of the men has been remarkable all the way through. Everybody over there has the idea everyone over here is sending all they can.

Major Fisher: Around 5,000 Air Force troops were on Bataan. Half of the Headquarters squadrons and the base squadrons, all at Bataan.

Col. Thomas: Did you go to Corregidor?

Major Fisher: No.

Gen. Moses: Are the planes able to get up there at all? (On Bataan)

Major Fisher: 12 P-40's were left with General MacArthur. They used P-40's and bombs in place of belly tanks on Bataan. One of the pursuit boys has worked out a technique of coming in at a 45° glide, with his engine throttled, using his gun sight and doing a very accurate bombing job. Several fields on Bataan, Cabanatuan, and a small field at Marivales, could have P-40's worked on them.

Gen. Moses: Can they hide planes in where they cannot be found?

Major Fisher: We had 25 pursuit planes on Clark Field. A large group of trees concealed these P-40's in the horseshoe of trees and they were never found by the Japanese. They were not damaged at all in the 2-week period.

Col. Borum: Did you have hard-surface runways.

Major Fisher: Some at Java. Most of the time, though, we operated off of turf.

Col. Borum: B-17's also?

Major Fisher: Yes, sir.

Gen Moses: Do you have aviation engineers for runways?

Major Fisher: Aviation engineers build air fields faster than you can think. They build them in a week.

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Gen. Moses: You had no mats, of course. They could improvise runways?

Major Fisher: We were operating under extreme field conditions. Another thing that came up was in fighting from island to island, if you leave many people you lose them. If you have a small group of maintenance men and combat crews and you have to leave a place, you can take them with you.

Col. Blair: You would recommend considerable reduction in Tables as we have them today?

Major Fisher: The 2 Squadrons of Bombers - 15 - B-17's - operating at Del Monte had only about 100 men besides the combat crews. It is amazing what you can operate with when you have to. The men were overworked. The first week or two it was terrific. The combat crews did their own maintenance and bomb loading for a couple of days.

Col. Thomas: Is there any necessity for Ordnance Companies, pursuit and bombardments?

Major Fisher: It won't work in the Theater of Operations. We need air bases and depots. In a Theater of Operations about all you can do is just fix 1st echelon maintenance and not too much of that, and load your bomb, ammunition, gasoline, oxygen and food. We need to split up in small fields. Only operate 6 or 8 airplanes on one field. Fighting in the islands is different from fighting on the mainland. All of our transportation was accomplished by air. There were no transports, no boats.

Col. Whiteley: What is the difference between pursuit and bombardment?

Major Fisher: For pursuit unit at Noro about 35 airplanes, 1 squadron strength 100 men, total 42 pilots. As we lost planes and strength diminished, we started to evacuate excess men above the strength necessary to operate. That was necessary because no reinforcements were coming. They operated

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very effectively there with a minimum of personnel and absolutely no supply as far as parts were concerned. If the oil tank were shot out, we would use the rest of the airplane for parts.

Col. Thomas: How about mechanics tools?

Major Fisher: That was the greatest difficulty. One bag you could pack and carry with you, and the mechanic had his bag plus a Kennedy kit. At one time in Java we had so few mechanics they would fly them from one island or plane to another so that work could be done on them.

Col. Hoag: Has there been any incendiary bombing?

Major Fisher: We heard it reported, but saw no incendiary bombs. The Japs dropped a small bomb which has a long nose and sets above the ground and does not continue to burn.

Col. Blair: As a result of your experience what would be your recommendations as to things we could change or do here in the way of organization and planning?

Major Fisher: All organizations that go out should be complete and trained. There is no room or time or equipment to train them in Australia. We suffered at first from untrained pilots.

Col. Blair: What changes in organization and ground equipment would you recommend?

Major Fisher: The staff was way too large. We spend our time supporting ourselves instead of the combat squadrons. There were too many pilots sitting behind desks shuffling papers and some of the work could have been consolidated. There was too much duplication of work. When I went out all I had was a morning report and payroll.

Col. Whiteley: What about the organization of the Japs?

Major Fisher: They had a good system worked out as they were going down to

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the South Pacific. They would come in with a heavy bombardment and send fighters over, which have terrific range, and clean out everything left. After several days of these attacks, they would bring in a Navy convoy of a few transports, with 2 or 3 cruisers or destroyers coming in at night taking over, and next day flying in on bombers or fighters and fight until they had complete area protected from ground forces and start operating with that as a base and then proceed to take another base in the same way. They would come in at night with equipment and get oil, gasoline, supplies, and get ready to operate next day. The organization was so good they could be operating in a day.

Col. Thomas: Do you have gasoline scattered all over the Philippines? Bombs, too?

Major Fisher: Yes, sir.

Col. Hoag: How long were you in Australia?

Major Fisher: At Darwin a week and Melbourne a week, and then left for Java. No trouble with gasoline supply there (Australia). Gasoline is strictly rationed to civilians there. They are allowed 4 gallons a month.

Col. \_\_\_\_\_: Organizational equipment? We plan here on Hemisphere defense.

Major Fisher: The organization and equipment should be cut down to the minimum. Figure in your Theater of Operations.

Col. Blair: When you cut your personnel down, you cut your equipment down.

Major Fisher: Gen. Arnold told me this morning that one squadron went out of Australia with 500 and some men. Ordnance equipment would go with decontamination squads, etc.

Col. Blair: The garrison we sent down to occupy one island near Australia

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was about 500.

Col. Borum: Do you use Drums? with hand pumps, motorized pumps, or what?

Major Fisher: They are extremely valuable. The most valuable piece of equipment is motor driven gasoline refueling equipment. The one with a washing machine engine. That little engine is wonderful. We used the hand pumps for refueling the drums.

Col. Thomas: How about portable lighting system?

Major Fisher: We have to operate at night right now. It has been used at Del Monte and other fields. It seems to be all right.

Major Fisher: Night lighting. Darwin had their own. No. 10 cans full of Kerosene and a stick rope in it were used.

Col. Blair: If you had pursuit, they would not be doing so much day flying?

Major Fisher: If we had P-47's we could take over. They should go down to Australia.

Col. Thomas: What about fuel stores down there?

Major Fisher: It is in barrels dispersed around the field. That way you don't lose so much. They should be painted green, brown or something instead of red as they are now.

Major Fisher: On the bases we are operating from the Bob trucks. The Government bought a lot of trucks in Java.

Col. Borum: What about light maintenance equipment?

Major Fisher: One P-40 engine was changed in the field at Java.

Col. Borum: Is the mobile depot group in the field?

Col. Thomas: The mobile depot group is supposed to take care of wrecks, etc. Did you ever recover any of these crashes?

Major Fisher: We did not have time. The Dutch fished a couple out of the water. You can't do anything when you are operating the way we were.

Col. Hoag: Are destructors being used on bombsights?

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Major Fisher: Destructors are not being used on bombsights. I do not believe we have captured any Jap sights yet. Our men take care of the sights and remove them after a crash.

Col. Thomas: How about the flight SBAE equipment?

Major Fisher: No bombs dropped with it. It is impossible to maintain in the field. It is too complicated. My answers are generally the opinion of most of the pilots and not merely my own. We need an automatic pilot. The Sperry is better as far as an automatic pilot is concerned. PBI is what we need. It takes too long to set up SBAE equipment.

Col. Hoag: How does the LB-30 compare with the B-17?

Major Fisher: The LB-30 cannot get the altitude. Anything that cannot get altitude will be subjected to heavy attack. On one flight 3 LB-30's were shot down, 1 got back. Armor plate and self-sealing tanks are very essential. It saves a lot of airplanes. You need turbos on them.

Col. Hoag: Have our pursuit ships got enough range -- the present ones?

Major Fisher: On that mission at Bali 16 P-40's participated about 200 miles from their hidden field to the airport. They went over there with full belly tanks holding about 195 gallons. 2 ran out of gas on the way home. The Japanese fighters have a range of around 1200 miles. The Japanese have operated 400 miles without refueling. They accompany their bombardment with fighters which is something we cannot do.

Gen. Moses: What have they sacrificed?

Major Fisher: Armor plate, self-sealing tanks, weight in general.

Major Fisher: This hidden field was around Noro (Java) in the mountains, just foothills, about 200 feet above sea level.

Col. Whiteley: Do you have any weather service over there?

Major Fisher: The weather was generally good. Except for Navy ARI's there

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is no weather service. We would very seldom run into an overcast. They have tropical type of weather. The rain season had not started. We had ground warning system only, that is ground observers. No Radar equipment. This ground warning system was very effective. It would give the number and type of airplane and whether it was high or low.

Col. Hoag: What about friend or foe identification?

Major Fisher: No, the difficulty was to know the position of friendly operations. We were using 4-motor bombers and theirs were bi-motor bombers. Our fleet called for fighter protection several times.

Col. Borum: About the B-17's, what range did you get out of them? How much did you have left in your tanks when you got across?

Major Fisher: From Hawaii I went to Midway, Wake. From Wake Island to Port Moresby -- 2100 nautical miles -- 2500 miles, and we had 500 gallons of gasoline left. The bathtub was already on the D. The E with the 2 tail guns gained an awful superiority.

Col. Hoag: Does the Japanese stuff begin to compare in bombardment with the B-17's?

Major Fisher: No sir, They can't touch it. Their ceiling is 26,000 feet, speed 160 miles an hour. They have wonderful discipline. If you shot down the leader another files in at once.

: Can Jap fighters get up to the B-17's?

Major Fisher: They can get up to 30,000 feet but the B-17 can outrun them. But the B-17's get 30,000 feet, go in as fast as they can and get out.

: Was there any trouble with wire cutting by Jap agents, etc., at Java?

Major Fisher: Not so terribly much. In the Philippines everytime we took off at night there was smoke columns going up. Flares and signals.

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I got to Melbourne on March 10th. General Brett is sending back all heavy bombardment pilots he can spare since we lost so much equipment. We are to form new units.

: Do you have any idea of the chance of surface vessels getting to the Philippines?

Major Fisher: No, sir, I don't. I wouldn't like to be on a surface ship that was trying to get into the Philippines. We left Marivales at night. We got down on the island of Mindoro to sit during the day. It was a 3 day, 2 night trip. At 2:30 the next afternoon a Navy patrol bomber found us and bombed us 40 minutes. The first bomb he dropped struck off the stern of the boat. The next approach, he dropped one that hit out on the edge of the rail. He made six more approaches, each time further back but he never hit the boat. A number of men jumped off the boat after the first bomb was dropped and attempted to swim to shore. One of the bombs hitting in the water killed a number of these men. The next night we pulled into some coves on the island of Negros. The captain of the Panay, which was a munitions ship, told us that some bombers had come over the day before and sunk his ship and we evacuated our boat. No bombers came over that day and that night we went on down to Mindanao.

The Japanese intelligence is perfect. There is nothing they don't know about our operations and strength.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
SAC  
W.M. G. T.

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3-26-42

GENERAL WATSON:

Major Sherry of the G-2 Ferry Command brought in these pictures, at your suggestion, for the President to take to Hyde Park to look over at his leisure.

This is only a small part of the large collection of pictures of ferry routes in Africa which Major Sherry brought to you yesterday.

Mr. Pres. 1d  
Perhaps you would care  
to look at these pictures  
at your leisure,  
E. M. W.

a71501

RF(S)-War

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I think this situation is in need of correction. Bill Bullitt is leaving within the next two weeks to make another trip as my Special Representative in the Near and Middle East. What do you think of having him make you a personal report?

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Kirk in Cairo, dated March 31, 1942, re divided control in that area of American military activities. The U. S. Military North African Mission, so Mr. Kirk says, is fully equipped to command control but the Air Corps Ferrying Command appears to be operating without ready to that Hdqts.

a71+01

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

*Boyle*  
April 4, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I acknowledge receipt of your memorandum of April 2, enclosing paraphrase of message (#507, March 31) from Louis Johnson relating to the matter of the United States Military North African Mission at Cairo and the Ferry Command activities in that district. I am glad to say that this is one of those cases in which the men in general supervisory charge of these operations have already diagnosed the difficulty and have instituted corrective measures insofar as the Ferry Command is concerned.

A thorough reorganization of the Ferry Command is now under way. Colonel Harold George is now in charge of the Command. We have obtained the services of the man who is reputed to be the ablest airline operator in the country, C. R. Smith of American Airlines. He is now actively engaged in reorganization of this Command. We propose to make him a Colonel in the United States Army Air Forces and Colonel George will place him in over-all charge of operations. We are bringing into this organization outstanding operating, traffic and technical men from all scheduled airlines.

In general, the program calls for dividing the South Atlantic transport and ferrying operation into five main divisions: first, from Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, to Natal; second, Natal to Coast of West Africa; third, the Transafrican operation to Cairo; fourth, Cairo to the Indian Terminal; and fifth, the Extension into China. Trained specialists will be in charge of each of these operating divisions. The reorganization plans are well advanced and will rapidly be put into effect.

As a result of reports from Ferry Command officers and the information obtained from Mr. Bullitt following his recent trip to the Far East, difficulty seems to have arisen mainly out of the following factors:

1. Inadequacy of personnel in the Middle East.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 4-7-59

Signature - *Carl S. Spaed*

a71+02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~418917 410000  
RECORDED

2. The matter of franchises in neutral countries and some jealousies arising out of post-war ambitions of commercial operators.

3. Lack of an adequate and efficient British communications system, which has resulted in deficient radio control, frequently resulting in planes arriving prior to receipt at the destination of radio messages reporting their flight.

4. Lack of whole-hearted cooperation between the British and American officials in part arising out of fear of post-war commercial designs.


5. Tendency on the part of the separate military commanders in Cairo and Basra to regard the Ferry Command as a local, instead of a through, service, resulting in confusion and conflicting instructions.

An expert operating man from the civil airlines and an inspector are scheduled to leave shortly for Cairo to investigate and report on the general situation in that district. They will, of course, inquire specifically into any matters which have caused difficulty. Any readjustments required as a result of their report will be incorporated into the general reorganization program now in process.

Since the stories of various travelers into this district necessarily reflect the special interest of the individuals with whom they have discussed the matter, I suggest that it would be wise to allow the experienced airline operators now in our service, and one of our trained military inspectors report on the matter after hearing all sides, before any final conclusion is reached on the recommendation made by Mr. Johnson that command of the enterprise be vested in the U. S. Army mission in Cairo. In a long-range transportation problem, it would be unsound if each divisional superintendent of a railroad had complete authority over equipment and movements through his division without regard to through schedules or terminal problems. In the same way, the best operation of this great airline must be planned with these elements very much in mind.

If anything unusual develops as a result of the above inspection, I will see that it is brought to your attention.

Very sincerely yours,



The President  
The White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a71 + 03

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM FOR**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR <sup>x25</sup>

I still think it would be an excellent gesture to return at least one flag captured at Chapultepec Castle. I do not think it is necessary to go into the matter of other Mexican flags at this time.

But in the case of the flag or flags of the Cadets at Chapultepec, I would suggest that if there is any question of identification you should get a Mexican historical expert to help us identify the flag or flags. Also, please go ahead with initiating action to get the necessary legislative authority.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Under Secretary of War.

at the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

OCT 26 1942

Recd 10-19-66

Signature: *Paul L. Spicker*

x146

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Return of Captured Mexican Flags.

x

You have asked me to comment on the suggestion made by the Under Secretary of State that certain flags captured by our troops in the battle of Chapultepec be returned to the Mexican Government as an expression of the fine relations which now exist between our two countries. Particular emphasis is placed on the desirability of returning those flags which were taken from the Cadets of the Mexican Military College who died in the defense of Chapultepec Castle during that battle. As has been pointed out, the Cadets who lost their lives there have come down through history as the child heroes of Mexico, and September 13th is set aside annually in commemoration of their death.

The flags that were captured in the Mexican War were deposited for preservation at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Many of these flags cannot be positively identified as having been captured in any particular battle. Only one flag has been identified as having been captured at Chapultepec Castle, but the unit from which this flag was taken has not been identified. It is possible that this flag may have belonged to the Mexican Military College, but to date it has been impossible to establish its identity. Further investigation is being made in this regard.

x25-6

I am advised that, according to the law, all property taken from the enemy, such as the flag in question, becomes the property of the United States, and can only be disposed of in the manner suggested by the Under Secretary of State by special authorization of the Congress.

If you desire that one or more of the captured Mexican flags be returned to the Mexican Government, the War Department would be pleased to initiate action with the view to obtaining the necessary legislative authority.

*R. L. P. Pitt*

Acting Secretary of War

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71u02

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Oct. 28, '42

Repy forwarded to  
the President

Edw

a71u03

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

FOR REPORT

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, 10/2/42, to the  
President, with attached copy of a despatch received  
from Ambassador Messersmith suggesting that the flags  
captured by our troops in the Battle of Chapultepec  
on September 13, 1847, be returned to the Mexican  
Govt. Copy of Mr. Welles' retained for our files.

*x b. f state*

a71u04

October 2, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I attach herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from Ambassador Messersmith suggesting that the flags captured by our troops in the Battle of Chapultepec on the thirteenth of September, 1847, be returned to the Mexican Government. I agree with the Ambassador that this would be a highly-desirable gesture and that it would be a very happy symbolic expression of the relations now existing between Mexico and the United States. It is indeed a source of the deepest satisfaction that Mexico and the United States, for the first time in the history of the two nations, are fighting side by side.

It is my understanding that the flags in question are currently in the Chapel at West Point and under the general custody of the Quartermaster General of the Army. If you are in agreement with our recommendation that they be returned to the Government of Mexico, you will wish to communicate with the Secretary of War in regard to the carrying out of the necessary arrangements.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Sumner Welles

As above.

The President,

The White House.

a71 u05

WAR DEPARTMENT  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON

Received from \* (AFASC-O), Headquarters, Army Air Forces the following (SECRET, COMMUNICABLE) document:

Addressed to: Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Subject: RE:SRTC

Type of Corres.: Letter

Date: November 28, 1942

Basic Dated: --

No. Incls. : 1 Incl -

S" SRTC"  
W/ITT

15  
C. J.  
War  
filed by J. P. 11/3/43  
miss J. P. 11/3/43

Confidential

PLEASE ACCOMPLISH AND  
RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO:

Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.  
Army Air Forces  
Room 1228, Overseas Division,  
Hq., Air Service Command,  
Gravelly Point,  
Washington, D. C.

DATE RECEIVED \_\_\_\_\_

BY \_\_\_\_\_  
Name \_\_\_\_\_

Rank \_\_\_\_\_ Branch \_\_\_\_\_

OFFICE OF: \_\_\_\_\_

AAF NO.

\* Insert symbol of office of origin.

x150  
x25-U  
x25  
x773

a71v01

W-7236, AF

Dear Mac.

(File 78-42  
~~Confidential~~)

Please talk to Mr. Currie  
about this, he knows more  
about Glima's problem than  
anyone whom I have met.

M. H. M. to Mr. Currie  
talked later again  
and later again  
and Col. Campbell just  
to Col. Campbell she wanted  
to phone to see if he wanted  
to see if papers  
at phone to see if he wanted no

  
(Col. Tom Campbell)

~~SECRET~~

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
COMMANDING GENERAL  
AIR SERVICE COMMAND  
ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ARMY AIR FORCES  
HEADQUARTERS, AIR SERVICE COMMAND  
WASHINGTON

NOV 28 1942

(AFASG-0)

~~SECRET~~

By Authority of  
The Commanding General  
Air Service Command  
Initials

November 28, 1942. U. S. National Library

REFLASSIFIED

DDO DIL. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

Date - 10-19-66

Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

I am attaching a summary of a somewhat lengthy report which has been prepared in regard to "Supply Routes to China". There are now over 70,000 tons of supplies of all kinds in Karachi, and the tonnage is increasing rather than decreasing owing to the transportation restrictions between India and China.

China is more in need of supplies than any one of our allies, and I believe it is possible to increase the delivery of supplies to China with very little delay and by the use of equipment and labor now available.

I have talked this over with my Commanding Officer, Brigadier General Clements McLullen, Commanding General, Overseas Division, Air Service Command; and he fully recognizes the need of the delivery of more supplies to China but his jurisdiction ends at Karachi. I have a feeling that I can contribute a great deal towards the solution of the ground transportation problem by the building of roads and the maintenance and repair of the thousands of trucks which have been used on the Burma Road but are now in poor operating condition. It is much easier and infinitely quicker to use the supplies which are now in China, repair the trucks which are there, than to ship in new equipment from the United States.

The work which I have been doing on increased supplies for Russia is finished primarily by the help of Admiral Leedy, who is doing a grand job in every respect. I would like to go to China as my experience has equipped me for such a job and I want you to take this up with the President.

Faithfully yours,

THOMAS D. CAMPBELL, X  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Overseas Division,  
Air Service Command.



ASG 3077 SA

1 Incls. -  
Summary "Supply Routes to China".

RECORDED

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SUPPLIES FOR CHINA

November 28, 1942

1. China is in more urgent need of supplies now than any other one of our allies. England and Australia are well provided for. Russia has received enormous quantities in spite of loss in transit, but China has received practically nothing--caused primarily by the invasion of Burma and the loss of trade routes.

2. It is very evident that until the Burma Road can be re-opened or some short route developed between India and China, it will be necessary to have a combination of air and ground transportation in order to increase the delivery of supplies to China.

3. There are now over 73,000 tons of supplies for China in India, as per list attached, and the logical thing is to deliver these supplies first. This can be done if we adopt the following procedure:

a. Increase the number of transport cargo planes.

b. Develop new roads from Sadiya to connect with points on the Burma Road using such equipment as they may now have on hand in China and Chinese laborers.

c. Repair the trucks now in use on the Burma Road and establish a system of maintenance. There are now 1,800 tons of parts for these trucks in Karachi and complete maintenance shop equipment which has never been delivered to China.

d. There is a possibility of using some river routes which should be investigated; and, if the railways between Karachi and Sadiya are crowded with freight, there is no reason why supplies can not be delivered to Calcutta by vessel and from there to Sadiya by rail.

4. Meager reports now available in the United States indicate that a great increase in the delivery of tonnage to China can be done by following the above suggestions with the equipment and supplies which are now in China and India. The attached map shows the available and suggested routes which should be investigated.

At Librator

Date 10-19-66

Signature Carl L. Spicer

1 Incl. -  
Map.

THOMAS D. CAMPBELL,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Overseas Division,  
Air Service Command.

~~SECRET~~

a71 v04

SUPPLIES AT KARACHI and OTHER POINTS  
IN INDIA

	<u>Long tons</u>
Arsenal . . . . .	.17,999.9
Aviation . . . . .	7,028.5
Medical and General . . . . .	2,366.9
Motor transport. . . . .	21,927.4
Ordnance . . . . .	22,697.8
Signal Corps . . . . .	1,494.2
TOTAL	<hr/> 73,514.7

July 22, 1872, 12.15 p.m. 100° 50' N. 110° 10' E. 100° 50' N. 110° 10' E. 100° 50' N. 110° 10' E.

58

971 v.05

~~SECRET~~  
SUMMARY OF REPORT ON SUPPLY ROUTES TO CHINA.

November 27, 1942

1. Lend-Lease records indicate that there are over 73,000 tons of supplies for China at Karachi and other points in India with thousands more to come as per list attached.

2. This means that it will be necessary to have a combination of ground and air transport to deliver these supplies using the railway across India to Sadiya.

3. Meager reports which we have from various sources indicate that there are several possible short, quickly constructed road routes between Sadiya and points on the Burma Road. These road routes should be investigated immediately by engineers.

4. It is absolutely necessary to have trucks—modern Armies can not operate without them. Mr. C. V. Bowman, Zone Manager, who was superintendent of maintenance on the Burma Road, reports that the trucks which were used on this highway are in very bad condition and that there are practically no facilities at all for maintaining these trucks. None of the equipment shipped from the United States and intended for maintenance for some 5,000 trucks on this highway ever reached China. Lend-Lease reports that there are 1,800 tons of spare parts—a greater portion of which are for vehicles in China are still at Karachi. It should be easier to transport these parts by plane to points on the Burma Road and install a system of maintenance and repair than to ship new trucks from the United States.

5. Lend-Lease reports the following trucks at Karachi:

Number of trucks:

1/4 ton (4x4)	285	a/
1/2 ton (4x2)	31	
3/4 ton (4x2)	50	
2 1/2 ton (6x4)	42	
2 1/2 ton (6x6)	449	b/
	857	

Tank trucks	48
Wrecker trucks	79
Floodlight trucks	40

all of which are supposed to be in good condition. These trucks can be shipped from Karachi to Sadiya by rail or go by highway and transport a load, if necessary. Colonel Dawson, Indian Supply Mission, says that the journey would require about three (3) weeks.

a/ Fifteen diverted - Jeeps  
b/ Probably 20 diverted.


Frank

a71 v06

"Summary of Report on Supply Routes to China".

They should not be turned over to the Burma Road Organization again without some system of maintenance as they will be needed by the Chinese Army. These trucks could deliver at least 3,000 tons plus their own weight if gasoline and oil could be secured enroute.

6. This seems to be the logical distribution point as it is at the end of the railway 23,000 miles from Karachi, is the closest railhead to China, is now used by Air Transport Command as its last terminal on its flying route to China and is the location of a large refinery



THOMAS D. CAMPBELL,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Overseas Division,  
Air Service Command.


1 Incl. -

List "Supplies at Karachi  
and Other Points in India."

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
a71v07

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a71v07



## GENERAL TRANSPORTATION MAP of CHINA

SCALE : 1 : 6,336,000  
0 50 100 200 300 400 Miles

### LEGEND

International Boundary	~~~~ Provincial Boundary
River	~~~~
City, Important	○ Town
Railway	— Road
Railway, under Construction	—·— Road, Projected or
Railway, Projected	·—·— under Construction
Railway, Dismantled	— Trail

T S I N G

200 Miles

T I B E T



May 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL W. B. SMITH ON "Flare Signal Pistol".

The President made the following statement in a speech:-

January 7, 1942. "And our overwhelming superiority of armament must be adequate to put weapons of war at the proper time into the hands of those men in the conquered nations who stand ready to seize the first opportunity to revolt against their German and Japanese oppressors, and against the traitors *in their own ranks*, known by the already infamous name of "Quislings". As we get guns to the patriots in those lands, they too will fire shots heard 'round the world."

The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee studied the question and came to the conclusion that because of the limitations of weight, size and usability, only a pistol be used for this purpose. The Army Ordnance, at our request, produced this one pound pistol made of stampings for regulation .45 calibre ammunition. The total weight of pistol and 20 rounds of ammunition is 2 lbs.

This is a revolutionary type of weapon in its method of manufacture by stampings.

The pistol was O.K.'ed by General Eisenhower, General Somervell and Assistant Secretary Patterson. Dies are being made and one million have been ordered and will be produced by the end of July. After that the rate can be stepped up to 2 million per week if necessary.

It is the opinion of the J.P.W.C. that this pistol should be used only in case of invasion of the continent and possibly for a general revolution. In either case, the dissemination of this weapon must be a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In case of invasion, the dissemination of pistols by planes to cell units of agents for distribution to loyal people must be carefully organized and well-timed. Much work on this has been done by the British S.O.E. We are working with the S.C.E. on this proposition. A hundred miles or more along the coast to be invaded should have a belt 40 miles <sup>deep of its people prepared</sup> and organized by agents for arming so that at the given time shootings of Gestapo, soldiers, etc., demolitions of bridges, railroads, yards, and power plants, etc., with general chaos

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS D. APR 6 1973

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and revolution would prevail to require German beach line troops and troops from support points in the rear to try to prevent sabotage and to take care of revolt among the people rather than be ready to concentrate on the point where the allied beach head was attempted.

It is essential for a successful invasion to have this extra help that the civilian population can give if properly organized and armed. If agents and the people are armed, they can then carry out the many important tasks of sabotage of communications, subversive activities for diversion of enemy troops.

Note

The deception plan for this weapon is that it is considered as a flare signal pistol for ground troop units, and because of priorities nothing will be done about it until later this year.

O.W. Solbert  
Col. G.S.C.  
Psychological Warfare Br.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1973  
By RT; NARS Date APR 6 1973

071w02

*W.M.*  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Landing Craft for BOLERO Operations.

1. Pursuant to the directions of the President, given at a conference in the White House at 2:30 P.M. May 6 at which the procurement of landing craft was discussed, the following report is submitted in answer to the questions:

a. What can be done by September 1942?  
b. What can be done by April 1943?

2. What can be done by September 1942?

The following landing craft can and will be available in the United Kingdom by early September 1942:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>BY U.S.</u>	<u>BY U.K.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ATL's (328')	0	4	4
YTL's (105' - 200')	45	151	196
TL's (50')	400	95	495
YR's (36')	400	202	602
Y's (36' - 39')	400	195	595

By that time the U.S. will have in the U.K. a total force of about 105,000 troops, including 3 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armored Division, 6 Pursuit Groups, 2 Medium Bomber Groups and 11 Heavy Bomber Groups.

The landing craft listed above can carry a force of about 21,000 men, 3,000 vehicles and 300 tanks.

3. What can be done by April 1943?

Present plans entail the launching of an assaulting force of

76,500 men  
18,380 vehicles  
2,250 tanks

The British recommend the use of the following landing craft for this operation:

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1973

By RT, NARS D-70 APR 6 1973

971x01

200 ATL's	(328')	carrying 18,000 vehicles
570 YTL's	(105'-200')	" 2,250 tanks
300 Giant Y's	(153')	" 60,000 men
300 TL's	(50')	" 300 vehicles
500 Y's	(36')	" 18,000 men
80 YR's	(36')	" 80 vehicles


It will be seen that chief reliance is placed in the larger, more seaworthy types of vessels. The British Navy recommend against a shore to shore crossing in small boats and against a ship to shore operation from combat loaded transports. The U.S. Army accepts the method and plan proposed by the British. It expects to have in the U.K. by April 1943 a total force of 832,000 men to sustain the movement.

To provide the landing craft listed, the construction of the following additional vessels in the U.S. to be available at seaboard by March 1, 1943 is required:

294 YTL's  
172 ATL's (328')  
300 Giant Y's (153')

This construction is considered to be physically possible only upon condition that this program be given priorities over all other items of the Defense Program as necessary to meet the date of March 1, 1943

The construction of the ATL's and Giant Y boats would require a modification of existing combat and cargo shipbuilding programs which may affect joint operations. It is therefore recommended that this entire matter be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for immediate consideration in collaboration with other affected agencies as necessary and report.

  
Brehon Somervell,  
Lt. General, U.S. Army.

  
F.J. Horne  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy.

May 14, 1942.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972 6 1973

-2- B, RT, NARS Date *a71x02*

SECRET

May 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:


Will you please send me your recommendation at an early date regarding the attached memorandum.

Will you consult with Mr. Nelson relative to the effect of this program on priorities which will have to be given these craft and the effect these priorities will have on other military items.

HLH/lmb

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By RT  
Date APR 6 1973

a71x03



Apr. 23, 1940.

See Archivist on Duty  
for complete map

271y01

~~SECRET~~

P-5  
Safe  
Ward

JUL 10 1941

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of July 7th, requesting information relative to the activities of certain vessels of the Army Transport Service which were listed on an inclosure thereto, has been received. I am attaching in tabular form the information which you have requested.

Respectfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

Incl..

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

REFILED

File 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 4-8-58

Signature - Carl S. Spence

~~SECRET~~

COPY

SAFE FILE: Welles Report, 1940 Part I

ROME, FEBRUARY 26, 1940

At 10 a.m. on Monday, February 26, the day after my arrival in Rome, Ambassador Phillips accompanied me to my first interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Count Ciano received me in his office in the Chigi Palace, the temporary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the permanent Ministry being now under construction in the 1942 Exposition grounds.

Count Ciano made an impression upon me quite different from that which I had anticipated. From his photographs, and from the reports which had been given me by persons who had been in contact with him, I had pictured him as overwhelmingly filled with a sense of his own importance. In my conversations with him I found him quite the reverse. He looks older than his thirty-eight years, but appears to be in exceptionally good physical condition. His manner was cordial and quite unaffected, and he could not have been simpler nor more frank in the expression of his views. He speaks easily in colloquial English.

I commenced the interview by saying how much I appreciated the courtesies which had been shown me on my arrival by the Government, and how much I welcomed the opportunity of talking with the Chief of the Government and with himself in order that I might report the views so communicated to me to the President and to the Secretary of State. I said that I wished to make clear at the outset my very strong conviction that during these past years relations between Italy and the United States had been far from satisfactory. I was going to be quite frank in adding that I believed there had been misunderstandings and misapprehensions on both sides, errors of omission and commission by

both

272 b01

both parties, regrettable attacks upon the United States in the Italian press, regrettable speeches in criticism of the Italian Government in the United States, and that I felt sure the Minister would agree with me that the time had now come when in the best interests of both countries such a situation, which had no real reason for existing, should cease. Count Ciano immediately said, "I fully agree: It is not a question of forgetting the past, because there really isn't any 'past'; but we must at once start in with a completely satisfactory 'future'."

I then went on to say that the President desired me to refer to what he himself had said to Ambassador Colonna a little while ago in expressing his own great satisfaction at the great change which had recently taken place on the part of public opinion in the United States with regard to Italy. The President wished me to emphasize the real pleasure of the American Government that the American people were viewing in so friendly a manner the efforts which the Italian Government had made to avert war, and with such favor the policy of neutrality being pursued by Italy since war had broken out. I said that this very friendly feeling in the United States towards Italy on the part of the public was fully shared by my own Government, and created, I hoped, a particularly propitious moment for an immediate return to that cordiality of relations between our two countries which for so many generations had been traditional. At this moment, the United States, in complete harmony with the other American Republics, constituted one great neutral influence; Italy constituted the other. In the interest of civilization itself it seemed to me desirable that

that those two great neutral influences should pull together, and not apart, so that, if at any moment there seemed to be an opportunity for the establishment of world peace, of a permanent and stable nature, those two great neutral influences could effectively cooperate morally together for the construction of lasting and sound peace foundations.

The Minister very heartily concurred.

I said that since I was happy to see that we were in full agreement on this premise, I believed it might be desirable to emphasize in some practical and open way the friendly relationship between our two countries. The American people had been greatly impressed with the splendid contribution which Italy had made both to the New York and San Francisco Expositions. My Government had also greatly appreciated the decision of the Italian Government to continue this coming year its participation in the New York World's Fair. I said that I was glad to tell the Minister that the day I left Washington a bill had been introduced in the United States Senate providing for the appropriation of \$2,000,000 for participation by the United States in the Rome Exposition of 1942, and that the President was personally interested in seeing that this legislation be enacted. I felt that this would constitute a practical demonstration of the kind I had in mind.

Count Ciano expressed his very great satisfaction. He said this Exposition, while constituting a permanent embellishment of Rome--since all the new Exposition buildings would eventually become Government offices--would be in reality Mussolini's monument, and that participation

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by the United States would be profoundly appreciated by the Duce.

I continued by saying that another desirable and practical demonstration of cordiality between us would be an increase of beneficial trade relations. At this moment all neutral countries found their normal export trade severely curtailed. It would surely be helpful to Italy and the United States to find some satisfactory method of enlarging a mutually beneficial volume of trade between them. I emphasized that, of course, to make possible such an arrangement the two Governments must find a meeting of minds as to principles and policies, but that I hoped that friendly study and consideration of all of the factors involved might pave the way for the desired solution.

The Minister once more heartily concurred, and said that the experts of his Government would be at our disposal whenever we desired them. Since the Ambassador had told me that Count Ciano does not interest himself in commercial questions nor in any economic problems, I did not continue in any detail this topic of conversation.

I then said to the Minister that he was, of course, fully familiar with the purpose of my mission. I said that I was directed by the President to report to him upon the present possibility of the establishment in Europe of a stable and lasting peace--that was the only kind of peace in which my Government was interested; the President was not interested in any precarious or temporary peace which would, in essence, be no more than a patched-up truce.

I felt it desirable to make very clear that I was not empowered

empowered to offer any proposals, nor to enter into any commitments. I would, however, be most grateful for any views which the Minister might care to express to me, and the Minister could be confident that any views so expressed would be maintained by me as completely confidential and as solely for the information of the President and of Secretary Hull.

The Minister said that he fully understood the situation, and that he would talk with me with the utmost frankness. And that he proceeded to do.

He commenced by saying that he was glad that I did not intend to offer any proposals, or any set formula as to a possible peace treaty. He doubted whether the moment was propitious for any effort of that character.

I took occasion at this juncture to remark that I had been privileged to follow from a distance his own brilliant career and to estimate with much admiration his own efforts to prevent war at the end of August, and since that date, to limit the spread of war. I said that I was particularly interested in knowing whether the Italian Government was still considering the possibility of the kind of a meeting between representatives of the belligerents which it had suggested last August 31.

Count Ciano said that the initiative then taken had been his own idea, taken, of course, after consultation with Mussolini.

He got up and from a safe took out his famous red diary in which he records in his own handwriting his daily activities. He read me excerpts from it covering the period in question. It appeared that during the three days commencing August 31 he had been constantly on the

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long distance telephone, speaking personally with Foreign Ministers Halifax and Bonnet and with Hitler himself, urging a meeting between them and Mussolini to be held at Stresa on September 5. He had recorded that Hitler had agreed to such a meeting on September first, but that he had had no replies from Bonnet and Halifax until September 2, and that while the latter had then agreed in principle, Halifax had insisted that as a condition precedent German troops must be withdrawn back beyond the German frontier with Poland. Ciano felt that if the reply from Halifax had come on September first, Hitler would have agreed to this condition, but that by September 2 German troops had advanced so far and German military enthusiasm had reached such a pitch, as to make this condition impossible of acceptance.

The Minister doubted whether any similar meeting at this time would be productive of any useful purpose.

Count Ciano then spoke at very considerable length of German-Italian relations. He spoke with no effort at concealment of his hearty dislike of Ribbentrop. He said, "If Hitler wants anything--and God knows he always wants enough--Ribbentrop always goes him one better." He likewise made it clear that he bitterly resented not only the lack of courtesy shown the Italian Government by Hitler in failing to consult it with regard to German policy, but also by what he claimed was Hitler's complete disregard for the terms of the understanding between Italy and Germany.

He stated that during the past summer when he had twice conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop, the subject of the negotiations then progressing between the Soviet Union and France and England had, of course, come up for discussion. The Germans had told him that in order to

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impede these negotiations they were attempting to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia, and that this would be merely in the nature of "a petit jeu". "Can you conceive," Count Ciano added with great bitterness, "of our being asked to regard a military alliance between Germany and Communist Russia as being merely 'a petit jeu'?" "Do you further realize," he asked, "that Hitler called me on the telephone only on August 21 last to announce the conclusion of this alliance to me, and that before I had even had time to get Mussolini on the telephone to break the news to him, this very radio in my own office here was carrying the report already broadcast to the whole world?" "That," he said, "was the way in which Italy was advised as to German foreign policy." "And with regard to Poland," he continued, "the clear-cut terms of our understanding with Germany provide that if Germany undertakes any military adventure, Italy must be first afforded the opportunity of consultation. We did everything we could to prevent the invasion of Poland, but we were never given any real chance to exert any influence upon Hitler to prevent it."

The Minister went on to say that the Italian Government had the deepest sympathy for the "real Poles". It believed that Poland must be reconstituted. To that end the Italian Government continued to recognize a Polish Embassy in Rome, and the Minister himself continued to spend a great part of his time in bringing what influence he could to bear upon Germany to mitigate the severity of its treatment of Polish nationals in occupied territory.

The Minister then talked about Russia and Russian policy. He said that Italy had always proclaimed that

Russian

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Russian policy was frankly imperialist in that the Soviet was bending every effort, at times in one way, at other times in another, to bring about the hegemony of Soviet influence in every part of the world. At the same time Russia had been maintaining that it only desired world peace, and that any form of conquest was abhorrent to it. Now he said that mask had been removed, and Russia had been revealed not only as avid for communist revolution throughout the world, but likewise as determined to conquer as much territory in Europe as it could get away with. Against this he said Italy would stand "like a wall".

The sympathy of Italy was overwhelmingly with Finland. The reaction in Italy against Russian occupation of Poland had been extreme; but it had been violent against the assault on Finland. He stated that the Italian Government had furnished Finland with munitions and airplanes, and that when Germany had refused to permit the planes to be shipped by rail through Germany, they had been sent by sea.

I asked Count Ciano if any volunteers from Italy had been permitted to go to Finland. He said not, but that the reason for this was not any objection on the part of Italy to their fighting against Russia, but solely because Italy did not think Finland could hold out for long, and that if any considerable number of Italians fought in the Finnish army, and Finland was defeated, it would be very difficult for Italy to repatriate her own nationals without actually declaring war on Russia, which she was not prepared to do because of Finland. For geographical reasons Italy could not do what she had done in Spain. The Minister doubted whether the Allies would render any effective aid to Finland before it was too late.

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With regard to the Balkans, the Minister said I undoubtedly knew all that Italy had done to preserve peace in that region. He alone, he said, through his meeting with Count Csaky in Venice had persuaded Hungary to refrain from provoking a conflict with Rumania so long as the present war continued, and Hungary had now agreed not only to postpone her claims for the territorial readjustments she desired, but also to refrain from press attacks against Rumania. C

Italy had definitely entered into an agreement with Rumania--and Count Ciano emphasized that this agreement was completely secret--that if Russia attacked Rumania, Italy would at once come to the assistance of Rumania, not through open declaration of war on Russia, but through the furnishing of every form of military assistance, including the furnishing of troops and airplanes.

The Minister here interjected that while volunteers had not been permitted to go from Italy to Finland, Italian aviators had gone in some numbers, and that today Count Ciano's private pilot was leaving to fly an Italian bomber on the Finnish front.

Italy would keep Russia out of the Balkans, and would do her utmost to keep the Balkans out of war. Italy had no interest in the Balkans save the preservation of peace, and the fomenting of Italian trade interests in that region.

At this point, Count Ciano reverted to Germany. He said, "No country would want to have Germany as a neighbor. We now have her as a neighbor, and we must do the best we can to get on with her.

"You will wonder why Italy did nothing at the time of the Dollfuss assassination, and nothing later when Hitler occupied Austria. I will tell you, for there is a great deal

deal of misunderstanding on that score. There are many people in Austria today who are unhappy, who are tormented, many who wish the Anschluss had not taken place. But, as an Italian, I tell you the great majority of Austrians would even today rather be a part of Germany than have to live the life they lived in independent Austria.

"Before the occupation of Austria Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome, and, sitting in the same chair you are sitting in, (and at this I shifted in my seat), he admitted to me frankly that if Germany occupied Austria the majority of Austrians would support the occupation, and that if Italy sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight Italy.

"For that reason, when peace terms are considered it would be stupid to support the French thesis that an independent Austria must be reconstituted. If any country would logically desire that objective it would be Italy. But Italy knows that the Austrians are primarily German, and that an Austrian people will never be content to go back to the state of starvation and inanition which they endured for twenty years after 1918."

In October last Count Ciano said he had spent two days in Berlin conferring with Hitler. At that time-- and he emphasized the words--he believed Germany would have been willing to agree upon a peace based upon the retention of Austria, or a plebiscite in Austria--knowing full well that a real plebiscite would result in an overwhelming vote in favor of continued amalgamation with Germany; an independent Slovakia, and an independent Bohemia-Moravia, both under the protectorate of Germany;

and

and the reconstitution of a completely independent Poland, Germany retaining Danzig, the Corridor and the territory in Western Poland occupied by German minorities, and Russia retaining eastern Poland, removing therefrom the truly Polish inhabitants to the new Polish state, which would be given access to the sea. German peace terms at that time likewise comprehended the return of her former colonial possessions or their equivalent.

Whether Germany still maintained this position, Count Ciano was not sure.

Throughout our conversation Count Ciano made no effort to conceal his dislike and contempt for Ribbentrop or his antagonism towards Hitler. He did not hide his anxiety with regard to Germany and his apprehension with regard to her military power. At the same time he indicated not the slightest predilection towards Great Britain or France.

His chief interests at the moment, I would judge, are to arrest by every means Russian expansion in the Balkans and Near East; to maintain a balance between the Allies and Germany so that Italian neutrality may be preserved and so that when peace negotiations are undertaken, Italian claims may receive preferential consideration; and finally to take every safeguard available to Italy against German domination of Southeastern Europe.

Our interview took place in a very beautiful hall of the Palace, hung with tapestries. The moving-picture apparatus had been already installed. As soon as the conversation terminated the moving-picture men were sent for, and the Minister posed with me for a rather unduly protracted

protracted period. That was the only time I saw the "chest out, chin up" Ciano of which I had heard. Until the cameras began clicking, he could not have been more human, more simple, nor more seemingly frank in everything he said.

ROME, February 26, 1940.

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ROME, FEBRUARY 26, 1940

Accompanied by the Ambassador and by Count Ciano's chief of cabinet, I called at 5 p.m. on February 26th at the Palazzo Venezia where I was received by Mussolini.

I entered the Palace by the side entrance used by the Duce, and going up in a small elevator was escorted through a long corridor hung with paintings, and filled with vitrines holding examples of old Italian porcelain, to a hall where Count Ciano was waiting to receive me. From there we passed to the Hall of the Grand Fascist Council, which, while on a far smaller scale, and hung in blue instead of red, is reminiscent of the Hall of the Doges in the Doges' Palace at Venice. At the end of the Hall is a raised and very large armchair for the Duce, while on a lower level, around a horseshoe table, are other chairs for the members of the Grand Council. The walls are hung with superb portraits.

After a wait of three minutes, we were summoned to Mussolini's office in the "Sala Mappa Mondo". The hall, of which so much has been written, is very long, but did not impress me as so long as usually depicted by newspaper correspondents. There is no furniture except the desk of the Duce at the extreme end, with three chairs placed in front of it for the Ambassador, Count Ciano, and myself. On the desk was a reading-lamp, which was the sole illumination in the whole vast room.

The Duce met me very cordially at the door, saying he was particularly happy to welcome me, and walked with me the length of the hall to his desk. He greeted the

Ambassador

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Ambassador very pleasantly, making no reference whatever to the fact that he had been unwilling to receive him for over a year.

I was profoundly shocked by the Duce's appearance. In the countless times I had seen him in moving pictures and in photographs, and in the many descriptions I had read of him, he had always seemed to me as an active, quick-moving, exceedingly animated personality. The man I saw before me seemed fifteen years older than his actual age of fifty-eight. He was ponderous and static, rather than vital. He moved with an elephantine motion. Every step appeared an effort. He is very heavy for his height, and his face in repose falls into rolls of flesh. His close-clipped hair is snow white. During our long and rapid interchange of views, he kept his eyes shut a considerable part of the time, opening them with his dynamic and oft-described wide-open stare only when he desired particularly to underline some remark. At his side was a large cup of tea which he sipped from time to time.

Mussolini impressed me as a man laboring under some tremendous strain; physical unquestionably, for he has procured a new and young Italian mistress only ten days ago; but in my definite judgment, mental as well. One could almost sense a leaden oppression.

Count Ciano commenced the conversation by saying that Mussolini desired him to act as interpreter, since in view of the importance of the conversation he would prefer to speak in his own language rather than in French or in English.

I said that I wanted first of all to express my  
gratitude

gratitude for the many courtesies shown me, and for the privilege of being received by Mussolini and his Minister. I then handed Mussolini the President's autograph letter. He found it difficult to read the President's writing, and asked Ciano to translate it for him. As the reading went on a smile of gratification came over Mussolini's face, and with the last sentence in which the President expressed the hope of seeing him soon, he smiled openly. "I have hoped for a long time," he said, "that this meeting of which I have heard so often would really take place, but I am beginning to fear that there are too many miles of ocean between us to make it possible." I quickly interjected, "But, of course, there are half-way points, which would halve that distance". He stopped smiling, and looked at me searchingly. Then he added slowly, looking at me all the time, "Yes, and there are ships to take us both there." He paused a moment, and then reaching over and taking the President's letter out of Ciano's hands, said, "I will answer this letter personally."

At the outset of our conversation I referred to American participation in the Exposition of 1942 and to the desirability of studying the possibility of agreeing on such policies and principles as would make possible more satisfactory commercial relations between the two countries. It was evident that Ciano had already reported to him our conversation of the morning, since he referred to notes he had made.

Mussolini expressed great appreciation of the President's interest in the Rome Exposition. He said that while he hoped peace would be reestablished before 1942,

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the Exposition would be held in any event. It would represent his own endeavor to build up the new Italy and the new Rome.

He expressed his hearty concurrence in the view that relations between Italy and the United States should be close and friendly both in the interest of the two peoples as well as in the interest of the reestablishment of world peace. He said there was nothing he would welcome more than increased trade relations with the United States, since Italy's trade was increasingly prejudiced due to war conditions, and to British war policies. He said he trusted a commercial treaty could be negotiated to mutual advantage, and that now that every other nation of the world, including the Soviet, had recognized the Ethiopian conquest, that technical point would no longer be an impediment to the United States.

I said that I was specifically authorized by the President to speak very frankly to him in that regard. The President felt that recognition of the Empire by the United States would not be an obstacle, provided that question were a part of a whole general and permanent peace settlement and readjustment, especially if it were accompanied by some utilization by Italy of some portion of Ethiopia for the settlement of European minorities. But the President wished me also to remind Mussolini very frankly that we could not regard the matter as an isolated question, because of its inevitable relation to our whole problem in the Far East.

Mussolini smiled and said if he had to wait until

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we had concluded our negotiations with the Japanese, he was afraid he would have to wait a long time, since there was no race that took a more interminable time in finishing any negotiation than the Japanese. In view of what I said, he added, pending further developments, it would be better to envisage the conclusion of a more ample modus vivendi, rather than a commercial agreement, and on that he hoped both sides would make every effort to agree.

I then spoke to Mussolini of the inquiry addressed to my Government to the other neutral powers, asking whether they did not consider it desirable to exchange views with regard to the possibility of finding a common point of view concerning a future sane international economic system, and concerning post-war reduction and limitation of armaments. I said Italy had in reply asked what the views of the United States might be in these two regards. I stated that I had brought with me a brief written statement of the views of the United States with regard to a sane international economic relationship, and that since I knew well the views expressed by Mussolini himself in his address to the Chamber of Deputies on May 26, 1934, I felt sure the views of my Government coincided very completely with his own.

Mussolini at once asked for the paper and read it word for word. As he read, he commented. His comment on the first paragraph was "molto bello, I agree with every word. Unfortunately, however, Italy has never been in a position where she could anticipate a situation where she would have access on equal terms to raw materials." When

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he came to the portion which related to discriminations, he said, "and could there be greater discriminations than those found in the Ottawa agreements? Or in the tariff policy pursued by the United States prior to the Roosevelt Administration?"

When he had concluded his reading he said, "I subscribe to every word in this. It coincides completely with what I said in 1934, and what I believe now. But you must remember that Italy was the last country to enter upon an autarchic system, and she did so solely as a last resort, and in self-defense. A poor country like Italy had no other remedy after Britain had entered on the Ottawa policy, and after the other European nations had adopted autarchy, and France had imposed her quota systems and other restrictions. This policy outlined in this document represents the ideal which nations must come to, but I want to remind you that if and when the time comes that nations again can trade freely with each other, no such ideal as this can be realized unless simultaneously the powers agree upon a practical and positive disarmament plan. So long as peoples are draining their national economies in the construction of armaments, there can be no hope of a sane international economic relationship."

I, of course, stated at once that the President and Secretary Hull fully shared these views. I said it was exactly for that reason we had suggested that if the neutral powers could now agree upon the principles he had set forth, the neutral influence would be of great service when peace came in bringing these ideals into practical realization.

Mussolini

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Mussolini replied that in his opinion the only neutral powers which had any influence were the United States, Japan and Italy, and that Italy was not technically a neutral because of her relationship to Germany. (This was his only reference in our conversation to the Axis.) He said that when peace came the influence of the United States would be decisive, and that our views on economic relations, which he would support, would have to be accepted, if we insisted.

But he felt that no efforts at moral influence at this time would prove effective. What was required before any constructive steps could be taken was the finding of a just political peace in Europe.

I then said that as he already knew I was charged by the President with the duty of reporting to him on the present possibilities of the establishment of the bases for a permanent and stable peace in Europe. I would greatly value Mussolini's views, and I was sure he knew from Count Ciano that any views he expressed to me would be reported solely to my President and Secretary of State.

Mussolini said he knew this, and that he would speak to me with utmost frankness. He would answer any questions I desired to ask.

He then set forth what he believed would be the terms Germany would accept. Austria to remain a part of the Reich after a plebiscite had proved Austrian determination in that regard; an independent Slovakia and Bohemia-Moravia under German protection. He then came

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to the question of Poland. He drew himself up and with much vigor said, "The Polish people have a right to their untrammeled independence and sovereignty, and I will support them in that endeavor. But that does not mean that Poland should again become a crazy-quilt of diverse nationalities. The poison of Europe during these past twenty years has been the question of minorities. That cardinal error must not be committed again. The real Germans of Danzig, of the Corridor, of Posen should remain in the Reich, but the real Poles should have their free Poland, with access to the sea." I interjected, "How about the real Poles who are now under Russian subjection?" Mussolini answered that they should emigrate from Russian controlled Poland to the new Polish state just the way in which Germans were emigrating from the Upper Adige back to Germany. "What other solution is there, " he said, "unless we are all prepared to fight Russia?" In saying this he gave me no impression of being bellicose.

He then stated that I should attribute great importance to Hitler's speech of February 23rd. That speech had been precise: "Vital interests in Central Europe" meant what he had just indicated, and colonial restoration was the additional factor. Germany, he believed, had every right to such a position in Central Europe, and there could be no lasting peace unless such a solution were found.

He quickly added, "And when peace negotiations are undertaken, Italy's just claims must be satisfied. I have

have not raised them now because the mad-house which is Europe will not stand further excitements. But there can be no peace which is real until Italy has free egress from, and access to, the Mediterranean. You have just come to Italy on the REX. You were held up at Gibraltar by the British and mails and passengers were taken off. In the western Mediterranean you have seen for yourself that we are the prisoners of the British. Do you also realize that an Italian cannot send a ship from Trieste, an Italian port, to Massowa, another Italian port, without having the British take off half the cargo? How would you like it if the British did that to your ships plying between New York and New Orleans?"

Mussolini spoke with the greatest bitterness of the British, but he gave no evidence whatever of antagonism towards the French.

He then ~~came~~ back to the question of peace terms. He said that in his judgment the Allies gravely underestimated the military strength and the efficiency of the organization of Germany.

I then asked him the flat question: "Do you consider it possible at this moment for any successful negotiations to be undertaken between Germany and the Allies for a real and lasting peace?"

His answer was an emphatic "Yes". He said that of one thing he was profoundly certain, and that was that none of the peoples now at war desired to fight. The situation now in that regard was utterly different from that which existed in 1914. He went on, "But I am equally sure that if a 'real' war breaks out, with its attendant

slaughter

slaughter and devastation, there will be no possibility for a long time to come of any peace negotiation."

He paused, and I asked him if he would give me any suggestions as to my conversations in Berlin. He said he would be glad to be helpful, but he believed I would be told in Berlin more or less what he had just said to me.

In conclusion, I said that Count Ciano had been good enough to ask if I would talk with him again before I sailed home. I said I would welcome the privilege of talking also with the Duce before I departed for the United States. He replied, in a very friendly way, that he would be glad to talk with me again at any time, and that he believed he would probably receive reports from Berlin, Paris and London after my visits to those capitals, which would be of value to the President and myself, before I returned to Washington. It was agreed that if my plans made it possible for me to return to Rome on March 16 or 17 I would see him again at that time.

Mussolini then got up and joined me on the other side of his desk. He spoke to me in English for a while and then turned into French. I asked him if he still rode every morning, and he said that he did, but that he had now taken up a new sport, tennis; that he had always thought of tennis as a young ladies' game but that he had now discovered that it was almost as hard exercise as fencing. He was delighted to say that he had that very morning beaten his professional 6-2.

He walked with me to the door, gave me a particularly cordial handshake, and said he would look forward to seeing me again.

BERLIN, Friday, March 1, 1940.

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BERLIN, Friday, March 1, 1940.

At noon on the day of my arrival in Berlin I was escorted to the Foreign Office Building, adjacent to Bismarck's old Chancery in the Wilhelmstrasse, by the Chief of Protocol, Herr von Doernberg, to an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop. Mr. Kirk, the American Charge-d'Affaires, who had never previously been received by Ribbentrop, accompanied me at my request to the interview.

Every official of the Foreign Office was dressed in military uniform, and at the top of the stairs, after passing the two sphinxes at the portal which date from Bismarck's time, there were stationed storm-troopers in stained uniforms.

After waiting in an anteroom for three minutes, I was shown into Herr von Ribbentrop's office.

The Minister received me at the door, glacially, and without the semblance of a smile or a word of greeting. I expressed my pleasure at being afforded the opportunity of talking with him, and spoke in English, since I knew that he spoke English fluently, having passed--as a wine salesman--several years in England, and four years in the United States and Canada. The Minister looked at me icily and barked at the famous Dr. Schmidt, the official interpreter, who stood behind him, "Interpret".

We then sat down. The Minister turned to me and asked in German whether I had had a comfortable journey. I turned to Dr. Schmidt, and saying in English that I had lost my facility in speaking German, expressed my appreciation of the courtesy of the German Government in sending a private car to the border and an official to meet me there.

I then said that I believed it desirable at the outset to make quite clear the nature of my mission. I was requested by the President to visit Italy, Germany, France and

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and England to report to him on the existing situation. It was the President's desire to ascertain whether there existed any possibility of the establishment of a sound and permanent peace in Europe. I wished to emphasize that my Government was not interested in any precarious or temporary peace. Whatever views the officials of the German Government were good enough to express to me would be regarded as solely for the information of the President himself, and of the Secretary of State, and for no other individual, and in conclusion I desired to make it very clear that I had, in the name of my Government, no proposals to offer, and no commitments whatever to put forward on the part of the United States.

I should be appreciative of any views the Minister desired to express to me.

Ribbentrop then commenced to speak and never stopped, except to request the interpreter from time to time to translate the preceding portion of his discourse, for more than two hours.

The Minister, who is a good looking man of some fifty years with notably haggard features and grey hair, sat with his arms extended on the sides of his chair and his eyes continuously closed. He evidently envisioned himself as the Delphic Oracle.

He started in with the subject of American-German relations. He said that relations between the two countries had been steadily deteriorating for several years, and that so far as the German Government was concerned, there was no reason for such a situation. It desired to maintain close and friendly relations between the two countries. A year and a half ago the United States had withdrawn its Ambassador, Mr. Wilson, for whom he, the Minister, and the Fuehrer had

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the highest regard, and in consequence the German Reich had withdrawn its Ambassador. Such a situation was in detriment to the best interests of the two peoples. The German Government believed expanded trade relations between our two countries were highly desirable. Such were now impossible under present conditions. The German Government had no feature in its foreign policy which conflicted with the interests of the United States; no ambitions which in any sense impinged upon the Western Hemisphere; and insofar as internal matters were concerned, all representatives of the German Government had received the most stringent orders never to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the domestic policies of the United States, nor in those of any other American Republic. Since all of these things were so, the Minister concluded, he could see no valid ground whatever for the completely unsatisfactory state of relations between the United States and Germany. He could only assume that lying propaganda had had a preponderant influence.

At this point I determined it was wiser for me to refrain from making the reply I desired to make until the end of the Minister's discourse. He was so obviously aggressive, so evidently laboring under a violent mental and emotional strain, that it seemed to me probable that if I replied at this juncture with what I intended to say, violent polemics was presumably ensue, with the possibility that things would be said that would not only make my interview with him entirely unfruitful, but which might also jeopardize the interview I was scheduled to have with Hitler on the following morning.

The Minister then continued. He passed to a narration of Germany's participation in European history, as he saw it,

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from January 30, 1933, the day Hitler became Chancellor, until the present time.

The German occupation of the Rhineland had been the first step in the reconstruction by Germany. That was a step which today was accepted by the entire world as a rightful step, as a step which returned to Germany an intrinsic part of Germany, and as a step which marked the end of the régime of Versailles. The Minister said that he was glad to remember that I myself in public addresses had criticized the inequities of Versailles.

Then had come the consolidation of Austria into the German Reich. This had marked the union of two severed portions of the old German Empire, of the old Roman Empire, and had brought back into one German family German peoples who had always desired such union since 1919. It had been attained without the shedding of blood and in accordance with the will of the overwhelming majority of the Austrian people.

Then had come the Sudeten question. Here again the German Government had desired no more than the return to Germany of German peoples, who had been ground down under Czech domination for twenty years. He detailed the efforts which Hitler had made to achieve a friendly solution of this problem with the Czechoslovak Government, and the continuous obstacles which other Governments had placed in the way of such an understanding. He narrated--it seemed to me from memory--all of the pages in the German white books which had led up to the agreements of Munich.

He emphasized the agreement entered into by Chamberlain and Hitler. And what had happened only a few weeks later: Chamberlain and his Duff Coopers, Edens and Churchills had announced in the British Parliament that Britain was embarking

on

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on the biggest armament program of its entire history so that "no agreement like Munich would ever again be necessarily accepted by the British Government". (I did not remind the Minister that neither Duff Cooper, Eden nor Churchill was at that time in the British Cabinet.)

From this moment on in the Minister's monologue, the word "England, England, England" punctuated his speech like the toll of a funeral bell. I could not help but think of the "Göt Strafe England" of the years 1917-1918.

The keystone of Hitler's foreign policy had been the creation of close and cooperative relations with England. From the year 1933 on Hitler, time and time again, had consulted England on the steps he had intended to take, and time and again England had not only repulsed his overtures with scorn--and the German word "Hohn" came out like the hiss of a snake--but had with craft and with guile done her utmost to prevent the German people from once more assuming their rightful place in the family of nations. Hitler had no ambitions which conflicted with the maintenance of the integrity of the British Empire; on the contrary, he believed the integrity of the British Empire was a desirable and a stabilizing factor in the world. For that reason he had entered into the naval agreement of 1935 with Great Britain, voluntarily pledging Germany to a minimum naval ratio, as a pledge to England that Germany had no designs upon the Empire. Until the last moment Hitler had sought peace and understanding with England, always to find hatred, scorn and trickery as her reward.

Germany had offered to guarantee the frontiers of the new Czechoslovakia agreed upon at Munich. But how could this commitment be carried out? The new Czech authorities had

had proved weak tools of the enemies of Germany. They had been unable or unwilling to prevent foreign agents from stirring up agitation and from concocting plots, with the connivance of the Czechoslovak military, against Germany. How could Germany guarantee the frontiers of a nation which was being deliberately turned into a menace to the heart of Germany? That, and that alone, had been the reason for the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and the support by Germany of the independence of Slovakia, and the consent by Germany for the earlier movements affecting Czechoslovak territory by Poland and Hungary.

And then the Minister turned to Poland.

The Fuehrer had always maintained that the separation of the German city of Danzig from the Reich, and the complete divorce of East Prussia from Greater Germany were provisions of the Versailles Treaty which could not endure. But at the same time he had been convinced that these questions could be solved satisfactorily by means of a direct understanding between Poland and Germany. In that spirit the non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland had been entered into. Early in the year 1938 negotiations had been commenced between the German Foreign Office and Colonel Beck looking towards the restoration of Danzig to the Reich, and the granting to Germany of an extraterritorial motor road and railroad across the Corridor between Greater Germany and East Prussia. These conversations had prospered. They had reached a complete agreement in principle when Colonel Beck had visited Berlin and Berchtesgaden early in 1939. In a few months, granted there had been no foreign interference, the entire arrangement would have been concluded to the entire satisfaction of Poland, and Germany would have abided permanently by this settlement.

And

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And what had happened? The German Government now had the complete archives of Warsaw. It had incontrovertible proof that England had incited the Polish Government to refuse to conclude this agreement; it had incontrovertible proof that England had incited the Poles to determine upon war against Germany, and it had incontrovertible proof that statesmen of countries not in the slightest degree connected with the issues involved had urged the Polish Government to make no concession of any nature to Germany.

Here the Minister paused and looked pointedly at me. My belief is that he desired me to understand that the German authorities have records of representations made to Poland by Bullitt through Biddle and the Polish Ambassador in Paris, in addition to Bullitt's telephone conversation with Biddle, already published by the German Foreign Office.

Finally, the German Government had proof that the British guarantee of military support had been thrust upon Poland, against the wishes and advice of Colonel Beck, and solely as a means of persuading Poland against reaching any fair understanding with Germany.

When this stage had been reached the Poles had undertaken every kind of cruel repression against the German minority in Poland. The German Government had attempted time and again to point out to Poland the dangerous results of such a policy. Torture and mutilation of Germans were so unbelievable that the Minister would give me photographs and documentary evidence if I so desired.

And finally Germany, to protect Germans in Poland, and as a means of self-defense against Polish mobilization had been forced to take military action. She had even at this last moment attempted to keep peace with England and France.

The

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The Fuehrer had made every effort to make clear to England and France that Germany wished in no way to endanger British or French security. It had been England and France who had insisted upon declaring war on Germany. Germany would not have declared war on England and France.

Germany wished for nothing more in Europe than what the United States possessed through the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. As a great power she was entitled to the safeguarding of her vital interests. He had been in the United States, and he knew how every American citizen felt, and he thought quite legitimately, that the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine was fundamental in insuring the safety of America's world position. Germany was entitled to the same situation in Central Europe. Germany desired nothing more than the unity under the German Reich of the German people in Europe; the return of the colonies which had been stolen from her at Versailles, so that she might thence obtain the raw materials she could not herself produce, and make possible the profitable emigration to them of German nationals; the ensured recognition by the other Great Powers of her sphere of influence in Central Europe-- just as she was willing to respect the spheres of influence of the other great European powers; the independence and autonomy of the smaller powers of Europe which had a clearly established historical right to independence. With regard to such powers, the Minister said, Germany had not the faintest design upon them, although she must expect that in trade matters the independent powers within her sphere of influence would have close economic ties with the Reich. And in that connection I must not forget that one thousand years ago German Emperors had been crowned in Prague. Germany, however, had

had no desire or intention of preventing the Czech people from having their complete cultural and municipal autonomy--something which the Germans in Czechoslovakia had never possessed under Czech rule.

Germany must have her "Monroe Doctrine" in Central Europe. She would never again discuss any question affecting her interests in Eastern Europe except with Soviet Russia, and with Russia she had already reached a complete and satisfactory delimitation of interests in that area. But the days of encirclement--of British and French political meddling in Central and Eastern Europe--were passed and forever.

(It was particularly significant that Italy was never mentioned by the Minister throughout the conversation.)

British policy made any such recognition of German rights impossible--Britain was determined to annihilate Germany and the German people. In October, Hitler had publicly announced the bases upon which he was willing to make peace. They had again been rejected with contempt. Only last night Eden had publicly declared that the war aim of England was to destroy "Hitlerism". The Minister wanted me to know that every German national was a part of Hitler. The destruction of "Hitlerism" meant only the destruction of the German people, for Germany would never again be governed by any form of government other than Hitlerism.

Germany was strong and completely confident of ultimate victory. She had immense military superiority, and from her eastern and southern neighbors she could obtain the raw materials she required. She was prepared for a long war, but the Minister was confident it would be a short war.

Germany

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Germany wanted peace, but only on condition, the Minister said, "that the will on the part of England to destroy Germany is killed, once and for all. I see no way in which that can be accomplished except through German victory."

By the time this stage had been reached, I said I would not attempt to speak at any length, but that I could not refrain from making certain comments upon what the Minister had said.

First of all, the Minister had referred to American-German relations and had drawn the inference that propaganda was responsible for their bad condition. I said I had no doubt that propaganda was active in almost every part of the world, and that I felt very deeply, with my own President, that the more peoples drank from the well of truth, and had freedom of true information, the more peaceful and happy the world would be.

But if the Minister thought that the unsatisfactory state of American-German relations was due to propaganda, he was sadly deceived. The American people, I said, were idealistic, emotional people, profoundly moved by humanitarian considerations. They resented in their inmost soul the ill-treatment of human beings in any part of the world. The cruel treatment of minorities in Germany was one of the two compelling causes of American feeling towards Germany. The other was the overwhelming feeling in the United States that international controversies can and must be settled by pacific methods, and that the use of force, such as had been exercised in recent years, destroyed international relations and those bases of international life which alone could give real security to the United States and to other nations.

Those,

Those, I said, and not propaganda, were the real reasons for the feeling in the United States towards Germany. So far as trade relations were concerned, the Minister must know that so long as Germany pursued her present autarchic policy and indulged in every form of discrimination against us, there was no opportunity offered the United States for improved trade with Germany.

With regard to the Minister's reference to the desirability of having Ambassadors in Berlin and Washington, I would be careful to report to the President the Minister's observations, but I wanted to make it clear that my Government had every confidence in Mr. Kirk, the American Charge d'Affaires. (Here the Minister interjected that he had only "good reports" of Mr. Kirk, but that he had been referring to the rank of the representation, and not to the individual.)

I further desired to refer to the Minister's reference to the Monroe Doctrine, for it seemed very clear that the Minister was laboring under a misapprehension as to the nature of that policy. Many years ago, I was quite willing to admit, the Monroe Doctrine had been occasionally misinterpreted by earlier administrations in the United States as entitling the United States to exercise some form of hegemony in the Western Hemisphere or to intervene in one way or another in the affairs of our neighbors. But the Doctrine had never in reality been other than a unilateral declaration by the United States that it would not permit any non-American power to exercise any kind of sway, military or political, within the Western Hemisphere. It had never implied the exclusion by the United States of non-American powers from having the same trade relations with the other American Republics such

as we ourselves possessed, and on equal terms. It had never rightfully implied the assumption of any political control by us over our neighbors. At this moment, I was glad to say, a new relationship existed in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine existed, and would continue to exist, but only in its true interpretation, and it was now reinforced by the unification of all the American Republics in the common policy of considering any menace from abroad to the peace of any one Republic as a menace to the peace of them all. The United States was an equal partner in a partnership of twenty-one partners.

If, consequently, the Minister desired to use the term "Monroe Doctrine" as synonymous with the term "sphere of influence", whether political or economic, he should find some more accurate synonym.

Finally, I said I would, of course, regard it as inappropriate to comment upon the remainder of the Minister's exposition. That would be outside of the scope of my mission.

I believe, however, that if a war of devastation now took place all that civilization held most dear, all the remaining material and social structure of Europe, would be in great part destroyed. The loss of lives would be appalling. No country on earth would remain unaffected, and the United States as the most powerful neutral would suffer every form of repercussion upon her own social, commercial and financial structure. It was for that reason that my Government hoped most earnestly, while there was still time, that there might still exist the way towards some durable and just peace. The President of the United States had officially stated last year, as the Minister knew, that if the way to a just political peace could be found by the nations directly concerned, of which the United States was not one, my

Government

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Government would participate whole-heartedly in a parallel common attempt to bring about a real limitation and reduction of armaments, and a return by the nations to a sane economic system of international trade relations. On these latter two points, as the Minister doubtless knew, my Government was even now discussing the possibility of finding common views with the neutral powers. All of these opportunities towards a return to a world of security, sanity and prosperity would be grievously, if not fatally, prejudiced, if a war of devastation now broke out.

The Minister made a brief rejoinder. He attempted, without success, to modify his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. He expressed the hope of the German Government, after the war was over, of being able to return, in cooperation with other powers, to a liberal international trade system. With regard to the prevention of a war of devastation, he said over and over again, "We have not attacked England. She has attacked us. I see no way by which we can attain the peace we want and which we seek, save through German victory."

I then terminated the interview, which had lasted from midday until quarter before three.

Ribbentrop has a completely closed mind. It struck me as also a very stupid mind. The man is saturated with hate for England, and to the exclusion of any other dominating mental influence. He is clearly without background in international affairs, and he was guilty of a hundred inaccuracies in his presentation of German policy during recent years.

I have rarely seen a man I disliked more.

BERLIN, Friday, March 1, 1940.

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BERLIN, Friday, March 1, 1940

At six o'clock I called upon Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker in his office at the Foreign Office. His position corresponds to Under Secretary in our system.

Herr von Weizsäcker is a typical example of the German official of the old school of the nineteenth century. He is reminiscent of the first Bernstorff and of the first Bölow, and not of their more famous sons. He is, I believe, sincere, and spoke throughout our hour's talk with deep feeling.

He had had a particularly happy home life—very typically German in the devotion to him of his three sons. His greatest pleasure, he told me, was when he and his wife and the three boys could have an evening of chamber music together in their house. Today the family is shattered. His youngest son of twenty was killed in the Polish war. The other two sons are serving on the Western Front.

He is retained at the Foreign Office, I was told, solely because of his expert knowledge of German foreign relations, and is never permitted to advise on policy.

I outlined to the Under Secretary the nature of my mission.

At the conclusion of my statement, to which I added some excerpts of my earlier conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop, Herr von Weizsäcker hesitated a moment and said, "I am going to be quite frank with you. I have been strictly instructed not to discuss with you in any way any subject which relates directly or indirectly to the possibility of peace."

He

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He then drew his chair towards the center of the room, and motioned to me to do likewise. (I assumed that the omnipresent German Secret Police dictaphones must be installed in the walls rather than in the central lighting fixtures.)

We had for a while a desultory conversation, in the course of which he took occasion to say how highly he regarded Kirk, who, in his opinion, had done wonders in a singularly difficult situation, and I corresponded--to his obvious pleasure--by saying that I thought Thomsen in Washington had shown great tact and discretion in an equally difficult situation.

I then reverted to my conversation with Ribbentrop. I said that if the feeling of the German Government was as decisive as that of Herr von Ribbentrop that ~~was~~ was the only course, I would be needlessly taking up the time of the German authorities by prolonging my stay. I said, however, that while, as Herr von Weizsäcker would be the first to appreciate, my conversations in Rome would be regarded as entirely confidential by me, I, nevertheless, felt entirely able to tell him that my impressions after talking with the Duce were that in the latter's judgment a basis for a just and lasting peace could still be found before it was too late.

Herr von Weizsäcker thought a good three minutes before saying anything. He then leaned towards me and said, "It is of the utmost importance that you say that personally to the Fuehrer."

I waited a moment myself, and then asked: "Let me have your personal advice, for I am now asking an entirely personal and individual question. Do you believe that any suggestions

suggestions for peace conversations proffered by the Duce would have any favorable reception here?"

This time Herr von Weizsäcker waited a good five minutes before answering. His reply was: "What I have already said about the Fuehrer answers a part of your question. But (and he motioned to the Foreign Office in which we were) here the relations between Germany and Italy have narrowed (and I use his exact English word) greatly."

The interpretation I give to this statement is that if the Duce approaches Hitler directly and secretly, it will have decisive influence. If Ribbentrop knows of the approach, he will do his utmost to block it.

During the remainder of our hour's talk, Weizsäcker talked of his regard for Neville Henderson and of his belief that in August war could have been averted by a more intelligent policy by the Poles. As I took leave, the tears came into his eyes as he said he knew I would realize how earnestly he hoped that the mission with which the President had entrusted me might show there still was a way by which an absolute holocaust could be avoided.

BERLIN, March 2, 1940.

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BERLIN, Saturday, March 2, 1940.

At eleven o'clock several Foreign Office officials, headed by Herr von Doernberg, came for me at my hotel to take me to my interview with Hitler at the new Chancery, which had been completed last year within a period of eight months. Workmen had worked night and day in order to have it ready for the Chancellor's New Year's Day reception for the Diplomatic Corps so that they might have a taste of what the new Berlin was going to look like.

Kirk accompanied me at my request. He had never before been permitted to see the Fuehrer except at a distance.

The façade of the new building on the Wilhelmstrasse reminds me of a factory building. My car drove into a rectangular court with very high blank walls. At one end was a flight of broad steps leading into the Chancery. Monumental black nudes flanked the portico to which the steps led. The whole impression of the court was reminiscent of nothing other than a prison courtyard. A company of soldiers was drawn up on each side to give me the Nazi salute as I entered.

At the head of the steps I was greeted by the Reichsminister Meissner, the head of Hitler's Chancery. He spoke to me most cordially in English, as did all the other officials present.

We then formed a procession of some twenty couples headed by Meissner and myself, and with very slow and measured tread first traversed a tremendously long red marble hall, of which the walls and floor are both of marble; then up a flight of excessively slippery red marble steps into a gallery which, also of red marble,

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has windows on one side and tapestries on the other. The gallery is lined on the tapestry side by an interminable series of sofas, each with a table and four chairs in front of them. From the gallery open off a series of drawing rooms. Finally, we deployed into one of these, and I was requested to sit down until the Chancellor was ready to receive me.

In a very few minutes Meissner came to announce that Hitler was ready to see me, and I went with Kirk into the adjoining room, a very long drawing-room furnished with comfortable upholstered sofas and chairs, and overlooking the garden of Bismarck's old residence, in which Hitler now lives.

Hitler received me near the door. He greeted me very pleasantly, but with great formality. Ribbentrop and Meissner were the only two German officials present at the interview.

Hitler is taller than I had judged from his photographs. He has, in real life, none of the somewhat effeminate appearance of which he has been accused. He looked in excellent physical condition and in good training. His color was good, and while his eyes were tired, they were clear. He was dignified both in speech and movement, and there was not the slightest impression of the comic effect from moustache and hair which one sees in his caricatures. His voice in conversation is low and well modulated. It had only once, during our hour and a half's conversation, the raucous stridency which is heard in his speeches--and it was only at that moment that his features lost their composure and that his eyes lost their decidedly "gemütlieh" look. He spoke with clarity and precision, and always in a beautiful German, of which I could

could follow every word, although Dr. Schmidt, of course, interpreted--and at times inaccurately.

After we were seated, and Hitler placed me next to him, he looked at me to indicate I was to commence the conversation.

I set forth the detailed purposes of my mission as I had already explained them to Ribbentrop. I made particular reference to the confidential nature of my interviews, and to the fact that I had no proposals to offer. In as eloquent terms as I could command, I then emphasized the President's hope that there might still be a way open for a stable, just and lasting peace, not a truce or a precarious breathing spell. I pointed out that if a war of annihilation now broke out, whether it was short or whether it was long, it would definitely preclude for the present the negotiation of a reasonable and just peace because of the human suffering it would create and of the human passions it would arouse, as well as because of the exhaustion of the economic and financial resources which still existed in Europe. From such a war as that, I said, who would be the victors? It seemed clear that all would be the losers. And in that sense not only would the belligerents be the losers, but also the neutrals, of which the United States was the greatest and the most powerful. We as a people now realized fully that such a war must inevitably have the gravest repercussions upon almost every aspect of our national structure.

The President of the United States had, in communications addressed to Chancellor Hitler himself, made it clear that if a just political peace could be found--and in the negotiation of such a peace we could not

not be directly involved--the United States would play its full part in cooperating towards two fundamental needs of a sane and ordered world--limitation and reduction of armaments and the establishment of a sound international trade relationship. If such bases could still be found, was it not worth every effort to seek the way of peace before the war of devastation commenced, and before the doors to peace were closed? I spoke, I said, only of a just peace, a peace which promised stability and security for the future. Personally, I said, I could not conceive of a lasting and real peace unless it envisaged as an essential component part a united, prosperous and contented German people, a German people satisfied with their own domain and their own security; but at the same time I could conceive of no lasting or real peace unless as an equally important factor Germany no longer was regarded by her neighbors as a threat to their independence or to their security, and unless Germany made it evident that she was, in fact, not striving for constantly increasing objectives--and objectives which implied aggression and a threat to the rights of free peoples.

The Chancellor knew, I said, that I had had the privilege of speaking with the Duce in Rome. That conversation, the Chancellor would appreciate, I must retain in complete confidence, but I felt at liberty to say that I had happily gained the impression from that conversation that the Duce believed the foundations of a just and lasting peace might still be laid. I hoped the Chancellor would find it possible to confirm that impression. I would be most grateful for any views he felt able to express.

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The Chancellor then very quietly and moderately outlined his foreign policy during the past seven years. The outline pursued exactly the lines followed in my conversation of the day before by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. (It is noteworthy that in every conversation I had with every member of the German Government, except Dr. Schacht, exactly the same historical survey prefaced the conversation. It is entirely clear that either the Chancellor or the Foreign Secretary had dictated the course which the conversations to be had with me by the members of the German Government were to follow.)

Hitler, however, emphasized even more strongly than had Herr von Ribbentrop his desire to reach an amicable and lasting understanding with England. He stressed particularly the naval agreement of 1935 as an indication that Germany, under his Government, had no intention of challenging British naval supremacy nor the security of the British Empire. When he came to the account of the negotiations with Poland which had resulted in the invasion of Poland by Germany in September, he turned to me and said, "I have never in my life made a more earnest nor a more sincere appeal than I did to the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, when I sent for him just prior to the break with Poland. He was sitting in the same place where you are now sitting, and I besought him to tell his Government that Germany had no intention of attacking England nor of impairing directly or indirectly British interests, but that Germany could not permit a continued domination by the Western European powers of the smaller States of Eastern Europe, nor the continuation of a state of affairs which resulted in a continuous attack and a continuous threat upon German vital interests." The Chancellor then concluded by saying, "That appeal, like every

every other approach made to England in seven years, was rejected with derision."

Hitler then said that I had referred to the problem of limitation and reduction of armaments. Time and again, he said, he had offered England and the other powers of the world the opportunity for a real and practicable reduction of armaments. He had guaranteed that Germany would maintain her standing army at 200,000 men; then at 300,000 men; he had expressed German willingness to outlaw certain types of munitions and implements of war. Never once, however, had these offers on his part received the slightest attention or, much less, consideration, as a basis of agreement. The Chancellor then said, "The present armament burden is crushing the life out of all peoples; it cannot continue much longer. The national economy of every nation will crash before much further time elapses."

He stated that he believed these were two practicable methods of securing a real disarmament. The first was for the great powers of Europe to agree upon their minimum ratios of military and of naval strength, outlawing all but a minimum of offensive armaments, and upon that basis further to agree that in the event of any threat to their security, or to the peace of Europe, these powers would pool their military and naval resources as a police power. He had formally made this proposal to Great Britain and to France. He had never received the slightest response.

The other alternative was for the powers to agree upon a progressive and gradual reduction in their respective military strength; with the gradual elimination at the same time of certain categories of offensive armament.

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This he believed would take a very long time, and was the less satisfactory of the two methods.

I had also mentioned the problem of a liberal, most-favored-nation international trade relationship as an objective towards which the nations of the world should strive. He felt quite in accord with me, he said, that that was a desirable goal and Germany, under more normal conditions, would gladly cooperate towards that end. He did not, however, believe that unrestricted international trade was the cure for all of the world's economic problems. He said, for example, that while Germany would doubtless profit by taking a considerable portion of America's agricultural surpluses, an industrial country like Germany could not take any considerable portion of industrial products from the United States, nor could the United States take any considerable portion of Germany's industrial exports. It was, consequently, necessary for Germany to intensify her trade relations with countries in Central and Southeastern Europe who desired to take Germany's industrial exports, which they themselves did not produce, in return for raw materials desired by Germany.

At this point I interjected to say that the Chancellor appeared to overlook the fact that while the United States, it was true, was a large industrial producer as well as an exporter of agricultural surpluses, nevertheless, trade between the United States and Germany over a period of many generations had been highly profitable to both sides. The Chancellor, I said, must not forget that Germany produced many forms of industrial products which were produced either more cheaply or in more efficient form than similar products produced in the United States, and that such exports from

Germany

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Germany had always been profitably sold by Germany to the United States. The question, I said, was not one of a purely bilateral nature but involved necessarily the problem of profitable triangular trade which had always entered into the picture of Germany's trade relations with the United States. Furthermore for Germany to be able to sell profitably the bulk of her luxury manufactured products she had to find countries where the standard of living was relatively high. Surely I believed the standard of living in the countries of Southeastern Europe was not sufficiently high to make it possible for Germany to find there any profitable market for a very large percentage of her industrial production.

Hitler did not seem to comprehend this problem, and dropped the topic after remarking that a country with a population of 140 individuals to the square kilometer must increase its production if those individuals are to find the where-with-all to survive. I said that it seemed to me that there was no country in the world that would profit more immediately and more greatly than Germany from a restoration of liberal international trade relations, and that through such a restoration the 140 individuals to the square German kilometer of whom he had spoken would obtain an increased standard of living and derive therefrom an immediately greater purchasing power, particularly if their work was dedicated to constructive production, rather than to the sterile manufacture of munitions.

Hitler then said that Germany's aims and objectives were simple and that he would outline them to me; he would classify them as (a) historical, (b) political and (c) economic.

From

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From the historical aspect Germany had existed as an empire five hundred years before Columbus had discovered the western world. The German people had every right to demand that their historical position of a thousand years should be restored to them; Germany had no ambition and no aim other than the return by the German people to the territorial position which was historically theirs.

Germany's political aims were coordinate. Germany could not tolerate the existence of a State such as Czechoslovakia which constituted an enclave created by Versailles solely for strategic reasons, and which formed an ever-present menace to the security of the German people; nor could Germany tolerate the separation from Greater Germany of German provinces by corridors, under alien control, and again created solely for strategic reasons. No great power could exist under such conditions. Germany, however, did not desire to dominate non-German peoples, and if such peoples adjacent to German boundaries did not constitute a military or political threat to the German people, Germany had no desire permanently to destroy, nor to prejudice, the independent lives of such peoples.

From the economic standpoint, Germany must claim the right to profit to the fullest extent through trade with the nations close to her in Central and Southeastern Europe. She would no longer permit that the western powers of Europe infringe or impair Germany's preferential situation in this regard.

In brief, the German people intended to maintain the unity which he had now achieved for them; they intended to prevent any State on Germany's eastern frontier from constituting

stituting again a military or strategic threat against German security and, finally, Germany intended to obtain recognition for her economic priority in Eastern and South-eastern Europe.

Germany, further, would insist that the colonies stolen from her at Versailles be returned to her. Germany had not obtained these colonies through military conquest; she had obtained them through purchase or through pacific negotiation; she had never utilized her colonies for military purposes. She now required them in order to obtain for the German people raw materials which could not be produced in Germany, and as a field for German emigration. Such a demand, Hitler felt, was not only reasonable, but just.

At no time during the course of our conversation did Hitler mention the subject of German-American relations, nor did he refer directly or indirectly to German relations with Soviet Russia and with Italy.

The Chancellor then passed to the subject of the war aims of the Allies. He asked me if I had heard or read the speech made in England the night before by Sir John Simon. I told him that I had not. He said that if I had read the speech, I would gain therefrom the same clear understanding that he had gained, namely, that the speech constituted a clear-cut definition of English aims, that is, the total destruction of Germany.

He said, "I am fully aware that the allied powers believe that a distinction can be made between National Socialism and the German people. There was never a greater mistake. The German people today are united as one man, and I have the support of every German. I can see no hope for the establishment of any lasting peace until the will of England and France to destroy Germany is itself destroyed.

I fear that there is no way by which the will to destroy Germany can be itself destroyed, except through a German victory. I believe that German might is such as to ensure the triumph of Germany but, if not, we will all go down together (and here he added the extraordinary phrase) whether that be for better or for worse." He paused a moment and then said textually, rapidly and with impatience, "I did not want this war. It has been forced upon me against my will. It is a waste of my time. My life should have been spent in constructing, and not in destroying."

I said that the Chancellor would, of course, understand that it was the belief of my Government that if some way could be found towards a stable and lasting peace which promised security to all peoples, no nation could have to "go down", let alone all of them. For that reason I earnestly trusted that such a way and such a peace might still be found.

Hitler looked at me, and remained quiet for a moment or two. He then said, "I appreciate your sincerity and that of your Government, and I am grateful for your mission. I can assure you that Germany's aim, whether it must come through war or otherwise, is a just peace." I replied by saying that I would remember the phrase the Chancellor had used. The interview then terminated.

BERLIN, March 3, 1940.

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BERLIN, March 3, 1940.

I talked at some length with the Italian and Belgian Ambassadors in Berlin, who are by far the most experienced members of the local Diplomatic Corps. They are both of them confident that the internal and army opposition to Hitler, which had assumed some proportions in November 1939, has now completely died away.

They told me that both the German army and the German people have by now been thoroughly convinced by propaganda of the German Government that the aims of the Allies are to destroy Germany and the German people, and that recent propaganda of the Allies, and recent speeches by British and French statesmen, had strongly increased this feeling in Germany. Both of the Ambassadors are confident that the Allied Governments grossly underestimate Germany's military strength and the ability of the German people to withstand a protracted war. Both of the Ambassadors are in agreement that a war of devastation will make any discussion of peace utterly impossible, and that the time within which peace terms can be discussed before Germany strikes is very brief indeed.

The Belgian Ambassador assured me that Germany's stores of oil are far greater than is realized by the British and French Governments, and that a large-scale offensive can be undertaken by Germany without bringing the German army to a point where it will suffer any lack of its full requirements.

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BERLIN, Sunday, March 3, 1940

BERLIN, Sunday, March 3, 1940.

Immediately after the termination of my interview with Rudolf Hess, I was accompanied by Dr. Schmidt, the official interpreter, to the home of Field Marshal Goering, known as Karinhall, which lies about an hour and a half's motoring distance from Berlin.

The Field Marshal's home has been built in the middle of a national game reserve. After reaching the entrance of the reserve, one drives some ten miles through a thin forest of pine and scattered birch to the Marshal's house, which has been built around a log cabin which he used in earlier years on hunting trips. The building which he has constructed is already immense, and he is now adding a new portion which will make the entire building, when completed, about the size of the new National Art Gallery in Washington. We arrived at the house in a driving snow at twelve o'clock. The Field Marshal, who had just returned to Berlin from a week's visit to the Western Front, received me immediately. At my request, and by the expressed desire of the Marshal himself, there was no one present except Dr. Schmidt and the American Chargé d'Affaires.

Goering looks exactly like his photographs. His thighs and arms are tremendous, and his girth is tremendous. His face gave the impression of being heavily rouged but, since at the end of our three-hour conversation the color had worn off, the effect was probably due to some form of facial massage which he had received prior to seeing me.

He wore a white tunic, on which were plastered various emblems and insignia in brilliants, and over the Iron Cross, which hung from his neck, dangled a monocle on a black cord. His hands are shaped like the digging-paws of a badger. On

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his right hand he wore an enormous ring set with six huge diamonds; on his left hand he wore an emerald at least an inch square.

His manner was simple, unaffected and exceedingly cordial, and he spoke with far greater frankness and clarity than any other German official whom I met. We dispensed with the services of the interpreter, except for the translation by Dr. Schmidt into German of what I had to say.

The Field Marshal, after I had once more set forth the nature and purposes of my mission, reiterated the history of German foreign policy during the past seven years along exactly the same lines as those followed by Hitler and Ribbentrop.

At one point, however, Goering deviated from the account given by the two others. In discussing the causes of the war against Poland, Goering stated with the utmost precision that at the time Ribbentrop had visited Paris on December 6, 1938, to sign the non-aggression pact between France and Germany, Bonnet, then Foreign Minister, had assured him in the name of the French Government that as a result of the conclusion of the agreements of Munich, France would renounce all interests in Eastern Europe, and specifically that France would refrain from any further influencing of Polish policy. While I had seen, of course, the recently published official declarations of the French and German Governments in regard to this question, I had not before received so precise a statement of the alleged commitments made by Monsieur Bonnet at that time.

I consequently asked the Marshal to repeat this statement, and the Marshal turned to Dr. Schmidt who, it appeared, had been present in Paris at the interview between Monsieur Bonnet and Herr von Ribbentrop when the alleged commitments were made, and Dr. Schmidt related textually what had been

said

said upon that occasion. The exact statement, according to him, which Monsieur Bonnet had made, was that France renounced all political interests in Eastern Europe, and specifically agreed not to influence Poland against the conclusion of an agreement with Germany whereby Danzig would return to Germany, and Germany would receive an extra-territorial corridor across the corridor from East Prussia to Greater Germany.

In his statement of German objectives, the Field Marshal was very clear. Germany had renounced forever any ambitions upon Alsace-Lorraine. Germany not only had no desire to impair the integrity of the British Empire; it believed in her own interest that the British Empire should be maintained intact. Germany must retain as an integral part of the German Reich, Austria, the Sudetenland, and all of those portions of Poland inhabited by German peoples. During the war Germany would continue her military occupation of Bohemia-Moravia and of Poland. If peace came, Germany would grant independence to the Czechs, but upon the understanding that they would remain completely demilitarized, so that never again would the Czechs or the Slovaks constitute a threat to Germany's military security in Central Europe. The Polish people who were really Poles would be installed in a free and independent Poland with access to the sea. Germany must regain her colonies. In addition to this, Germany must possess a recognized position of economic preference in Eastern Europe.

From this point the Field Marshal went on and discussed British policy, and the inability of Hitler to reach any form of understanding with England. The Field Marshal said that he knew Hitler so well that he realized that, as a result of

so many years of failure in this regard, Hitler had now hardened, and that he doubted whether Hitler could bring himself to believe that there was any way of destroying the British will to destroy Germany, except through military victory. He recounted to me his own conversation with Lord Halifax when the latter visited Germany two years ago. He told me he had warned him time and again not to encourage Poland and Czechoslovakia to refuse to reach a reasonable and pacific understanding with Germany. He told him that if England persisted in this course, war was inevitable, and that there was no justifiable need of war.

Both the problem of the German minorities in Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak military threat to the military security of Germany, as well as the problem of Danzig and the Corridor in relation to Poland, could have been settled readily if England and France had not refused to permit such a settlement.

The Field Marshal himself had never believed that there was any possible justification for war, and he had done everything within his power to avert it, but England and France had persisted in bringing it about.

Now, the situation from the military standpoint, was this: Germany's air force was supreme and would remain supreme. Her military strength was far greater in proportion to the strength of the Allies than it had been in 1914. Today Germany had "all the trumps in her hands". In 1914 Germany had been attacked on all fronts. Today, Russia and Italy were friendly, and the Balkans were neutral. The British blockade had already proved ineffective, and every day that passed made it easier for Germany to procure the raw materials which she required from the East and from the South. He could assure me that

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the stocks and supplies on hand in Germany were more than sufficient to meet every requirement, and I might be interested to know that the Germans were now even manufacturing butter and other fats in very great quantities from coal. While the Marshal believed that the war would be short, and that a German victory would soon be attained, nevertheless, if the war were prolonged five or ten years, Germany would strengthen and consolidate her position with every month that passed.

I stated that it seemed to me that no matter who would win such a war, the devastation and loss of life, and the destruction of economic resources, would inevitably be so vast as to result in the early destruction of much of what modern civilization had built up. I said that in that regard the American people were directly concerned. I said that we in the United States now realized that the repercussions from such a war would affect us profoundly in many ways, and particularly because of our realization that in a world where war reigned supreme, where the rule of force replaced the rule of reason, security for all peoples, no matter how remote they might be from the scene of hostilities, was inevitably undermined. If a war of devastation broke out, the vital interests of all neutral peoples, no matter how much they were determined to keep out of the war, would correspondingly be affected.

The Field Marshal here interrupted to say that he did not see how the American people could feel that their vital interests were affected through war in Europe. He said, "It is needless for me to say to you that Germany has no ambitions of any kind other than those I have indicated to you, and least of all any ambitions which could affect the Western Hemisphere."

I replied that the Field Marshal must remember that while the American people today were overwhelmingly determined not to be drawn into the war, and that it was the consistent policy of the Government of the United States to keep the American people from being drawn into war, nevertheless, he would also remember that in 1916 President Wilson had been re-elected on a platform which amounted to "he has kept us out of war"; the Republican candidate, Mr. Hughes, set forth in his platform that he, if elected, would keep the American people out of war; and yet not six months after the election in November 1916, the American people overwhelmingly supported our entrance into the war. I said it must never be forgotten that the American people are quick to act when they believe that their vital interests are at stake.

I discussed at some length with the Field Marshal the conversations which my Government had recently undertaken with the neutral powers in order to ascertain whether it was possible to find an agreement in principle upon the problems of the limitation and reduction of armaments and of a sound international trade policy. I said to the Field Marshal that I had brought with me a brief memorandum setting forth the views of my Government on the latter subject. The memorandum was read to him. The Field Marshal immediately stated that he was entirely in accord with every word contained in the memorandum, and that the German Government, at the time of any peace negotiations, would wholeheartedly co-operate in restoring to the countries of the world such a policy as that indicated. He stated that there was no country on earth that would stand to gain more than Germany by the adoption of such an international trade policy. He said that

that at the first appropriate opportunity he himself, in a public speech, would indicate Germany's intention to cooperate towards that end.

Insofar as the question of the limitation and reduction of armaments is concerned, Goering made to me very much the same statement as that made to me by Hitler the day before. He said that the armament race was ruining the economy of the entire world, and that no people could stand the strain much longer. He said that time and time again the German Government had offered in all sincerity to participate in any reasonable plan for disarmament, and time and time again her offers had been rejected. If peace came, Germany would enter into any practical plan which would make a real reduction of armaments possible.

Goering reverted to the British war objectives. He said that he was completely convinced that the British and French Governments were determined to destroy the German Régime, to subjugate the German people, and to split Germany into small units under military control. He said, "The English say that that is the way to get a lasting peace, because early in the 19th century, when Germany was a collection of small independent states, with an infinity of customs barriers, the Germans were only a race of musicians and poets. But they have never made a greater mistake. If they succeeded today in carrying out that plan, they would find, not a race of musicians and poets, but a horde of Bolsheviks and Communists."

At the end of our interview the Field Marshal said to me very simply, but with a great deal of feeling, "My Government is grateful to your Government for your mission. I fear that when you visit Paris and London you will realize that

that there is no hope for peace. You will there learn what I now know, and that is that the British and French Governments are determined to destroy Germany, and that no peace, except on that basis, will be considered by them. If there is any way of averting the war which I believe is inevitable, your Government will have accomplished the greatest thing which human beings could desire. From the bottom of my heart I wish you success."

Before I left Karinhall to return to Berlin, the Field Marshal escorted me through all the miles of rooms in the first floor of his house.

I have never seen so incredibly ugly a building. The walls are lined with paintings, some of them superb examples by old Italian and German masters, placed side by side with daubs by modern German painters. Many of the halls are filled with glass cases, in which are placed gold gifts that have been presented to the Field Marshal during recent years. Goering told me that he personally had arranged the placing of every object in the house.

BERLIN, Sunday, March 3, 1940.

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BERLIN, Sunday, March 3, 1940.

At ten o'clock, accompanied by officials of the German Foreign Office and by Dr. Schmidt, the official interpreter, I called upon Rudolf Hess, the Deputy to Hitler as head of the Nazi Party organization.

Hess received me in his offices in the party headquarters built in the modern German style, the walls being completely bare of molding or decoration of any kind.

Herr Hess bears the unmistakable appearance of being devoid of all but a very low order of intelligence. His forehead is low and narrow, and his deep-set eyes are very close together. He is noted for his dog-like devotion to Hitler. During our conversation he reverted again and again to the years when he was imprisoned with Hitler and of their service together in the Great War.

At the outset of our conversation, I outlined to him the nature of my mission and said that I would be glad to receive any views that he cared to express to me.

Herr Hess took out of his pocket a typewritten memorandum, in which were noted the points he had been obviously told to make in his talk with me. His exposition followed precisely the lines set forth by Ribbentrop in his talk with me, and there was no deviation from that outline other than a paragraph or two which related to Nazi Party organization. This was brought up in connection with Hess's statement to me that the German people were convinced that the war aims of the Allies were solely the destruction of Germany and of the German people, and that the German people stood as one man behind Hitler. Hess said that as active Head of the Nazi Party he was in a

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better position than anyone else to know what the real feeling of the German people was, since every district leader and every local leader under his jurisdiction was in turn in touch with the unit leaders, who were in hourly contact with the German masses, and that he could assure me that never before in the history of the Nazi Party had the German people themselves been more completely identified with their Fuehrer than at the present moment.

There is nothing to be gained from any detailed account of this conversation, which lasted about one hour. Hess was quite as vehement as Ribbentrop, and in his presentation of German objectives infinitely less temperate than Hitler himself. He closed the door completely to the possibility of any negotiated peace and stated flatly that in his judgment, as head of the Nazi Party, there was only one possibility for Germany to achieve a lasting peace, and that was through a German military victory.

It was so obvious that Hess was merely repeating what he had been told to say to me, and that he had neither himself reasoned about the problems at all nor thought anything out for himself, that I made no attempt to set forth any views of my own. At the conclusion of our interview I merely stated that I regretted to learn his opinion, that there now existed no hope of a lasting peace save through the force of arms.

BERLIN, March 3, 1940.

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BERLIN, March 3, 1940.

I had an interview with Dr. Schacht at the private house of Mr. Kirk upon my return to Berlin from my interview with Field Marshal Goering.

Dr. Schacht told me that he was grateful for my having requested the Foreign Office to arrange this interview with him, since, if I had not taken the step in that way, it would have been impossible for him to see me. He had taken the precaution, he said, to call the day before upon Hitler, whom he had not seen for many months, to ask whether he had Hitler's permission to talk with me. He said that Hitler had given him permission, but with the understanding that Dr. Schacht was to return to see Hitler the day following my departure, in order to relate to him the topics discussed in our conversation.

Dr. Schacht said: "I cannot write a letter, I cannot have a conversation, I cannot telephone, I cannot move, without its being known."

Then, leaning over and talking in a whisper, he said, "If what I am going to tell you now is known, I will be dead within a week." He gave me to understand that a movement was under way, headed by leading generals, to supplant the Hitler régime. He said that the one obstacle which stood in the path of the accomplishment of this objective was the lack of assurance on the part of these generals that, if such a movement took place, the Allies would give positive guarantees to Germany that Germany would be permitted to regain her rightful place in the world, and that Germany would not be treated as she had

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been in 1918. If such a guarantee as this could be obtained, he said, the movement would be pushed to a successful conclusion.

Dr. Schacht said that he was unable to mention any names and that he felt sure I would understand the reasons therefor. He said that he had been wanting to leave Germany, in order thus more readily to further this conspiracy, and that he was going to try to persuade Hitler, in his next conversation with him, to send him as Financial Adviser to the Embassy in Washington, or to permit him at least to go to Rome for the purpose of giving a series of lectures at the Royal Academy of Italy. He asked me if I could help him to secure an invitation from the Royal Academy in Rome for such a series of lectures.

I said that I feared it would be very difficult for me to intervene in such a delicate matter as this, but that it seemed to me that if he could persuade Hitler to let him go as Financial Adviser to the Embassy in Washington, he would not have to consider the trip to Rome of which he spoke.

Dr. Schacht said that another possibility was for him to be invited by some leading American university to give a series of lectures in the United States.

He wanted to know whether it would be possible for him to maintain some form of contact with me after my departure from Berlin. I told him that I would be glad to receive any message that he might care to send to me, and that if he would communicate such messages as he might have in mind orally to Mr. Heath, Secretary of the American Embassy, the latter would see that they were conveyed

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to me safely. Dr. Schacht said that every cable sent by the American Embassy in Berlin was immediately read by the German Foreign Office. I said that I was fully aware of that fact, and that we had various ways in which confidential messages could be transmitted to me from Berlin without their having to go by cable.

I asked Dr. Schacht whether he believed such a movement as that to which he had referred could successfully take place if an offensive were undertaken either by Germany or by the Allies. His reply was that if an offensive were undertaken, it would make it much more difficult, but that he believed the individuals sponsoring the movement were in such a position as to prevent the offensive from being undertaken by Germany, and that they would, in any event, be able to delay it for a considerable period.

Dr. Schacht said it would take a few months 'perhaps, even if no offensive took place, before the conspirators would be ready to take action.

Dr. Schacht referred to Hitler as the "greatest liar of all time", and as a genius, but an amoral, a criminal, genius. He said with much satisfaction that he himself was the only man who had ever dared tell him the truth.

Dr. Schacht further said that the atrocities being committed in Poland were so far worse than what was imagined, as to beggar description. People in Germany were only now beginning to know about them, and the reaction was intense.

At the end of our talk Dr. Schacht turned to me and asked

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asked very earnestly, "What do you think of me? Do you think I'm a 'terrible' person for working against my Government, when I'm a Minister in it?" I limited myself to replying that his reputation as a great financial and economic expert was world-wide, and that I could of course not undertake to question any course which he might determine to lay down for himself.

PARIS, March 7, 1940.

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PARIS, March 7, 1940.

As soon as I left the Elysée Palace I proceeded immediately to the Ministry of National Defense, where I was received at once by Prime Minister Daladier. My conversation with M. Daladier lasted just short of two hours and was exceedingly frank and entirely informal.

The Prime Minister first reminded me of a conversation I had had with him in the critical days of September 1938, and of all of the events which had taken place since that time.

M. Daladier desired me to express to the President the undying gratitude of himself personally, and of the French people, for the unfailingly sympathetic and understanding attitude taken by the President of the United States, and of their tremendous appreciation of the leadership displayed by the President which had resulted in the revision of the neutrality legislation of the United States. More than that, M. Daladier wanted me to say to the President that the repeated efforts of the President to prevent the outbreak of war, and to bring about that kind of a just settlement of European controversies which would make possible a just and permanent peace, involving security for all the nations of Europe, had, in the opinion of the French Government, been of the utmost value in bringing to the minds of men and women in Europe the moral issues involved.

I made it very clear to M. Daladier that my Government had at this juncture no proposals to proffer, much less any commitments to offer, but that the President

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had sent me to Europe in order to ascertain whether there was still any hope that a basis for the negotiation of a peace of the right kind could be found.

I said that in the few days I had been in Europe I had reached the conclusion that if an offensive were undertaken this Spring, and if a so-called "real war" broke out, there would not be the slightest possibility for some time to come of any peace through negotiation. I said I believed that the kind of war which would be waged would be such as not only to result in the destruction of the material resources of the nations involved, but also to result in the unloosing of human passions to such a degree as to bring with it a breakdown of most of the spiritual, social, and economic factors in the fabric of our modern civilization. It was clear to the Prime Minister, I said, that the Government of the United States realized that such a state of affairs as that which I had mentioned would inevitably have most intimate repercussions upon the social, political, financial and economic life of all of the neutral Powers, and particularly of the United States.

I said that I would be particularly grateful for the views which M. Daladier might express to me as to the possibilities for the negotiation now of a just and lasting peace, and that the views which he would give me would be entirely confidential and solely for communication to the President and Secretary Hull.

I said that he would recognize that for this very reason I was not in a position to comment upon, or to disclose, any of the views which had been communicated

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to me in Rome or in Berlin, but that I felt sure that I was violating no confidence when I said to him that I gained the very definite impression from my conversations with the Duce that the latter believed that there was still time for the establishment of such a peace, and that the Duce himself was disposed to do what he could to further that objective.

We then spoke for some moments upon the subject of Italian policy and the history of Franco-Italian relations since the Sanctions controversy of 1935. M. Daladier expressed the very positive belief that both British and French policy at that time had been unrealistic and in the highest degree unwise.

He said that in 1935 French policy towards Italy had been neither one thing nor the other. It had neither prevented the Italian Government from obtaining the raw materials it required in order to carry on successfully its war in Abyssinia, nor had it made possible the continuation of really friendly relations with Italy. Publicly France had said to Mussolini that Sanctions would be imposed for high moral reasons; privately France had said to Mussolini: "All of this is just for public consumption, and we will really let you get the oil and other supplies that you need." The result naturally had been to throw Italy into the arms of Germany, and M. Daladier expressed the very positive conviction that the mistake made by Great Britain and France in 1935 had been the direct cause of Mussolini's supporting the occupation by Hitler of the Rhineland, and acquiescing in the seizure of Austria. If from 1935 to 1938 the French and British had

had reached a realistic understanding with Mussolini, the calamities of the moment would in all likelihood have been prevented.

M. Daladier stated that he was entirely willing to concede to Mussolini the port of Djibouti, the French railroad in Abyssinia, and fair representation in the Suez Canal. He said that he had no objection whatever towards granting Italy the rights for her nationals in Tunisia which she had demanded, but that it was his own observation, after his recent visit to Tunis, that the 100,000 Italians living there were strongly anti-Fascist and not in the least desirous of obtaining the special rights demanded by the Italian Government.

On none of these points, he said, would there be the slightest difficulty with France; the real difficulty he thought was an adjustment between Italy and Great Britain. Mussolini was constantly complaining that Italy was "the prisoner of the Mediterranean", and that no Great Power could continue to agree to having British police at Gibraltar blocking one end of the Mediterranean, and the British and the French blocking her at Suez at the other end, and that furthermore the British fortifications at Malta and the French fortifications at Tunis constituted an ever-present threat to Italian security. M. Daladier trusted that the British would take a reasonable point of view with regard to these problems, although he could not concede that the Italian contention was in reality justified. He said that certainly the British fortification of Gibraltar and Malta was of no real danger to Italian security under modern conditions of warfare, and that he

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had the belief in the back of his own mind that Mussolini's ultimate objectives were territorial acquisitions by Italy in Northern Africa, primarily in Tunis at the expense of France, and that the limited objectives now stated by Italy were only a part of the whole picture.

He said that a year and a half ago he had been fully prepared to reach an immediate settlement with Italy, but that just at that juncture the Italian people had been deliberately stirred up to make public demands for Corsica, Nice, et cetera, in addition to the demands which France was prepared to concede, and that under those conditions no French Government could have survived politically if it had attempted to reach an agreement with Italy. During recent months he said the attitude of the Italian Government had been reasonable and moderate. The French economic arrangement with Italy was in general working out well, and none of the economic difficulties which had arisen between the British and Italians had so far arisen in the case of France and Italy.

I took occasion at this point to say that in all of my conversations in Rome I had never heard one word said by the Italian authorities which was in the slightest degree in the nature of any recrimination against France, and that my own observation had led me to the conclusion that whatever antagonism to France might have existed last year, there was no overt sign of such antagonism at the present moment.

I stated that it seemed to me that the Italian Government was now in a position where from the standpoint of the possibility of peace it occupied a singularly

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strategic place. I had gained the impression that the Italian Government believed that if a "real war" broke out its own position would become increasingly precarious with every week that passed. Its economic situation would become prejudiced because of the greatly increased difficulties under such conditions of obtaining the raw materials, such as coal, which were indispensable to its national economy. The military pressure which would undoubtedly be brought to bear upon Italy from one side or the other, or from both, would result in serious disquiet on the part of the Italian people, and it was therefore my judgment that Italy desired to do what she could to further peace, although of course always taking it for granted that in the negotiation of any agreement which might result in peace Italy would be out to get for herself everything that could be obtained.

M. Daladier then went on to a discussion of French peace objectives. He said that obviously neither France nor England could agree, from the political standpoint, to any peace which did not provide for the restoration of an independent Poland and for the independence of the Czech people. He said that in his own judgment there was every reason why the really German peoples of Central Europe should live under German rule, provided they so desired. The City of Danzig was clearly a German city, and it was equally obvious that the Germans of the Sudetenland or of Western Poland should be afforded the opportunity of uniting with the Reich if they so desired. That, he said, had been his point of view at the time of the Munich Agreement.

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But he emphasized that he did not believe at the time of Munich, and he did not believe now, that this one factor--the unity of the German peoples of Central Europe--was what the German people really desired, much less what their present leaders desired. He repeated to me how Hitler had said personally to him at Munich that the Czechs were an inferior people, and that Germany would never consent to defile the purity of the German race by incorporating Bohemia and Moravia in Greater Germany, and now of course Hitler had proved that the assurances given in that sense had been lies, knowingly uttered. He believed that the German Government had been following very intelligently a policy of ultimate domination of Europe and of the Near East. He was by no means sure that the ultimate ambitions did not go further. In any event, he said, the point had been reached where France could no longer submit to the kind of experience to which the present German regime was forcing Europe to submit, and France consequently must fight until she had gained actual security for herself.

He knew thoroughly well that the assurances continually uttered by Hitler, that he had forever renounced any aspirations upon Alsace-Lorraine, were as untruthful as the assurances he had earlier given with regard to Czechoslovakia, since he had absolute evidence that German propaganda agents long before the outbreak of war had been attempting to create the same kind of emotional stir among the German-speaking peoples in Alsace as that which had been created by German agents in 1938 in the Sudetenland. He said that he even had documents showing that

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that these German agents were instructed to follow exactly the same lines as those followed by Henlein in the Sudeten-land.

At this stage I interrupted to ask, with reference to the Prime Minister's statement that he believed that the German peoples of Central Europe had a right to unite, what his view might be with regard to the attitude of the Austrian people, so far as continued amalgamation with the German Reich was concerned. I told him that I had been frequently told that the majority of the Austrian people preferred continued amalgamation with the Reich to the kind of national semi-starvation which they had undergone during the twenty years following 1919.

M. Daladier replied that his own judgment was that if a fair plebiscite was held in Austria an overwhelming majority would indicate their desire to separate from the Reich, and possibly to amalgamate with some other country, such as Hungary, but that, from the standpoint of French policy, with regard to any possible peace basis, France would agree to a continued domination by Germany of Austria, if a really impartial plebiscite showed that the Austrian people so desired.

The Prime Minister made it very clear to me that he did not believe that political or territorial adjustment would create any insuperable difficulty in reaching peace. He made it equally clear that whatever he might say in public, he would not refuse to deal with the present German regime, but always upon one fundamental and essential basis, namely that France should thereby obtain

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actual practical, physical security, which would make it impossible for her again to find herself involved in war with Germany. I asked him what his views might be with regard to the machinery that might be created--machinery of an international character--that could afford such actual physical security.

M. Daladier said that the real problem was that the military forces of the opposing Powers were in some ways equivalent. Clearly disarmament was the only solution; and yet how could any actual step towards disarmament be undertaken by France or by England unless they were confident that Germany and Italy were in reality disarming at the same time? How could France have any confidence in any disarmament which Germany might allege she was undertaking, in view of the experience France had had during the post-War years, and especially during the latter portion of that period? (He referred to the period before Germany publicly announced that she was rearming.) The French military mission in Germany under General Nollet had been perfectly well aware that every time stocks of German armaments were destroyed, equivalent or greater stocks were being constructed secretly in other parts of Germany. He said it would seem as if only the neutral Powers could insure disarmament in Europe by means of the assumption by them of the responsibility for seeing that disarmament was actually undertaken, and this in the last analysis meant the possibility of the use of force by the neutral Powers. None of the European neutral Powers had any military strength whatever, and there was clearly only one neutral Power which had the military strength

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to assume such responsibility, and that was the United States.

I said that as he knew this was a field for conjecture outside of the strict limitations of my mission, but that I felt I would be remiss if I did not give him immediately my own personal feeling on this point, and that I believed I was entirely accurate in expressing the views of my own Government, and of the American people, when I said that the United States would not assume any responsibility of this character which implied as a potential obligation the utilization of American military strength in preserving the peace of Europe. I said that that determination on the part of the American people had been made clear time and again in the course of the history of American policy in the last twenty years.

On the other hand, I said, I thought that it was conceivable that if some practical plan for the gradual, progressive, reduction of armaments in Europe was agreed upon by the European Powers, and they desired to create commissions composed in part of neutral representatives in order to insure the faithful compliance with the reduction of armament agreements which might be reached, the Government of the United States in its desire to further a real and lasting peace in Europe, and in the world, might agree to the utilization of American citizens in such a capacity, but always with the clear understanding that the service of American citizens in such capacity did not involve in any sense an obligation on the part of the United States to see that the parties to such an agreement lived up to their obligations.

M. Daladier

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M. Daladier said that he thought aviation was the crux of the problem. He said that he thought it was entirely possible, as he himself had indicated in Geneva on earlier occasions, for an aviation force composed of units from the various European Powers to be set up, under some form of international authority, as a police power in Europe to insure the maintenance of peace, and the compliance by the various Powers with the commitments into which they might enter. He said he was confident that such a police force, if properly administered, would be sufficient to prevent any nation in Europe from undertaking aggressive action. He said that he could not believe that, with modern aviation being what it was, the threat which the utilization of such a police force would involve would not be sufficient to have prevented those European Powers which had pursued a policy of aggression in recent years from carrying out such acts of aggression, had such a police force existed.

He said that he further believed that a very clear distinction could be made, as President Roosevelt had indicated, between offensive and defensive categories in armaments. He said that he believed that security could be obtained by the destruction of all offensive types of armaments and the retention by the individual nations of only those categories of armaments which were clearly defensive in nature.

We discussed the nature of the authority which might be set up under international agreement and, while it did not seem to me that he had reached any precise or detailed views with regard thereto, he made it very clear to me that

that his mind was open on the subject and that if practical machinery of this kind could be worked out he would favor it as the basis for French security in the future. Our conversation on this subject was premised upon the continuing mobilization of the Powers now in conflict until the first practical steps had been taken to carry out such a disarmament scheme, with progressive demobilization over a considerable period of time.

The Prime Minister then went back to his experiences at Munich and to a discussion of the personality of Hitler. He said that during the Munich meetings Hitler had been intolerant, and intolerable, for long periods during the discussions, and then would suddenly change completely and become moderate and conciliatory in his manner. He spoke with real appreciation of the efforts of Mussolini at that time, and of the fact that it had been Mussolini time and again during the Munich conferences who had brought Hitler back to a more reasonable point of view. He spoke with contempt of Ribbentrop, and with great antipathy, but of a different kind, for Goering, although he expressed the belief that the substitution of Hitler by Goering would not in any real sense change the present character of the regime in Germany.

The Prime Minister had asked me to dine with him at the Quai d'Orsay at 8:30, with three or four members of the Government, and I therefore left him at this point in our conversation since the hour for dinner had nearly arrived.

Before dinner I made a brief call of courtesy on

M. Champetier

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M. Champetier de Riba, the Under Secretary of Foreign Relations, who said nothing of interest beyond expressing his gratification that the President had designated a special representative to the Vatican, and beyond emphasizing his own belief that this recognition by the President of the United States of the moral force of the Church was of real practical value in the present world situation.

I also spent a quarter of an hour in conversation with M. Alexis Léger, the Secretary General of the French Foreign Office. M. Léger, whose mind is typical of that kind of French mentality which is logical, and mathematically precise, and very clear, but which makes no allowances for the imponderables of human nature such as human emotion, devoted himself to a discussion of French relations with Italy. To M. Léger the fault throughout had been on the side of the Italians, and French policy had been correct from beginning to end. It was very clear that on this question he differed entirely from M. Daladier, and I gained the impression that the latter had complained of the results of the policy toward Italy which the French Foreign Office had been carrying on. M. Léger also informed me that the French Government had ready at Brest, waiting to sail, a number of French vessels sufficient to transport 50,000 French troops to Finland by way of Norway and Sweden, but that up to the present moment the French Government had been unable to persuade the Government of Finland to request officially the sending of this military assistance by France. M. Léger told me that the Government of Sweden had informed the French Government, and also the Government of Finland, that

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that if these troops were sent over Swedish territory the Swedes would destroy the railroad lines so as to make it impossible for the troops to reach Finland, and that it had been this attitude on the part of Sweden, in addition to the fear on the part of Finland of German intervention on the side of Russia, which had caused the unwillingness of Finland to ask for such assistance.

The Prime Minister had me to dinner with MM. Chautemps, Bonnet, Léger, Champetier de Ribes, and Coulondre. The conversation both at dinner and after dinner was of no particular significance except for the graphic details given by the Prime Minister of his expedition to Munich in September 1938 and except for the discussion of Franco-Italian relations. The Prime Minister made it very clear, and with the open assent of MM. Chautemps and Bonnet, that if a general peace settlement could be reached France would agree to sell the Abyssinian railroad to Italy, concede the Port of Djibouti to Italy, give Italy fair proportionate representation on the Board of the Suez Canal, and to give Italy the rights requested with regard to Italians resident in Tunis. My conversation with the Prime Minister in the afternoon had evidently brought relations with Italy to the forefront of his mind, since he instructed Léger in my presence and in the most categorical manner to see to it that every possible consideration was given from now on to the sensibilities of both Mussolini and Ciano, quite apart from the taking of a conciliatory attitude with regard to any negotiations that might be in progress, or which might be later undertaken, between the two Governments.

PARIS, March 7, 1940.

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PARIS, March 7, 1940.

I was received by President Lebrun at the Elysée Palace at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of March 7. The American Chargé d'Affaires accompanied me, as he did to all my interviews with the members of the French Government at my particular request.

President Lebrun greeted me with the utmost cordiality, and I outlined to him the nature of my mission and emphasized the confidential character of any views he might care to give me.

The President read to me the text of the message which he had addressed in November to the Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians indicating the nature of the peace which the French Government regarded as being indispensable. He emphasized the words "a durable and just peace" and the insistence of France that no peace could be made unless France obtained thereby complete guarantees of security for the future.

I said to the President that the President of the United States had especially charged me to make it clear that the Government of the United States was not interested in the possibility of any temporary or precarious peace, but solely in the possibility which might today exist of finding the basis for a peace based on justice and security. I said that in this regard the views of my Government corresponded very exactly to the views already enunciated by the French Government, although I desired to make it clear that at this stage my Government had no suggestions or proposals to offer.

President

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President Lebrun then launched into an historic dissertation covering the sixty-nine years of his life. He spoke of his having been born in a French province adjacent to the German border, and of his earliest recollections being memories of German officers and troops occupying that portion of France. The gist of the argument was the argument which has been so frequently set forth, and which is today being so frequently set forth-- and with so much reason--by French statesmen, namely that the oldest generation of Frenchmen living today has seen three wars involving France, brought about as the result of German policy, and that it is the vital need of France to assure herself that at least one generation of Frenchmen can be born to live a normal span of life, and die, without having seen their country involved in war as the result of German aggression.

There was nothing in the slightest degree significant in any of the details mentioned by the President, and his memory is evidently failing rapidly, because it seemed to be impossible for him to remember with any accuracy names or dates, or even facts.

At the end of our interview he asked me to convey his most friendly personal greetings to the President; he spoke of the deep appreciation of his wife for the courtesies shown her when she visited the United States some years ago, and of his great regret that he himself would be unable to visit the United States this coming summer as he had planned. He said that he had done his utmost to prevent his own re-election to the Presidency, but that, in view of the critical situation in Europe,

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he had been forced to accede to the insistent demand of the French political leaders for his re-election. He then took me upon a tour of the Elysée Palace--being absolutely unable to remember the name of the subjects of any of the portraits which he pointed out to me--and we then spent some ten minutes before the photographers.

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PARIS, March 8, 1940.

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PARIS, March 8, 1940.

I first visited Senator Jeanneney, the President of the Senate. The Senator received me in his official residence overlooking the Luxembourg Gardens. He has now reached the age of seventy-seven, and he prefaced our conversation by calling my attention to the fact that the bust of Clemenceau was on the chest of drawers above his head. He said to me that Clemenceau had been the dominating influence in his life.

The Senator told me that he, like President Lebrun, came from a French province adjacent to Germany, and that his earliest recollections had to do with the German military occupation of the village where he was born. He reminded me that since that time as a result of German policy France had been plunged into two new wars, and he assured me that the sentiment of the French Senate was unanimous in favoring a continuation of the present war until Germany was defeated, and until Germany had been taught such a lesson as to make it impossible for the German people ever again to bring about a European conflagration.

It seemed to me, as I listened to the Senator, that I was hearing the voice of Clemenceau himself: "There is only one way in which to deal with a mad dog. Either kill him, or chain him with steel chains which cannot be broken."

I next visited M. Herriot, President of the Chamber of Deputies. M. Herriot spoke with the deepest admiration for the President, and with much appreciation of his visit

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to Washington in 1933.

He then delivered to me an address which lasted well over an hour, and which was beautifully phrased and highly emotional in character. The gist of the address was that his entire life, during the past twenty years, had been devoted to the attempt to lay the foundations for a real and lasting friendship and understanding between the German and French peoples; that time and again his efforts had failed; that time and again German statesmen like Stresemann and Marx had lied to him, and had deceived him, and that he had reached the positive conviction that the German people were themselves the cause of the present situation, and not their leaders alone. He told me that when he had visited London in 1924 in order to meet the members of the German Government who were then visiting England upon the invitation of Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister, Stresemann in a secret meeting with Herriot had done his utmost to persuade the latter to enter into an alliance with Germany to the exclusion of England. Herriot said that he had rejected the proposal in no uncertain terms.

Insofar as the present situation was concerned, M. Herriot saw no solution other than a military victory by France. He told me that the result of a "real war" would be devastating, that French economy would be in ruins for many decades to come, and that he believed that as a result of the war the social and economic structure of Europe would be completely changed. He was utterly pessimistic, completely without hope, and without an iota of any constructive suggestion or proposal with regard to the possibility of any lasting peace at this time.

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In the afternoon I had separate interviews of approximately two hours each with MM. Chautemps and Bonnet. In my conversation with the former, M. Chautemps indicated an entirely receptive attitude towards the possibility of the negotiation of a peace with the present Government of Germany, provided that the political terms of such a peace agreement included the reconstitution of Poland, the independence of Bohemia and Moravia, and the independence of Austria. He insisted that the Austrian people desired their liberty and independence, and that no plebiscite was either necessary or expedient. With regard to the possibility of obtaining security for France through an international agreement for the destruction of offensive armaments, and for the maintenance of an international police power, he said that his mind was entirely open and that if some practicable plan could be devised which would give real security to France he, personally, would strongly recommend the entrance upon negotiations of that character rather than a continuation of the war.

We talked at some length upon the economic features of a lasting peace, and he assured me that his own belief was that in the interests of France herself France should adopt the liberal policy supported by the United States.

In my conversation with M. Bonnet, the latter gave me a detailed account of the history of negotiations between Germany and France since September 1938. There was nothing of any importance in his relation beyond an account of correspondence and conversations already published in the French Yellow Book. He insisted upon it that when Ribbentrop came to Paris early in December of

1938,

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1938, and the question of French policy in Eastern Europe had come up for ventilation, he had never directly or indirectly given Germany any assurances that France would wash her hands with regard to the fate of Poland [as Goering in Berlin had assured me had been the case]. M. Bonnet said that the only statement he had made to Ribbentrop in that connection had been that the French Government signed the Pact of Non-aggression with Germany with the sole reservation that the Non-aggression Pact should not be construed as impairing France's obligations under her two then-existing treaties of alliance, namely those with Soviet Russia and with Poland. M. Bonnet told me that Ribbentrop had stated in reply to the above declaration of the French Minister that the French reservation in regard to Poland could in no sense be regarded as prejudicial to Germany by the German Government, inasmuch as Germany herself then had a pact of non-aggression with Poland, and inasmuch as the German Government believed that relations between Germany and Poland would be increasingly friendly during the next four or five years. M. Bonnet said that Ribbentrop with regard to this question had lied brazenly and directly, and that in the official documents covering that period which had already been made public he had attempted to set forth the facts as they really were.

M. Bonnet spoke at some length of the situation with regard to the French Labor Unions, and assured me that Labor in France was cooperating solidly with the Government, and that in that sense the situation was far more satisfactory in France than had been the situation in 1914-18.

SAFE FILE: Welles Report, 1940 Part II

PARIS, March 9, 1940.

I had an hour's interview with M. Paul Reynaud, the French Secretary of the Treasury, and afterwards had lunch with him alone in his office in the Louvre, which occupies the former bedroom of the Prince Imperial, and which overlooks the Tuileries Gardens and the Champs Elysées.

In my judgment M. Paul Reynaud has a greater grasp of Foreign Relations, and has a keener mind, than any other member of the present French Government.

I first touched upon economic questions, and emphasized my hope that the French monopoly would continue its purchases of American tobacco, and that the French Government would continue to buy as many agricultural supplies as might be possible in the United States.

M. Reynaud told me bluntly that the situation of the French Government was fast reaching the point where it would have to utilize all of the foreign exchange it obtained in the purchase of armament constructed in the United States, and that consequently purchases of non-essentials like tobacco, et cetera, could not be undertaken on any considerable scale by the French authorities. He said that he fully realized the international significance of this decision, and the distress which would be occasioned our American producers, but that in a time of grave crisis such as this he saw no other way out of the difficulty.

I said to the Minister that as he undoubtedly knew my Government had been in contact with other neutral Governments during recent weeks, with the hope that these

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diplomatic interchanges might result on the part of the neutrals in a crystallization and coincidence of views with regard to the after-war problems of the limitation and reduction of armaments, and the creation of a liberal international economic system. I said to the Minister that I had brought with me in memorandum form the outline of the views of my Government with regard to the latter problem, and that I would very gladly have him read this memorandum. The Minister read it, and expressed emphatic acquiescence in all of its details. I then said to the Minister that if the principles so laid down were supported by the French Government, I believed it would be of the utmost importance that the policy of the French Government in such regard, insofar as the post-war period is concerned, be made known to the public. He immediately adopted the suggestion, said he would dictate a few sentences expressing the adherence of the French Government to the principles so outlined, and said that he would issue a communiqué to the Press in those terms before the end of the day. This he subsequently did.

During our conversation in his office, and at lunch, the Minister discussed in an exceedingly temperate, moderate and constructive fashion the present situation, the problems created by the actions of Germany in the past three or four years, and the post-war settlements which would arise after the war.

He said that he was rightly regarded as the "hardest" man in the French Government with regard to French relations with Germany. He added that in September 1938, as

I undoubtedly remembered from a conversation I had had with him at that time, he had believed that France should declare war upon Germany in order to save Czechoslovakia, and that he was convinced that if France had done so at that time, England would have been forced into the war on the side of France. Munich had been a cardinal error in French and British policy.

But that was past history. His well-known sentiments on this subject, and on the general subject of Franco-German relations, made it easier for him to follow an objective policy now.

He stated to me quite plainly that he believed the political and territorial issues now at stake could be solved without any considerable difficulty through negotiations between the Allies and Germany. He stated that the real problem was the problem of how France could obtain security and insure herself against a repetition of German aggression. He said that if a practical scheme could be devised, upon the basis of an international air force as a police power, and the abolition of all categories of offensive armament, he would support such a negotiation, believing it to be infinitely more in the interests of the French people than the continuation of the present war, with the probable economic and social havoc and ruin which would result, quite apart from the inevitable losses in life and property.

M. Paul Reynaud spoke with deep appreciation of the cooperation shown the French Treasury by the American Treasury Department. He especially asked that I convey his gratitude to Secretary Morgenthau.

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Paris, March 9, 1940.

I called upon General Sikorski and upon M. Zaleski, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the recently constituted Polish Government.

General Sikorski impressed me as a man of character, of integrity, and of patriotism, but as being without any particular intellectual ability. His conversation was devoted entirely to an account of the recent atrocities committed in Poland by the Germans, and to the emphatic expression of his belief that if Poland had mobilized last August forty-eight hours before she actually did, Germany would never have been able to be victorious.

M. Zaleski handed me a written memorandum containing his views as to the present European situation and as to the situation of the Polish people. There was nothing really significant in my conversation with him. I inquired about the report I had received to the effect that Colonel Beck had reached a detailed agreement with Hitler at Berchtesgaden in January 1939, covering the restoration of Danzig to Germany, and the granting of extraterritorial communications to Germany between Greater Germany and Eastern Prussia. M. Zaleski assured me that no such detailed agreement had ever been reached, but that it was true that when Beck's interview with Hitler at that time terminated, Beck had said to Hitler that he believed the solution of this problem would not create any real difficulty between the Polish and German Governments.

M. Zaleski seemed profoundly pessimistic with regard to the present situation in Europe, and appeared to share none of General Sikorski's optimism as to the eventual victory of the Allied armies.

LONDON, March 11, 1940.

The Ambassador accompanied me at 3:30 p.m. to the Foreign Office, where I was received immediately by Lord Halifax.

Lord Halifax is exactly like his photographs: exceedingly tall, gangling, and with a rather inchoate face. But one cannot be with him for more than a few minutes before one is impressed with his innate sincerity, with the strength of his determination to pursue "the right", as he sees it; with his essential "goodness". One can question the ability of his intellect to cope with the more devious processes of other minds, or the breadth of his insight into the problems of the present world situation; but not, I think, his quality of "character".

The conversation began with very few preliminaries. I outlined to the Foreign Secretary the scope of my instructions, and made it particularly clear that I was not carrying with me any proposal, and that all that I was looking for on behalf of the President was the possibility at this juncture of the establishment of any real and lasting peace.

Lord Halifax reviewed the history of the past year and a half since Munich. He related in great detail the efforts of Mr. Chamberlain and of himself to adopt towards Germany a policy of conciliatory justice, with recognition by Great Britain of the legitimate right of Germany to economic benefits in Central and Eastern Europe, and with full willingness to concede that Germans under other jurisdictions in Central Europe should, if they so desired, be afforded the opportunity of living under the German Reich. He reminded me that every step taken by Great Britain in that direction has resulted not only in new and more far-reaching demands

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by Hitler, but also, what was far more intolerable, in the utter disregard by Hitler of the solemn agreements into which he had entered. He said that no international society in which powerful nations went back on their pledged word was a society which could long survive, unless one were willing to admit that physical force should be the determining factor in modern civilization - that, the British Government, he said, and likewise the United States Government, he felt sure, could not concede.

He gave me a very careful account of the statements made by the British Government to Hitler in August, 1939, to convince me that Chamberlain had made it completely clear to Hitler that the British were willing to favor a negotiation between Poland and Germany of the Danzig and German minority issues, but that if Germany invaded Poland Great Britain would fight. Whatever Ribbentrop may have told Hitler, Lord Halifax said, Hitler Must have known beyond the shadow of a doubt that German invasion of Poland meant a general European War.

Lord Halifax mentioned his own journeys to Germany in recent years, and his conferences with Hitler and with Goering in the hope that personal contacts and explanations might help to solve the problem.

In summary, his conviction was, he said, that no lasting peace could be made in Europe so long as the Nazi régime dominated Germany, and controlled German policy. Peace could not be made except on the basis of confidence, and what confidence could be placed in the pledged word of a Government that was pursuing a policy of open and brutal aggression, and that had repeatedly and openly violated its solemn contractual obligations?

I said that it seemed to me that the issue he raised was necessarily a fundamental issue, but that it occurred to me that there were other vital and basic issues to be explored in the present situation as well. I said that it seemed to me that the question Lord Halifax had raised had to do squarely with the question of security, but that under existing conditions I wondered whether it would be possible for any Government, or any people, to believe that the millennium had come and place complete confidence in the good faith of even a completely new government of Germany, or for that matter, of many other governments, so long as present armaments continued, and so long as every great nation had it within its power overnight to destroy civilian populations, to slaughter women and children, and to ruin industrial production. I wondered, I said, whether disarmament was not the real key to the problem, because it seemed to me that a real disarmament must tend towards the reestablishment of confidence, and towards the rebuilding of economic security which in turn always made less likely the urge towards military conquest.

At this stage the conversation ended because the King and Queen had invited the Ambassador and myself to tea at Buckingham Palace at half past four.

Lord Halifax said that the Prime Minister was expecting me at six. He said that if I preferred to see Mr. Chamberlain alone he would of course quite understand, and would not be present at the interview. I replied that, on the contrary, I particularly hoped that Lord Halifax would be present at my conference with Mr. Chamberlain.

LONDON, March 11, 1940.

The Prime Minister received the Ambassador and myself in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street at 6 p.m. Lord Halifax came in shortly afterwards.

The Cabinet Room, which runs across the back of the house on the ground floor, is considerably smaller than the Cabinet Room in the White House. A green ~~blaze~~ table almost fills it. The windows look out upon the Park.

Mr. Chamberlain was sitting alone at his place at the Cabinet table when we were shown in. He is one man who does not in the least look like his photographs. He is spare, but gives the impression of physical strength, and he seems much younger than his 71 years. His hair is dark, except for a strand of completely white hair across his forehead. In conversation one obtains none of the "puzzled hen" effect of which one hears so much, and which photographs emphasize. The dominating features are a pair of large, very dark and piercing eyes, and a low and incisive voice.

Mr. Chamberlain read the President's letter which I at once handed him. I said that he was already fully informed of the nature and limitations of my mission, but that I wished to say to him, as I had to Lord Halifax, that I had no suggestions nor proposals to offer. As he had seen from the President's letter, I was here to listen and not to talk, and that I would be most grateful for any information he would give me, and for any views he might care to express, for the President's knowledge, as to the possibility at this stage of any negotiation of a real and lasting peace.

Mr. Chamberlain

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then said, "You are probably right. And that is a problem we here have got to think more about. But I can't think now what the solution may be. It makes more than ever clear in my own mind the truth of what your President has said, that one of the essentials to a lasting peace is freedom of information."

He then went on to say that we might take as a premise the positive assurance that England had no intention of destroying the German people, nor of impairing the integrity of the German Reich. England however could not in the first place consider the possibility of peace unless Germany was forced to restore complete independence to the Polish people, and reconstitute a free and independent "Czechia". Germany must furthermore cease to be a continuing menace to the political and economic security of the other smaller nations of Europe.

He continued by stating that Lord Halifax had given me the full details of his own efforts to maintain peace by making every possible concession to Germany during the past two years. He had been deceived. He had been lied to. It was clear that Hitler did not desire a peaceful Europe founded upon a structure of justice and reason, but a Europe dominated by German Hitlerism. England had been forced into war as the last resort in order to preserve the institutions of liberty and of democracy which were threatened with extinction.

Mr. Chamberlain said flatly that so long as the present Government of Germany continued there could be no hope of any real peace. You could not envisage a peace between the great powers of Europe, when no one anywhere in the

world

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world could have any faith in the word of the Government of one of those powers. Mr. Chamberlain by this time spoke with a white-hot anger. It was very apparent that this particular issue had a deeply personal response from his individual emotions.

After a further pause, he went on to speak of his experiences at the time of Munich. He said that no Government in England could continue to receive popular support if it entered into any negotiations with the Hitler régime.

He then said that from what Lord Halifax had told him of our talk he agreed with what he understood was my own feeling that the key to the problem of today was the question of disarmament. But he said "I do not believe you can achieve real disarmament until you can reestablish confidence. You cannot obtain confidence until the German people show that they wish a real peace by changing their present government."

I said to Mr. Chamberlain that if he would forgive my apparent levity, the issue he presented reminded me a good deal of the old conundrum as to which came first, the hen or the egg. He spoke of disarmament being impossible until confidence in Europe was reestablished. I for one could not begin to see how any nation could have real confidence until disarmament had actually in great part taken place, and at least until certain types of offensive armaments had been abolished, and particularly bombing airplanes. I could not help but feel that the problem of physical and national security must be solved before the atmosphere could become propitious for the growth of that very tender plant, confidence.

Mr. Chamberlain

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Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax both laughed. The former said that he was struck by what I said, and that he believed with me that the way to attack the disarmament problem, when the moment came was from the qualitative approach, rather than from the quantitative approach.

He then said "What exactly is your proposal?

I replied that, as I had already made very clear, I had no proposal. I said I was merely exchanging views in order to try and get as clear a knowledge as I possibly could of his point of view and that of his Government. The main issue I thought was security. I could conceive of a situation where the great powers of Europe could agree upon a practical basis for actual and progressive disarmament. It would possibly have to envisage the control by some international commission, or commissions, of the actual destruction of agreed-upon categories of offensive armaments, and of the factories where they were manufactured, with full rights of inspection and determination. It might further perhaps include the constitution of a regional aviation police-force, divided, for reasons of practical expediency, into several units with bases in various of the smaller neutral European countries. All of this obviously implied limitation of sovereignty. I stated that this was a subject upon which I was not authorized to speak; upon which I had no expert knowledge, and upon which I consequently did not wish to dwell. And it was of course a problem which directly concerned the European powers, and in which the United States very definitely had no direct part to play. The general thoughts I had expressed were the result of conversations I had had during recent months with

LONDON, March 11, 1940.

I dined with Lord Halifax in his apartment at the Dorchester Hotel. He had to meet me the Marquess of Crewe, for half a century a prominent leader in the Liberal Party; Lord Snell, the leader of the Labor Party in the House of Lords; Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for the Dominions; Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for War; Sir John Anderson, Minister for Civilian Defense; Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office.

At dinner Lord Halifax asked me confidentially to remember always in my conversations with the Prime Minister that Mr. Chamberlain had undergone the most harrowing human experience of which a statesman could conceive as a result of the Munich episode, and that as a result his point of view was necessarily affected in all that related to British policy towards Germany, and in particular towards the members of the present German Government.

After dinner, to my amazement, Lord Halifax conducted a seminar. He placed me opposite to him in the drawing-room, and ranged all of his guests facing me. He said that he would call upon them all so that they might freely express to me their views of the present situation, and of the possibility of the reestablishment of peace in Europe.

Lord Crewe was the first to speak. He said that he thought I should realize that feeling in England today was far more bitter towards the German people than it had been at any time during the Great War. This remark threw a good deal of consternation into some of the other guests, and Lord Halifax hurriedly interrupted to say that he thought there might be some divergence of opinion on that point,


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speech, and of information - would inevitably be destroyed; that men and women would become no better than slaves, and that for that reason, deeply opposed as they were to war, and hard as they had fought to avert it, they were supporting a Government which they would necessarily oppose on all other issues.

As the party broke up Sir John Anderson, the Minister for Civilian Defense, who had not spoken all evening, took me by the arm, and said, "Please do not for one instant believe that most of us agree with the opinions you have heard expressed tonight. I can assure you we do not."

LONDON, March 12, 1940.



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been listened to, and now the crisis once more was upon them. There could be no solution other than outright and complete defeat of Germany; the destruction of National Socialism, and the determination in the new Peace Treaty of dispositions which would control Germany's course in the future in such a way as to give Europe, and the World, peace and security for 100 years. Austria must be reconstituted, Poland and Czechoslovakia re-created, and Central Europe made free of German hegemony. Russia, to him, offered no real menace and no real problem.

At the conclusion of the address--in the course of which he became quite sober--Mr. Churchill showed me the charts he had upon his desk, which showed the amount of British merchant tonnage destroyed during the war, and the manner of destruction, whether by submarine, mine, warship or airplane. According to the figures he showed me, out of a claimed total of some 18,000,000 ton's of British shipping of all classes, some 770,000 tons had been sunk. The greatest percentage of losses was due to mines. Of the 770,000 tons of losses since the war, 550,000 tons were offset by new construction since the outbreak of the war, and by captured German merchant ships. The net loss consequently was about 220,000 tons.

Mr. Churchill told me that the convoy system was now functioning perfectly, and that British daily exports and imports were precisely at the normal daily level. England was furthermore daily receiving the required 1,500,000 tons of supplies by sea.

Mr. Churchill said that the German magnetic mines had been completely defeated. His naval experts had found

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of extraordinary efficiency, and I assume one of the reasons why British shipping losses have not been more severe.

Mr. Churchill expressed his deep regret that the President himself could not see this room, since he knew how interested he would be in the systems of protection for shipping which had been devised.

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